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Eco artist Edina Tokodi has always been known for her moss graffiti work, but now she has created a portrait for the Fort Green Garden Walk event. Made completely out of succulent plants with white panels atop, the project perfectly create a portrayal of the human face. http://designyearbook.blogspot.com/2009/08/succulent-wall-by-edina-tokodi.html This is incredible!!!

wtf?

Not be a negative nancy- but we all know we will never see an indicted in our lives……maybe not even in our children’s lives. Too much money, power, corruption and good lawyers……….

http://www.wallsnotebook.com/

Okay- so I have been reading this post and I have to say- at first- I was pissed off because I was –and- am a total Obama supporter. I consider myself so liberal –that- I make the off the deep end liberal look conservative. THEN- I had an epiphany I thought about the fact that when I first read what Casek had to say- and saw the link- I put my blinders on and would not even click on the link. Basically I have turned into exactly what I loathed about the right wing conservatives – at least- MY PERCEPTION- of right wing conservatives- who sat back and put their blinders on while a nonsensical war transpired in Iraq- torture- rape- extraordinary rendition- and so on. So- there you have it- an over the top- off the deep end- liberal finally realized what is really going on. I still have my doubts though that Obama is worse than Bush- but I have taken off my blinders.

HEPATITIS, VIRAL - PAKISTAN: (SINDH) FATAL ****************************************** A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> Date: Tue 9 Jun 2009 Source: Regional Times [edited] <http://regionaltimes.com/09jun2009/heartlandnews/4person.htm> 　 4 persons die of hepatitis, 460 other cases reported in New Saeedabad --------------------------------------------------------------------- Due to consumption of contaminated water in village Jan Muhammad Jamali near New Saeedabad [Matiari District, Sindh], 4 people have died, while 460 others have been diagnosed with hepatitis. The Regional Times learnt on Monday [8 Jun 2009] that after an outbreak of diarrhea, which killed 3 persons in village Jan Muhammad Jamali a few days ago, the deadly disease of hepatitis has spread due to consumption of contaminated water. In this regard, it was learnt that 4 villagers have died in a few days, while 460 other hepatitis positive cases have also been reported. However, health department Sindh has decided to establish an emergency hepatitis vaccination camp in village Jan Muhammad Jamali on Tuesday (today [9 Jun 2009]). It is worthwhile to mention that Sindh minister for health has taken serious notice of the matter and directed the EDO [executive district officer] Health to provide better health facilities to the villagers. The Sindh minister for health has also initiated an inquiry into the outbreak of hepatitis and appointed special secretary public health as inquiry officer. The minister also directed the inquiry officer to present a report within 3 days. [byline: Danish Memon] -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail Rapporteur Brent Barrett [This report does not indicate which etiological agent is involved in this hepatitis outbreak. A 2007 report quoted Dr Sharif Ahmad Khan, the national programme manager for prevention and control of hepatitis, who said the percentage of hepatitis B in the country was about 3-4 percent while those infected with hepatitis C reached 5-6 percent. "There are 5 types of hepatitis: A, B, C, D, and E." "Hepatitis A and E occur due to consumption of unhygienic food or contaminated water..." (see ProMED-mail archive no. 20070306.0796). Sindh Province can be located on the map of Pakistan at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pol_2002.jpg> The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Pakistan can be accessed at <http://healthmap.org/r/00tz>. - Mod.TY] [see also: HIV/AIDS & hepatitis, barbers - Pakistan (Islamabad) 20070521.1630 2007 --- HIV/AIDS & hepatitis, barbers - Pakistan (Islamabad) 20070521.1630 Hepatitis, viral - Pakistan 20070306.0796 2006 ---- Hepatitis B and C, barbers - Pakistan (Islamabad) (02) 20061216.3536 Hepatitis B and C, barbers - Pakistan (Islamabad) 20061215.3529] ...................................dk/ty/mj/dk *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID and its associated service providers shall not be held responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted or archived material. ************************************************************ Become a ProMED-mail Premium Subscriber at <http://www.isid.org/ProMEDMail_Premium.shtml> ************************************************************ Visit ProMED-mail's web site at <http://www.promedmail.org>. Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help, etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org. ############################################################ ############################################################

Bloody Hell.......... SMALLPOX VACCINATION, ADVERSE EVENTS - USA: PROGRESSIVE VACCINIA ********************************************* A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> Date: Tue 19 May 2009 Source: CDC. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2009; 58 (early release); 1-4 [edited] <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm58e0519a1.htm?s_cid=rr58e0519a1_e> Progressive vaccinia in a military smallpox vaccinee -- United States, 2009 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Progressive vaccinia (PV), previously known as vaccinia necrosum, vaccinia gangrenosum, or disseminated vaccinia, is a rare, often fatal adverse event after vaccination with smallpox vaccine, which is made from live vaccinia virus (1). During recent vaccination programs potential cases of PV were investigated, but none met standard case definitions (2). PV has not been confirmed to have occurred in the United States since 1987 (3). On [2 Mar 2009], a US Navy Hospital contacted the Poxvirus Program at CDC to report a possible case of PV in a male military smallpox vaccinee. The service member had been newly diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia M0 (AML M0). During evaluation for a chemotherapy-induced neutropenic fever, he was found to have an expanding and nonhealing painless vaccination site 6.5 weeks after receipt of smallpox vaccine. Clinical and laboratory investigation confirmed that the vaccinee met the Brighton Collaboration and CDC adverse event surveillance guideline case definition for PV (4,5). This report summarizes the patient's protracted clinical course and the military and civilian interagency governmental, academic, and industry public health contributions to his complex medical management. The quantities of investigational and licensed therapeutics and diagnostics used were