dreaken1993 Posted May 12, 2009 Share Posted May 12, 2009 im just saying that there are many high up people saying the world is overpopuilated and trying to put in the publics minds that thats the truth and i think that if the govt wants more control they will kill off people but most likely they will use a virus to do that, or nuke, or world war 3, Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ink face Posted May 12, 2009 Share Posted May 12, 2009 i woke up with a scratchy throat and runny nose today, i'm gonna die now right?:rolleyes: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
dreaken1993 Posted May 13, 2009 Share Posted May 13, 2009 yeah you better take some mercury and aids infected vaccines Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Street Terror Posted May 13, 2009 Share Posted May 13, 2009 SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
lord_casek Posted May 15, 2009 Share Posted May 15, 2009 cia uses swine fever on cuba http://www.maebrussell.com/Health/CIA%20Pig%20Virus.html Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
christo-f Posted May 15, 2009 Share Posted May 15, 2009 Fema death camps, govt control, depopulation..... Ok, I think I'm done on this thread. Catch y'all when the next war starts or major terror attacks hit. Till then, you guys stay loony now, ya hear! Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
2342 Posted May 17, 2009 Share Posted May 17, 2009 INFLUENZA A (H1N1) - WORLDWIDE (31) *********************************** New H1N1 rumour A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> In this update: [1] New H1N1 rumour [2] Estimation of R [3] Source of novel H1N1 ****** [1] New H1N1 rumour Date: Fri 15 May 2009 Source: Swine Flu Archives, ScienceInsider, Science [edited] <http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/swine-flu> A New, New H1N1 in Mexico? -------------------------- This odd exchange took place at today's press conference with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): David Brown, The Washington Post: There's a report that there is yet another new H1N1 virus that has been found in the states of Durango, Zacatecas, and Jalisco that is distinct from both this swine H1N1 and the seasonal Brisbane H1N1. Have you heard of this and can you tell us anything about this? Daniel Jernigan, CDC's deputy director of influenza division: We've heard of some reports about that, but I've not had any direct information about the specifics of that case. There's ongoing dialog between us and the folks that are in Mexico, and as we know more about that, we'll be able to let people know. ScienceInsider is investigating but has yet to learn anything substantive. It was aired in a public venue, though, and likely will receive media attention, regardless of whether it turns out to be false. "We heard a rumor but think it may be a misinterpretation of some lab data by a non-lab person," Nancy Cox, head of CDC's influenza division, tells ScienceInsider. "We are following up." [byline: Jon Cohen] -- communicated by: Kunihiko Iizuka <edcvfr3464@yahoo.co.jp> ****** [2] Date: Thu 14 May 2009 Source: Eurosurveillance, Volume 14, Issue 19, 14 May 2009 [edited] <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19212> Why are Mexican data important? ------------------------------- This issue of Eurosurveillance contains an article by a French team on the transmission of the new influenza A(H1N1) in Mexico, which uses published figures from the outbreak to estimate important parameters for transmission, among them the reproduction rate, R (1). Such studies may have important implications for public health action in Europe. [This article has been reproduced previously in ProMED-mail; see Part [3], Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (29) 20090515.1824] What is R? ---------- The growth rate of an epidemic is determined by 2 factors: the number of new persons infected by each case and the time from start of infectiousness in one case to start of infectiousness in the secondary cases caused by him/her. The 1st factor is called "reproduction rate" and is usually denoted R. If the disease is spreading in a population that is totally susceptible the term "basic reproduction rate" (Ro) is used. R is the product of four terms: the risk of transmission in one single contact between an infectious and a susceptible person, the frequency of such contacts in the population, the duration of infectivity of a case, and the proportion of susceptibles in the population. If R is greater than 1 this means that each case infects more than one new person, and the outbreak is likely to continue. If R is less than 1 the outbreak will eventually die out, even if there may be a number of cases before that. The time from infectiousness in one case to infectiousness in his/her secondary cases is called "generation time" (Tg) and is basically a biological constant, even if its exact value depends on how it is estimated. Values for the factors that determine R can be calculated on the basis of scientific knowledge of the disease, its context of transmission, and the immunity status of the population. However, during an epidemic an R value usually has to be derived from the analysis of the epidemic curve or by the study of transmission chains. Several studies have now tried to estimate R (or Ro) and Tg for the new influenza A(H1N1) virus from Mexican data. In the one published in this issue of Eurosurveillance [1], the authors use one exponential fitting and one real-time estimation model to arrive at an estimate of R between 2.2 and 3.1. This is higher than the value found in an article in Science [2], which estimated Ro to be 1.4-1.6 using 3 models: one exponential fitting, one genetic analysis, and 2 standard SIR models for a confined outbreak in La Gloria. Another analysis of the minor genetic changes in the virus over time arrived at a Ro estimate of 1.16 [3]. Why is Ro important in public health? ------------------------------------- The reproduction rate reflects effectiveness of transmission, and therefore has important implications for the efforts that