greater than anticipated based on existing smallpox preparedness plans. To support future public health needs adequately, the estimated national supply of therapeutics and diagnostic resources required to care for smallpox vaccine adverse events should be reevaluated. Case description ---------------- On 13 Jan 2009, a healthy service member aged 20 years received a primary smallpox vaccination (ACAM2000 [Acambis, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts]) in accordance with the US Department of Defense smallpox vaccination policy*; no other vaccinations were administered that day. Twelve days later, the patient visited a local hospital with fever and headache of one day's duration and was admitted for workup of leukopenia after his white blood cell count was found to be 1400 cells/mm3. On [28 Jan 2009], after transfer to a US Navy tertiary-care facility, he was diagnosed with AML M0. On [30 Jan and 13 Feb 2009], the patient underwent 2 successive rounds of induction chemotherapy with cytarabine, idarubicin, and dexamethasone. Before initial chemotherapy, the vaccination site pustule had a central crust and measured approximately 1 cm [0.4 in] in diameter with minimal surrounding erythema. During the patient's hospital stay from the end of January to the beginning of March [2009], his vaccination site dressing was changed daily. On [2 Mar 2009], during the evaluation of neutropenic fever, the failure of the patient's vaccination site to heal was described. An annular lesion with a deep bulla, raised violaceous leading edge, and a central crust that bled with pressure was noted. The size of the lesion had progressed to approximately 4 x 4 cm [1.6 x 1.6 in] with minimal surrounding erythema or induration. The patient described no pain at the site, although he reported occasional pruritus. A swab of the lesion and serum were sent to CDC for viral and serologic analysis. Viral analysis of the swab by multiple real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays for orthopoxvirus and vaccinia yielded evidence of viral DNA; viral culture was positive for orthopoxvirus. Serum showed equivocal to absent levels of anti-orthopoxvirus immunoglobulin G (IgG) and immunoglobulin M (IgM) by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. The results of the diagnostic testing combined with the patient's medical history met the PV level 1 case definition as defined by the Brighton Collaboration and the confirmed case definition as described by CDC surveillance guidelines (4,5). The criteria met by both case definitions were 1) a documented clinical diagnosis of a disease that is known to be associated with cell-mediated immunodeficiency (in this case AML M0), 2) the primary vaccination site's failure to resolve (in this case more than 6 weeks post vaccination), and 3) the laboratory confirmation of vaccinia virus as the causative agent. On [3 Mar 2009], imiquimod was applied directly to the lesion. Within 24 hours of confirmation of PV on [4 Mar 2009], the patient received licensed Vaccinia Immune Globulin Intravenous (Human) (VIGIV) (Cangene Corporation, Winnipeg, Canada). On [5 Mar and 6 Mar 2009], oral and topical ST-246 (SIGA Technologies, Corvallis, Oregon) were administered under an Emergency Investigational New Drug (E-IND) application. The patient remained stable until the evening of [7 Mar 2009], when he became septic with _Pseudomonas aeruginosa_, likely from a perirectal abscess. He required intubation, maximal vasopressor support, multiple antibiotics, and stress dose corticosteroids. He then developed multiorgan failure and began continuous venovenous hemodialysis. During the next 12 days, the patient slowly stabilized. As a consequence of the duration and amount of vasopressor support, the patient required a bilateral trans-tibial amputation because of dry gangrene of his feet. During [6-19 Mar 2009] the patient received additional oral and topical ST-246 and VIGIV; his ST-246 levels were noted to be lower than those achieved both in healthy subjects in phase I clinical trials and in successful treatment of nonhuman primates with systemic orthopoxvirus disease. The lesion size remained unchanged, but the central crust of the vaccination site sloughed off, followed by most of the outer "ring" flattening, leaving a shallow ulcer with healthy-appearing granulation tissue. During his steroid taper, additional satellite lesions surrounding the vaccination site appeared on [18 Mar 2009], and viral DNA was detected again in the blood. These lesions became vesicular in nature, and on [26 Mar 2009], after a 2nd E-IND was issued, CMX001 (Chimerix, Inc., Research Triangle Park, North Carolina), a lipid conjugate of cidofovir, was administered. From [24 Mar 2009] onward, the satellite and main vaccination site lesions continued to crust, the scabs separated, and underlying tissue epithelialized. Blood viral DNA levels cleared on [29 Mar 2009]. On [10 Apr 2009], the borders of lesions again appeared raised; a shave biopsy grew methicillin-resistant _Staphylococcus aureus_, which responded to antibiotic therapy. The patient received intermittent granulocyte colony-stimulating factor, and his absolute neutrophil and lymphocyte count increased over time. By [1 May 2009], significant portions of the scabs/eschars had fallen off or were removed manually, revealing healthy epidermis. Numerous therapeutics with different biologic mechanisms were used to treat PV in this patient. From [21 Feb 2009] onward, the patient had remained in contact isolation, first for a _Clostridium difficile_ infection and then for his progressive vaccinia infection. On [5 May 2009], contact precautions were discontinued because of the lack of viable virus in lesion specimens from the previous 4 weeks. No cases of contact vaccinia were identified among this patient's health-care workers or close contacts. During [3 Mar-18 May 2009], nearly 200 clinical specimens (lesion and satellite swabs/crusts, ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid [EDTA] blood, bone marrow, and serum) were collected and submitted to CDC to evaluate disease progression and guide therapeutic interventions. After [23 Apr 2009], swabs from satellite lesions or the main vaccination site showed significantly reduced or absent levels of viral DNA, and no viable virus was detected after [2 Apr 2009]. Oropharyngeal sampling and bone marrow biopsies from early and late March [2009], respectively, were negative for vaccinia virus. Orthopoxvirus DNA was detected in EDTA blood at intermittent times during the course of the patient's infection; however, no viable virus was cultured from blood. As of [12 May 2009], the patient had no demonstrable IgM response to orthopoxvirus; IgG levels appeared fully reliant on VIGIV infusion. During [3 Mar-18 May 2009], a total of 20 conference calls to discuss patient status and treatment options were held between the Vaccine Healthcare Centers Network, Military Vaccine Agency (MILVAX), Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy, CDC, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), SIGA Technologies, Chimerix, Inc., and academic and health-care professionals. As of [18 May 2009], MILVAX provided 22 and the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) provided 254 vials of VIGIV used in treatment of this case. [Reported by: E Lederman, MD, H Groff, MD, T Warkentien, MD, A Reese, MD, US Naval Medical Center. D Hruby, PhD, T Bolken, D Grosenbach, PhD, S Yan, PhD, SIGA Technologies, Corvallis, Oregon. W Painter, MD, L Trost, MD, B Lampert, MD, Chimerix, Inc., Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. J Cohen, MD, National Institutes of Health; R Engler, MD, Walter Reed Vaccine Healthcare Center; W Davidson, MPH, S Smith, MS, K Wilkins, Z Braden, Y Li, PhD, I Damon, MD, Div of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, CDC] MMWR editorial note ------------------- Although PV is a rare adverse event (one case per million during routine vaccination during 1963-1968), its case fatality rate in primary US vaccinees was 15 percent despite treatment with massive amounts of VIG (intramuscular) (6). Extensive surgical debridement was sometimes required, even necessitating disarticulation of the arm to "debulk" the amount of infectious material (7). Before smallpox vaccination, patients are screened for numerous contraindications (8). At the time of his vaccination, the patient described in this report did not have any obvious signs or symptoms that would meet any exclusion criteria for vaccination. Training in use of, and careful adherence to, screening tools can identify vaccine candidates at risk for PV and other adverse events (2). Despite this, vaccinees with occult immunodeficiencies might not be recognized, and therefore appropriately deferring vaccination in these persons is not always possible. Lack of inflammation at the expanding vaccination site is the hallmark of PV. Any smallpox vaccinee who has an expanding, nonhealing, painless vaccination site without inflammation for more than 2 weeks should be evaluated for an underlying immunodeficiency, and diagnosis of and treatment for PV should be considered. Health-care providers should report suspected cases of PV or other adverse events to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS). Suspected cases of PV also should be reported to state health officials and CDC for clinical consultation and to obtain select therapeutics available only through the SNS. State health departments should call the CDC Emergency Operations Center at 770-488-7100. This patient's protracted clinical course is consistent with previously published cases reports and surveillance summaries. The development of progressive vaccinia, historically observed in patients with cellular immunodeficiencies, often leads to superinfection and subsequent sepsis (that is, fungal, parasitic, and bacterial infections resulting in toxic or septicemic shock, then ultimately death). Past treatment typically included massive doses of VIG, administration of thiosemicarbazone, blood products, and supportive care for accompanying infections (7,9). The improvement of progressive vaccinia in this patient was associated with receipt of VIGIV (the only licensed product for treatment of vaccinia adverse events stockpiled by the SNS), ST-246, and CMX001, and an increase in lymphocyte count. The use of 2 antiviral agents with different mechanisms of action (see note 1) was enabled by the research and development of medical countermeasures for smallpox preparedness activities, as well as the use of the emergency IND process. As of [18 May 2009], the patient had shed nearly all of the scab material on and around the vaccination site. The rapid mobilization of military, CDC, FDA, NIH, drug manufacturer, and academic and health-care human resources to review the case's status and to provide daily, then biweekly laboratory findings that guided treatment recommendations, was enabled by smallpox public health preparedness research and training efforts. Continuing medical education and reinforcement of training related to the prevention, early recognition, and treatment of smallpox vaccine-related adverse events should be part of smallpox vaccination programs. The patient described in this report received VIGIV in the amount originally estimated to treat 30 persons. The extraordinary amounts of VIGIV used to treat this single case of PV underscore the need to reevaluate the adequacy of the national stockpiled supply of this or other medical countermeasures (treatment or prophylactic). Such reevaluation, with additional focus on immunocompromised hosts, will aid in the smallpox vaccination program planning and overall smallpox preparedness efforts. References ---------- 1. CDC: Recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in a pre-event vaccination program. Supplemental recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). MMWR 2003; 52 (No. RR-7) [available at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5207a1.htm>]. 2. Vellozzi C, Lane JM, Averhoff F, et al: Generalized vaccinia, progressive vaccinia, and eczema vaccinatum are rare following smallpox (vaccinia) vaccination: United States surveillance, 2003. Clin Infect Dis 2005; 41: 689-97 [abstract available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16080092>]. 3. Redfield RR, Wright DC, James WD, Jones TS, Brown C, Burke DS: Disseminated vaccinia in a military recruit with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease. N Engl J Med 1987; 316: 673-6. 4. Nell P, Kohl KS, Graham PL, et al: Progressive vaccinia as an adverse event following exposure to vaccinia virus: case definition and guidelines of data collection, analysis, and presentation of immunization safety data. Vaccine 2007; 25: 5735-44. 5. CDC. Surveillance guidelines for smallpox vaccine (vaccinia) adverse reactions. MMWR 2006; 55 (No. RR-1) [available at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5501a1.htm>]. 6. Aragon TJ, Ulrich S, Fernyak S, Rutherford GW: Risks of serious complications and death from smallpox vaccination: a systematic review of the United States experience, 1963-1968. BMC Public Health 2003; 3: 26 [abstract available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12911836>]. 7. Maurer DM, Harrington B, Lane JM: Smallpox vaccine: contraindications, administration, and adverse reactions. Am Fam Physician 2003; 68: 889-96 [available at <http://www.aafp.org/afp/20030901/889.html>]. 8. Fulginiti VA, Papier A, Lane JM, Neff JM, Henderson DA: Smallpox vaccination: a review, part II. Adverse events. Clin Infect Dis 2003; 37: 251-71 9. Bray M, Wright ME: Progressive vaccinia. Clin Infect Dis 2003; 36: 766-74 [abstract available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12627361>]. 