public health authorities would have to make in implementing health measures aiming at containing or mitigating the outbreak. For example, with a Ro of 1.16, preventing 14 per cent of cases will result in eventually interrupting transmission, while with a Ro of 3.1, preventing 68 per cent cases would be needed -- assuming a total random mixing of contacts in the population. Why are Ro estimates so different for influenza? ------------------------------------------------ A few studies have tried to measure Ro for seasonal influenza [4], and found it to be in the order of 1.2 to 1.4. However, for most of the seasonal strains, there is already some immunity in the population from past seasons, which lowers the reproduction rate (and it should thus really not be called Ro in this situation). For any epidemic of a disease that leads to immunity after infection the initial Ro will also be higher than the actual R at any later stage, since the proportion still susceptible in the population will decrease. It should also be realised that delayed reporting of cases will affect an estimate of R; a problem that adheres to the study in this issue and the others cited above. What influences Ro? ------------------- The risk of transmission in a contact when an infective meets a susceptible is basically a biological constant (even if it varies over the time course of the infection), as is the duration of infectiveness. However, frequency of contacts varies considerably between populations and population groups. For example, among children in schools or day care, the contact frequency is higher than among adults [5], and it also varies by culture, by family size in a society, by types of social interaction, etc. Why is the Ro from Mexico important? ------------------------------------ One could question why there is so much interest around studies of R and Ro based on Mexican data. Would they apply to Europe? One could guess that contact density might be higher in a Mexican setting, but on the other hand, since the epidemic has already run its course for some time there, the proportion of non-susceptibles would be higher in Mexico and the European situation would more approach a "true" (higher) Ro, with a totally susceptible population. In a graph [not reproduced here] of the daily reported cumulative number of cases in Mexico, Canada, US and EU/EFTA countries, outbreak of new influenza A(H1N1), April-May 2009, we have just compared the daily reported cumulative number of cases in Mexico, Canada, United States, and European Union and European Free Trade Association (EU / EFTA) countries. On a semi-logarithmic scale it is evident that the slope for Europe is very much the same as for Mexico. It is difficult to estimate the time lag for Europe, but it seems that we are some 1-2 months behind. If the generation times are the same for both epidemics -- which seems highly plausible ***--then an estimate of Ro for Mexico would apply also to Europe. A Ro just above 1 could mean that a containment strategy might be successful. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) is continuously monitoring the situation and with more data being available every day in Europe we will obviously be able to have a better picture here soon as well. Nevertheless, the similarities of the shapes of the epidemics indicate that lessons from Mexico could apply also to Europe. References ---------- 1. Boelle PY, Bernillon P, Desenclos JC. A preliminary estimation of the reproduction ratio for new influenza A(H1N1) from the outbreak in Mexico, March-April 2009. Euro Surveill 2009; 14(19): pii=19205. Available from: <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19205> 2. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchelmes S, Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD, Hollingsworth TD, et al. Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early findings. Published 11 May 2009 on Science Express. DOI: 10.1126/science.1176062. Available from: <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/1176062> 3. Rambaut A. Human/Swine A/H1N1 flu outbreak - BEAST analysis. Available from: <http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/groups/influenza/wiki/178c5/BEAST_Analysis_29_Apr_2008_-_Andrew_Rambaut.html> 4. Chowell G, Miller MA, Viboud C. Seasonal influenza in the United States, France, and Australia: transmission and prospects for control. Epidemiol Infect 2008; 136(6): 852-64. 5. Keeling MJ, Eames KT. Networks and epidemic models. J R Soc Interface 2005; 2(4): 295-307. [byline: D Coulombier and J Giesecke At: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden] -- communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [3] Date: Sat 9 May 2009 Source: The Veterinary Record, May 9 2009 [abbreviated and edited] <http://veterinaryrecord.bvapublications.com/cgi/content/full/164/19/577> [subscription required] Novel H1N1 influenza in people: global spread from an animal source? -------------------------------------------------------------------- The rapidly unfolding and evolving events, on a worldwide scale, relating to the human-to-human transmission of a novel H1N1 influenza A virus have dominated the news media in the past 2 weeks. In Europe to date, as in North America and Canada, there have been cases of laboratory-confirmed H1N1 infection in people returning from recent foreign travel in South America, specifically Mexico. In the vast majority of cases in people who are not from Mexico, the reported clinical presentation has been mild. Nevertheless, the emergence of this novel H1N1 influenza virus, and its rapid and worldwide spread, facilitated by the normal movement of people across international boundaries, highlights some important epidemiological features. It is relevant to note that while this H1N1 influenza virus has been termed "swine influenza" (or "swine flu"), the definitive scientific evidence base to support its origin in pig populations has not yet been confirmed. Furthermore, in the absence of contemporaneous reports of clinical disease in pigs infected with this virus, it is not possible to confirm the clinical signs that may be observed in infected animals. In common with other influenza A infections of pigs, where a range of clinical presentations can occur, asymptomatic infection with this virus is also a theoretical possibility. Epidemiology ------------ The epidemiology of swine influenza in pigs is itself not straightforward. However, a number of consistent features exist: -- swine influenza is an important, contagious disease of pigs that occurs worldwide, and is typically caused by infection with influenza A viruses; -- virus subtypes H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 are endemic in many pig populations around the world, and pigs serve as major reservoirs of these viruses; -- interspecies transmission, including zoonotic infections, with the recognised endemic swine influenza viruses does occasionally occur (reviewed by Brown 2000). The maintenance of these influenza viruses in pigs, and the frequent introduction of new influenza viruses from other species, could, therefore, contribute to the generation of strains of human influenza virus with pandemic potential (Alexander and Brown 2000). Historical evidence of this suggests that, to date, the risk has been low. In addition, there is significant genetic and antigenic variability within each of the endemic swine influenza subtypes, which can often be dependent on geographical region. More specifically, before the emergence of this novel H1N1 virus, there has been a clear genetic distinction between North American and Eurasian lineages of swine influenza viruses. This new variant of H1N1 virus contains 3 of 8 gene segments (encoding for the neuraminidase and matrix protein genes) that do not appear typical of the genes seen in current North American strains. It has been postulated that these 3 gene segments have derived from Eurasian swine influenza viruses. It is not known if the particular genotype of H1N1 virus that appears putatively to have originated in Mexico is circulating in North American pigs, but its close similarity to other strains of swine influenza known to be circulating in the region (sharing 6 of 8 gene segments) has led to the assumption that this novel H1N1 strain is derived from pigs. [insert in text: Influenza A virus ecology with relevance to swine Influenza A viruses -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Influenza A viruses infect a large variety of animal species, including mammals and birds, and, given the worldwide animal-human interface, there is potential for interspecies transmission of influenza viruses in nature. Phylogenetic studies of influenza A viruses have revealed species-specific lineages of viral genes and have also demonstrated the frequency of interspecies transmision depends on the animal species. Aquatic birds are known to be the source of all influenza viruses for other species. Pigs are an important host in influenza virus ecology as they are susceptible to infection with both avian- and human-origin influenza A viruses, and are often involved in interspecies transmission, facilitated by regular close contact with people and/or birds. Following transmission to and independent spread of avian or human influenza viruses in pigs, these viruses are general referred to as being "avian-like" or "human-like" swine influenza viruses, reflecting both their previous and current hosts. After reassortment with other influenza A viruses, some of the genes of these viruses may be maintained in the resulting progeny viruses. Therefore, the evolution of influenza genes in species-specific lineagesis an invaluable characteristic in studying and determining influenza virus epidemiology.] Influenza viruses in pigs in Europe ----------------------------------- A number of countries in Europe conduct routine surveillance of pig populations for swine influenza, but, as this is not a notifiable disease in the EU, the surveillance programme is not consistent across the region. A European Swine Network for Influenza in Pigs (ESNIP2), funded by the EU, has been proactively monitoring the influenza situation in the European pig population for several years, and has demonstrated that subtypes H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 co-circulate. There are also some significant differences in epidemiology in terms of the virus subtypes involved within the EU. For example, currently in Great Britain (GB) "avian-like" swine H1N1 viruses co-circulate with H1N2, but H3N2 has apparently disappeared since the mid-1990s [Data tabulated in the original text]. This is in contrast, for example, to the situation in Italy, where these viruses are still widespread (Van Reeth and others 2008). The genotypic diversity of the influenza viruses in the European pig population is also well recognised, and periodically genotypic variants are identified. However, broadly, the endemic strains retain common genotypes and the new reassorted variants appear to have poor viability for long-term sustainability and transmission within the swine population (Brown 2008). This is in contrast to the current situation in North America, where multiple genotypes of several different subtypes have emerged within the past 10 years, creating a complex aetiology with respect to swine influenza in these populations. Based on current evidence from surveillance programmes in several European countries, the variant of H1N1 virus recently isolated in human beings has never been reported, and therefore does not appear to be present in the European pig population. Swine influenza surveillance in Great Britain --------------------------------------------- In Great Britain, the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) has run a national swine influenza scanning surveillance programme since 1991, funded by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). This programme is targeted, based on clear criteria using a standardised case definition, selection algorithm and sampling protocol, and provides free-of-charge laboratory testing for the detection of swine influenza viruses in clinical samples from affected pigs submitted by veterinary