10. Quenelle, DC, Prichard MN, Keith KA, et al: Synergistic efficacy of the combination of ST-246 with CMX001 against orthopoxviruses. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2007; 51: 4118-24 [available at <http://aac.asm.org/cgi/content/full/51/11/4118>]. Note 1. ST-246 prevents viral egress, whereas CMX001 inhibits viral replication, and some data suggest they are synergistic in vitro (10). Note 2. * Information about US Department of Defense policies regarding smallpox vaccination and screening before smallpox vaccination is available at <http://www.smallpox.army.mil>. CDC's clinical evaluation tools for smallpox vaccine adverse reactions are available at <http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/clineval>. -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> [The essential message of this episode is that future cases of PV likely will require similar intensive and multidisciplinary clinical consultation. Experts with background in vaccine safety, PV treatment, clinical virology, infectious disease, and immunodeficiencies should be engaged. The extraordinary amounts of VIGIV used to treat this single case of PV underscore the need to reevaluate the adequacy of the national stockpiled supply of this or other medical countermeasures (treatment or prophylactic). Such reevaluation, with additional focus on immunocompromised hosts, will aid in the smallpox vaccination program planning and overall smallpox preparedness efforts. The text of the original article (available at the source URL above) is accompanied by graphic images of the progressive vaccinia lesion over a period of 8 weeks. - Mod.CP] [see also: 2003 ---- Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (12) 20030712.1716 Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (11): few 20030620.1519 Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (10) 20030404.0825 Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (09) 20030329.0781 Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (08) 20030327.0772 Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (07) 20030326.0749 Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA (06) 20030314.0635 Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA (05) 20030311.0592 Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA (04) 20030307.0569 Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA (03) 20030306.0557 Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA (02) 20030306.0556 Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA 20030301.0515 Smallpox vaccination, adverse event monitoring - USA 20030206.0324 Smallpox vaccination strategies 20030103.0018] ...................................mpp/cp/mj/mpp *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID and its associated service providers shall not be held responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted or archived material. ************************************************************ Become a ProMED-mail Premium Subscriber at <http://www.isid.org/ProMEDMail_Premium.shtml> ************************************************************ Visit ProMED-mail's web site at <http://www.promedmail.org>. Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help, etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org. ############################################################ ############################################################

Vaccinations Designed To Sterilize Women? by Kjeld Heising 11-9-7 http://www.clubconspiracy.com/forum/f24/vaccinations-designed-sterilize-women-5619.html Women are being drawn into a medical trap.The outcome is toxication and health erosion. The tool is vaccinations * presented as a solution to "fight" an ever growing number of dangers from the world of microbes. The medical world has got its own Al Qaeda * the invisible army of viruses. With exactly the same attributes: Unknown, being everywhere and nowhere. Invincible. The answer is also approximately the same: More fear, more death. And now, with growing clarity, targeting women. We have for more than a decade had the campaigns for mandatory HIV-tests of pregnant women. Only women. In the Third World, we have had numerous vaccination campaigns targeting women in their fertile age. Only women. Recently, in Denmark, the great drug donor, Bill Gates, has donated USD 10m to a Copenhagen university to further studies on a Malaria vaccine * target group: Women of the Third World. And then, the latest stunt: Vaccination of 12 year old girls in many countries * allegedly against the HPV virus which might (or might not) eventually cause Cervical Cancer. Target group: Girls in the age of just becoming fertile. In some states mandatory, in others just heavily propagandized. What is all this about? Money? Of course but that doesn't account for the focusing on women. Special care for women? Nice. But in fatal opposition to the agenda of "women's lib". Women's lib doesn't include reproduction and is uninterested in the female sex. Could it be ? Yes, it could be exactly the opposite, and I'll tell you why. First, "women's lib" is not a population movement fostered by women being sick-and-tired of oppression. It it a masculine invention, defined in policy papers back from the 1950's, most eagerly promoted by the Rockefeller all-seeing-everywhere-being dynasty and it's political operators. Approximately at the same time when the first feminists surfaced, and already up and run as the project culminated. That happened with the 1974 Henry Kissinger <i>National Security Study Memorandum 200</i> about "the consequences of the global population growth for the US security and overseas interests". This paper, which should be given much much more attention , states that Urgent immediate measures must be taken to reduce fertility. The memo recommends Zero growth rate in the developed countries by 1985 and Zero growth rate in Lesser Developed Countries by 2000. Notice: Defertilization first in the West, then down to the poor. It also recommends the tools. For the industrialized world: Reproductive health - a nicer word for abortion, use of condoms etc. Sex education Improved health Women' equality Day care Government participation Improved social security Reduced infant mortality Well, in Europe, we used to call this "welfare". It now seems, it was just a means to make us stop reproducing ourselves. A great success: Today, we find declining birth rates all over the Western World * only Albania (the poorest country of Europe * no "welfare") is maintaining the size of of its population. The picture becomes clearer when we learn that our Rockefeller-friend John D. the Third back in the 1950's also began advocating that all vaccines should have added Mercury. That served a tripple purpose: Mercury works as a preservative. It can help the chemical industry get rid of a highly toxic waste product (just like Fluoride in toothpaste did). And, most important, the Mercury is