surgeons to VLA regional laboratories (RLs) and Scottish Agricultural College (SAC) Veterinary Services. Further information can be found on the VLA website at <http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/diseases/dis_si.htm>, or from local VLA *** RLs or SAC disease surveillance centres. It is important for vigilance to be maintained within both the swine and human sectors for the emergence or spread of the newly reported H1N1 virus. The recent report of human-to-pig transmission in Alberta, Canada, highlights the importance of reverse zoonosis, a recognised phenomenon in influenza virus epidemiology. Ongoing close liaison and collaboration is also occurring between the VLA and public health institutes and delivery agencies to ensure rapid and robust information exchange. Capacity for change ------------------- The global human-animal interface is complex and dynamic, with the potential for zoonotic transmission of known pathogens, variants thereof and emergent infectious agents. In turn, animal reservoirs and people, both with the capacity for rapid global movement and distribution in time and space (intrinsic properties of globalisation), face these shared infectious challenges, not forgetting the propensity of some pathogens for 2-way exchange between species. While the novel H1N1 influenza virus is assumed to be of animal origin, it is now clearly spreading between humans and has already entered the EU, as well as other parts of the world. However, to date, human-to-animal transmission has not been identified or reported by EU member states. The case of human-to-pig transmission in Canada followed contact of an infected occupationally exposed worker, apparently incubating H1N1 virus infection following return from travel to Mexico. It also seems inevitable that more human cases will be detected worldwide. It is important to note that the potential host range for this virus is currently unknown. Potential changes in the virus characteristics need to be closely monitored by both public health and veterinary institutes. The world is watching on as international scientific and sociopolitical efforts attempt to better understand and combat an historical foe with seemingly limitless capacity for change and variation, and to evade predictions -- the influenza virus. [byline: Richard Irvine and Ian Brown Veterinary Laboratories Agency] References ---------- 1. Alexander DJ, Brown IH. Recent zoonoses caused by influenza A viruses. OIE Scientific and Technical Review 2000; 19: 197-225. 2. Brown IH. The epidemiology and evolution of influenza viruses in pigs. Veterinary Microbiology 2000; 74: 29-46 3. Brown IH. The role of pigs in interspecies transmission. In: H-D Klenk, MN Matrosovich, J Stech (editors). Avian Influenza. Monogr Virol. Karger, 2008; 27: 88-100. 4. Van Reeth K, Brown IH, Darrwald R, Foni E, Labarque G, Lany P, et al. Seroprevalence of H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 swine influenza viruses in seven European countries in 2002-2003. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 2008; 2: 99-105. -- communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmil.org> [see also: Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (30): case counts 20090516.1831 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (29) 20090515.1824 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (28): case counts 20090515.1822 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (27): case counts 20090514.1800 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (26) 20090514.1798 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (25): case counts 20090513.1785 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (24): case counts 20090512.1772 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (23) 20090511.1764 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (22): case counts 20090511.1759 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (21) 20090510.1749 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (20): case counts 20090510.1741 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (10): case counts 20090504.1675 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide 20090430.1636] .......................cp/ejp/sh *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. 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russell jones Posted May 17, 2009 Share Posted May 17, 2009 Fema death camps, govt control, depopulation..... Ok, I think I'm done on this thread. Catch y'all when the next war starts or major terror attacks hit. Till then, you guys stay loony now, ya hear! Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
azert Posted May 21, 2009 Share Posted May 21, 2009 I haven't really been following this mainly because I think it's bullshit, but the paper today said (basically) the reason I never got swine flu is because the government did such a good job at handling it. Ever since I've come back to America I've started to dislike it more and more. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
troubador406 Posted May 21, 2009 Share Posted May 21, 2009 yea this land is definately not your land Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
azert Posted May 22, 2009 Share Posted May 22, 2009 GO AMERICA!!!!!!!! Is it now? 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
dreaken1993 Posted May 30, 2009 Share Posted May 30, 2009 ok you can stay Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
misteraven Posted April 14, 2020 Share Posted April 14, 2020 Weird, just noticed this thread because I got an email about it from some spammer. Anyhow, going to bump it since it seems like interesting context at something that happened years ago. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
abrasivesaint Posted April 18, 2020 Share Posted April 18, 2020 On 4/28/2009 at 7:12 AM, skroez said: 1976 Swine flu Propaganda The only thing that worry's me about this they say its close to the 1918 Spanish flu, which killed up to 50 million world wide. .. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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