absorbed in our body, is not automatically excreted and has various toxic effects. One of the effects is that it destroys the cilia inside the female sex, removing the ability of the mucous membrane to transport men's semen to the egg cells. Which obviously impedes natural conception. Another effect is that children who are born become autistic - the frequency of autistic children increases clearly with the amount of Mercury consumed. And there are other effects of this additive which is called <i>thiomesal</i> - such as diabetes. So, any vaccine containing Mercury, is a defertilization drug. That means almost all vaccines almost all over the world. We get another clue by studying simple facts on HIV and AIDS. As shown in many papers and documentaries, the existence of a virus destroying our immune system has never been documented * to this day it remains a rumour having obsessed most of the medical world and, by being backed up by deeply corrupt statal medical authorities, a fully controlled political layer and a centralized media network loving the "scary setup", it has also obsessed most common people. The facts are that as well as there is no disease-causing HIV virus, there is no test which can prove it's presence in human blood. The so-called HIV-tests test the presence of antibodies and antibodies belong in a functioning immune system. The tests are known to crossreact with many conditions having nothing to do with any particular virus. One of these conditions is you better sit down pregnancy. That's where the AIDS swindle becomes a depopulation tool. For the next step from a positive HIV test is prescription of deadly toxic drugs (charmingly named "Life Prolonging Medication") destroying the immune system and the intestine's ability to absorb nutrients - and causing defective children. These drugs are the most toxic chemicals ever invented by the pharmaceutical industry. In Africa, HIV tests are only performed on pregnancy clinics. And guess where the deadly drugs go. Another clue becomes clear when we look at the WHO vaccination campaigns in the Third World. Most famous are the campaigns from the mid nineties against Tetanus. Despite the fact that 70% of all Tetanus occurred in men, the vaccinations were only given to women. And only women between 14 and 44 years old. The vaccines were mixed with hCG Gonadotropine. Now, hCG is a hormone which is naturally formed in the foetus within the first few days, and which is necessary for it's continued life and growth. When the mixture of vaccine and hCG is inoculated in a woman's blood, her immune defence will not only produce antibodies to the Tetanus bacteria but also to the hCG. As a result, she looses her foetus. These vaccination campaigns were performed on millions and millions of women in Nicaragua, Mexico, Nigeria, Tanzania and the Philippines. Other vaccination campaigns have had other effects. In Uganda, a polio vaccination was performed, killing 600 children in just one month and just one village (Mbarara) - in which there was by coincidence a counting. In Nigeria, polio vaccine was distributed, contaminated with estradiol and a number of carcinogen (cancer generating) agents. How many more of these criminal campaigns have been performed through the years? Then we have the bogus on the Malaria vaccine. Malaria is no microbe disease, so what has a vaccine to do with this? Nothing. But the funny scientist came up with a funny story on a "certain molecule" being necessary for the Malaria parasite to fix on the inside of women's uterus. It's the molecule the vaccine is supposed to target. But only in women. The average age of women getting Cervical Cancer is 50 * as Dr. Tim O'Shea writes in his excellent article "HPV - The First Cancer Vaccine" on Rense.com (http://www.rense.com/general78/hpv.htm). The creator of the HPV vaccine, company Merck, promises an effect-time of five years. So, what the point of vaccinating 12 years old girls? I have no doubt anymore: This has nothing to do with medicine. It has nothing to do with anything based on science. It has nothing to do with diseases. It is a money machine, yes, but it is more. We have another war, and this war is moving from covert to overt. We have a global war on women. ------- Heising is a Danish Men's activist. He can be reached at kjeld@heising.dk

I did not want to start a new thread for this- so I posted it here. I have been VERY skeptical of this vaccine since I first read about it- I got this article today from natural news and thought I would share it. 1300 Girls Harmed by HPV Vaccines in UK; Bizarre Side Effects Like Paralysis and Epilepsy http://www.naturalnews.com/z026293.html 1300 Girls Harmed by HPV Vaccines in UK; Bizarre Side Effects Like Paralysis and Epilepsy by David Gutierrez, staff writer (NaturalNews) More than 1,300 girls in the United Kingdom have experienced negative reactions to the government-mandated Cervarix vaccine for the human papillomavirus (HPV), according to adverse events reports collected from doctors by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). "When they introduced this new vaccine, we had major concerns about its safety," said Jackie Fletcher of Jabs, a support group for those negatively affected by vaccines. "The current statistics detailing adverse reactions -- including cases of epilepsy and convulsions -- bears out that we were right to be concerned." Cervarix, manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline, inoculates patients against strains 16 and 18 of HPV, which are believed to be responsible for 70 percent of cervical cancer cases. The British government began a program to vaccinate all secondary school girls in September 2008, and 700,000 have received the injections so far. The government's plan is to have all girls under the age of 18 vaccinated by 2011. Critics have objected, however, that the government based its decision on studies of women under the age of 26, rather than studies conducted on school-age girls. In addition, while the vaccine has been shown to prevent against HPV infection in the short term, there is no evidence of its long-term efficacy or that it actually lowers cancer rates. The MHRA reports show a total of 2,891 adverse events reported in 1,340 girls. The majority were minor and short-lived problems, such as swelling, rashes, pain or mild allergies to the vaccine. A number of cases were more severe, however, including 20 cases of blurred vision, four cases of convulsions, one case of seizures and one epileptic fit. Five cases of partial paralysis were reported, including Bell's palsy (face), Guillain-Barre syndrome (legs), hyopaesthesia (loss of sense of touch) and hemiparesis (severe weakening or paralysis of half the body). "The government needs to look at the future of this program given the number of side-effects coming through," Fletcher said. Sources for this story include: http://www.dailymail.co.uk.

INFLUENZA A (H1N1) - WORLDWIDE (31) *********************************** New H1N1 rumour A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> In this update: [1] New H1N1 rumour [2] Estimation of R [3] Source of novel H1N1 ****** [1] New H1N1 rumour Date: Fri 15 May 2009 Source: Swine Flu Archives, ScienceInsider, Science [edited] <http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/swine-flu> A New, New H1N1 in Mexico? -------------------------- This odd exchange took place at today's press conference with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): David Brown, The Washington Post: There's a report that there is yet another new H1N1 virus that has been found in the states of Durango, Zacatecas, and Jalisco that is distinct from both this swine H1N1 and the seasonal Brisbane H1N1. Have you heard of this and can you tell us anything about this? Daniel Jernigan, CDC's deputy director of influenza division: We've heard of some reports about that, but I've not had any direct information about the specifics of that case. There's ongoing dialog between us and the folks that are in Mexico, and as we know more about that, we'll be able to let people know. ScienceInsider is investigating but has yet to learn anything substantive. It was aired in a public venue, though, and likely will receive media attention, regardless of whether it turns out to be false. "We heard a rumor but think it may be a misinterpretation of some lab data by a non-lab person," Nancy Cox, head of CDC's influenza division, tells ScienceInsider. "We are following up." [byline: Jon Cohen] -- communicated by: Kunihiko Iizuka <edcvfr3464@yahoo.co.jp> ****** [2] Date: Thu 14 May 2009 Source: Eurosurveillance, Volume 14, Issue 19, 14 May 2009 [edited] <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19212> Why are Mexican data important? ------------------------------- This issue of Eurosurveillance contains an article by a French team on the transmission of the new influenza A(H1N1) in Mexico, which uses published figures from the outbreak to estimate important parameters for transmission, among them the reproduction rate, R (1). Such studies may have important implications for public health action in Europe. [This article has been reproduced previously in ProMED-mail; see Part [3], Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (29) 20090515.1824] What is R? ---------- The growth rate of an epidemic is determined by 2 factors: the number of new persons infected by each case and the time from start of infectiousness in one case to start of infectiousness in the secondary cases caused by him/her. The 1st factor is called "reproduction rate" and is usually denoted R. If the disease is spreading in a population that is totally susceptible the term "basic reproduction rate" (Ro) is used. R is the product of four terms: the risk of transmission in one single contact between an infectious and a susceptible person, the frequency of such contacts in the population, the duration of infectivity of a case, and the proportion of susceptibles in the population. If R is greater than 1 this means that each case infects more than one new person, and the outbreak is likely to continue. If R is less than 1 the outbreak will eventually die out, even if there may be a number of cases before that. The time from infectiousness in one case to infectiousness in his/her secondary cases is called "generation time" (Tg) and is basically a biological constant, even if its exact value depends on how it is estimated. Values for the factors that determine R can be calculated on the basis of scientific knowledge of the disease, its context of transmission, and the immunity status of the population. However, during an epidemic an R value usually has to be derived from the analysis of the epidemic curve or by the study of transmission chains. Several studies have now tried to estimate R (or Ro) and Tg for the new influenza A(H1N1) virus from Mexican data. In the one published in this issue of Eurosurveillance [1], the authors use one exponential fitting and one real-time estimation model to arrive at an estimate of R between 2.2 and 3.1. This is higher than the value found in an article in Science [2], which estimated Ro to be 1.4-1.6 using 3 models: one exponential fitting, one genetic analysis, and 2 standard SIR models for a confined outbreak in La Gloria. Another analysis of the minor genetic changes in the virus over time arrived at a Ro estimate of 1.16 [3]. Why is Ro important in public health? ------------------------------------- The reproduction rate reflects effectiveness of transmission, and therefore has important implications for the efforts that public health authorities would have to make in implementing health measures aiming at containing or mitigating the outbreak. For example, with a Ro of 1.16, preventing 14 per cent of cases will result in eventually interrupting transmission, while with a Ro of 3.1, preventing 68 per cent cases would be needed -- assuming a total random mixing of contacts in the population. Why are Ro estimates so different for influenza? ------------------------------------------------ A few studies have tried to measure Ro for seasonal influenza [4], and found it to be in the order of 1.2 to 1.4. However, for most of the seasonal strains, there is already some immunity in the population from past seasons, which lowers the reproduction rate (and it should thus really not be called Ro in this situation). For any epidemic of a disease that leads to immunity after infection the initial Ro will also be higher than the actual R at any later stage, since the proportion still susceptible in the population will decrease. It should also be realised that delayed reporting of cases will affect an estimate of R; a problem that adheres to the study in this issue and the others cited above. What influences Ro? ------------------- The risk of transmission in a contact when an infective meets a susceptible is basically a biological constant (even if it varies over the time course of the infection), as is the duration of infectiveness. However, frequency of contacts varies considerably between populations and population groups. For example, among children in schools or day care, the contact frequency is higher than among adults [5], and it also varies by culture, by family size in a society, by types of social interaction, etc. Why is the Ro from Mexico important? ------------------------------------ One could question why there is so much interest around studies of R and Ro based on Mexican data. Would they apply to Europe? One could guess that contact density might be higher in a Mexican setting, but on the other hand, since the epidemic has already run its course for some time there, the proportion of non-susceptibles would be higher in Mexico and the European situation would more approach a "true" (higher) Ro, with a totally susceptible population. In a graph [not reproduced here] of the daily reported cumulative number of cases in Mexico, Canada, US and EU/EFTA countries, outbreak of new influenza A(H1N1), April-May 2009, we have just compared the daily reported cumulative number of cases in Mexico, Canada, United States, and European Union and European Free Trade Association (EU / EFTA) countries. On a semi-logarithmic scale it is evident that the slope for Europe is very much the same as for Mexico. It is difficult to estimate the time lag for Europe, but it seems that we are some 1-2 months behind. If the generation times are the same for both epidemics -- which seems highly plausible ***--then an estimate of Ro for Mexico would apply also to Europe. A Ro just above 1 could mean that a containment strategy might be successful. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) is continuously monitoring the situation and with more data being available every day in Europe we will obviously be able to have a better picture here soon as well. Nevertheless, the similarities of the shapes of the epidemics indicate that lessons from Mexico could apply also to Europe. References ---------- 1. Boelle PY, Bernillon P, Desenclos JC. A preliminary estimation of the reproduction ratio for new influenza A(H1N1) from the outbreak in Mexico, March-April 2009. Euro Surveill 2009; 14(19): pii=19205. Available from: <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19205> 2. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchelmes S, Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD, Hollingsworth TD, et al. Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early findings. Published 11 May 2009 on Science Express. DOI: 10.1126/science.1176062. Available from: <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/1176062> 3. Rambaut A. Human/Swine A/H1N1 flu outbreak - BEAST analysis. Available from: <http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/groups/influenza/wiki/178c5/BEAST_Analysis_29_Apr_2008_-_Andrew_Rambaut.html> 4. Chowell G, Miller MA, Viboud C. Seasonal influenza in the United States, France, and Australia: transmission and prospects for control. Epidemiol Infect 2008; 136(6): 852-64. 5. Keeling MJ, Eames KT. Networks and epidemic models. J R Soc Interface 2005; 2(4): 295-307. [byline: D Coulombier and J Giesecke At: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden] -- communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [3] Date: Sat 9 May 2009 Source: The Veterinary Record, May 9 2009 [abbreviated and edited] <http://veterinaryrecord.bvapublications.com/cgi/content/full/164/19/577> [subscription required] Novel H1N1 influenza in people: global spread from an animal source? -------------------------------------------------------------------- The rapidly unfolding and evolving events, on a worldwide scale, relating to the human-to-human transmission of a novel H1N1 influenza A virus have dominated the news media in the past 2 weeks. In Europe to date, as in North America and Canada, there have been cases of laboratory-confirmed H1N1 infection in people returning from recent foreign travel in South America, specifically Mexico. In the vast majority of cases in people who are not from Mexico, the reported clinical presentation has been mild. Nevertheless, the emergence of this novel H1N1 influenza virus, and its rapid and worldwide spread, facilitated by the normal movement of people across international boundaries, highlights some important epidemiological features. It is relevant to note that while this H1N1 influenza virus has been termed "swine influenza" (or "swine flu"), the definitive scientific evidence base to support its origin in pig populations has not yet been confirmed. Furthermore, in the absence of contemporaneous reports of clinical disease in pigs infected with this virus, it is not possible to confirm the clinical signs that may be observed in infected animals. In common with other influenza A infections of pigs, where a range of clinical presentations can occur, asymptomatic infection with this virus is also a theoretical possibility. Epidemiology ------------ The epidemiology of swine influenza in pigs is itself not straightforward. However, a number of consistent features exist: -- swine influenza is an important, contagious disease of pigs that occurs worldwide, and is typically caused by infection with influenza A viruses; -- virus subtypes H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 are endemic in many pig populations around the world, and pigs serve as major reservoirs of these viruses; -- interspecies transmission, including zoonotic infections, with the recognised endemic swine influenza viruses does occasionally occur (reviewed by Brown 2000). The maintenance of these influenza viruses in pigs, and the frequent introduction of new influenza viruses from other species, could, therefore, contribute to the generation of strains of human influenza virus with pandemic potential (Alexander and Brown 2000). Historical evidence of this suggests that, to date, the risk has been low. In addition, there is significant genetic and antigenic variability within each of the endemic swine influenza subtypes, which can often be dependent on geographical region. More specifically, before the emergence of this novel H1N1 virus, there has been a clear genetic distinction between North American and Eurasian lineages of swine influenza viruses. This new variant of H1N1 virus contains 3 of 8 gene segments (encoding for the neuraminidase and matrix protein genes) that do not appear typical of the genes seen in current North American strains. It has been postulated that these 3 gene segments have derived from Eurasian swine influenza viruses. It is not known if the particular genotype of H1N1 virus that appears putatively to have originated in Mexico is circulating in North American pigs, but its close similarity to other strains of swine influenza known to be circulating in the region (sharing 6 of 8 gene segments) has led to the assumption that this novel H1N1 strain is derived from pigs. [insert in text: Influenza A virus ecology with relevance to swine Influenza A viruses -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Influenza A viruses infect a large variety of animal species, including mammals and birds, and, given the worldwide animal-human interface, there is potential for interspecies transmission of influenza viruses in nature. Phylogenetic studies of influenza A viruses have revealed species-specific lineages of viral genes and have also demonstrated the frequency of interspecies transmision depends on the animal species. Aquatic birds are known to be the source of all influenza viruses for other species. Pigs are an important host in influenza virus ecology as they are susceptible to infection with both avian- and human-origin influenza A viruses, and are often involved in interspecies transmission, facilitated by regular close contact with people and/or birds. Following transmission to and independent spread of avian or human influenza viruses in pigs, these viruses are general referred to as being "avian-like" or "human-like" swine influenza viruses, reflecting both their previous and current hosts. After reassortment with other influenza A viruses, some of the genes of these viruses may be maintained in the resulting progeny viruses. Therefore, the evolution of influenza genes in species-specific lineagesis an invaluable characteristic in studying and determining influenza virus epidemiology.] Influenza viruses in pigs in Europe ----------------------------------- A number of countries in Europe conduct routine surveillance of pig populations for swine influenza, but, as this is not a notifiable disease in the EU, the surveillance programme is not consistent across the region. A European Swine Network for Influenza in Pigs (ESNIP2), funded by the EU, has been proactively monitoring the influenza situation in the European pig population for several years, and has demonstrated that subtypes H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 co-circulate. There are also some significant differences in epidemiology in terms of the virus subtypes involved within the EU. For example, currently in Great Britain (GB) "avian-like" swine H1N1 viruses co-circulate with H1N2, but H3N2 has apparently disappeared since the mid-1990s [Data tabulated in the original text]. This is in contrast, for example, to the situation in Italy, where these viruses are still widespread (Van Reeth and others 2008). The genotypic diversity of the influenza viruses in the European pig population is also well recognised, and periodically genotypic variants are identified. However, broadly, the endemic strains retain common genotypes and the new reassorted variants appear to have poor viability for long-term sustainability and transmission within the swine population (Brown 2008). This is in contrast to the current situation in North America, where multiple genotypes of several different subtypes have emerged within the past 10 years, creating a complex aetiology with respect to swine influenza in these populations. Based on current evidence from surveillance programmes in several European countries, the variant of H1N1 virus recently isolated in human beings has never been reported, and therefore does not appear to be present in the European pig population. Swine influenza surveillance in Great Britain --------------------------------------------- In Great Britain, the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) has run a national swine influenza scanning surveillance programme since 1991, funded by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). This programme is targeted, based on clear criteria using a standardised case definition, selection algorithm and sampling protocol, and provides free-of-charge laboratory testing for the detection of swine influenza viruses in clinical samples from affected pigs submitted by veterinary surgeons to VLA regional laboratories (RLs) and Scottish Agricultural College (SAC) Veterinary Services. Further information can be found on the VLA website at <http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/diseases/dis_si.htm>, or from local VLA *** RLs or SAC disease surveillance centres. It is important for vigilance to be maintained within both the swine and human sectors for the emergence or spread of the newly reported H1N1 virus. The recent report of human-to-pig transmission in Alberta, Canada, highlights the importance of reverse zoonosis, a recognised phenomenon in influenza virus epidemiology. Ongoing close liaison and collaboration is also occurring between the VLA and public health institutes and delivery agencies to ensure rapid and robust information exchange. Capacity for change ------------------- The global human-animal interface is complex and dynamic, with the potential for zoonotic transmission of known pathogens, variants thereof and emergent infectious agents. In turn, animal reservoirs and people, both with the capacity for rapid global movement and distribution in time and space (intrinsic properties of globalisation), face these shared infectious challenges, not forgetting the propensity of some pathogens for 2-way exchange between species. While the novel H1N1 influenza virus is assumed to be of animal origin, it is now clearly spreading between humans and has already entered the EU, as well as other parts of the world. However, to date, human-to-animal transmission has not been identified or reported by EU member states. The case of human-to-pig transmission in Canada followed contact of an infected occupationally exposed worker, apparently incubating H1N1 virus infection following return from travel to Mexico. It also seems inevitable that more human cases will be detected worldwide. It is important to note that the potential host range for this virus is currently unknown. Potential changes in the virus characteristics need to be closely monitored by both public health and veterinary institutes. The world is watching on as international scientific and sociopolitical efforts attempt to better understand and combat an historical foe with seemingly limitless capacity for change and variation, and to evade predictions -- the influenza virus. [byline: Richard Irvine and Ian Brown Veterinary Laboratories Agency] References ---------- 1. Alexander DJ, Brown IH. Recent zoonoses caused by influenza A viruses. OIE Scientific and Technical Review 2000; 19: 197-225. 2. Brown IH. The epidemiology and evolution of influenza viruses in pigs. Veterinary Microbiology 2000; 74: 29-46 3. Brown IH. The role of pigs in interspecies transmission. In: H-D Klenk, MN Matrosovich, J Stech (editors). Avian Influenza. Monogr Virol. Karger, 2008; 27: 88-100. 4. Van Reeth K, Brown IH, Darrwald R, Foni E, Labarque G, Lany P, et al. Seroprevalence of H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 swine influenza viruses in seven European countries in 2002-2003. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 2008; 2: 99-105. -- communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmil.org> [see also: Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (30): case counts 20090516.1831 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (29) 20090515.1824 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (28): case counts 20090515.1822 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (27): case counts 20090514.1800 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (26) 20090514.1798 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (25): case counts 20090513.1785 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (24): case counts 20090512.1772 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (23) 20090511.1764 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (22): case counts 20090511.1759 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (21) 20090510.1749 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (20): case counts 20090510.1741 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (10): case counts 20090504.1675 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide 20090430.1636] .......................cp/ejp/sh *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID and its associated service providers shall not be held responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted or archived material. ************************************************************ Become a ProMED-mail Premium Subscriber at <http://www.isid.org/ProMEDMail_Premium.shtml> ************************************************************ Visit ProMED-mail's web site at <http://www.promedmail.org>. Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help, etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org. ############################################################ ############################################################

You had me up until you mentioned death camps- I completely agree that whatever is “really going on” regarding “H1N1 or any of the other H1, H7, H2, H5- avian, bird, swine or human -yada yada yada- flu was absolutely created in a lab by our own government and I also agree it is going in a very strange direction- either to control the population- or forced vaccinations- but death camps? Perhaps that thought is just something- I don’t want to think about yet.

Hummmmmm- and yet again...... International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> Date: Tue 5 May 2009 Source: The Poultry Site [edited] <http://www.thepoultrysite.com/poultrynews/17685/bird-flu-found-at-another-tennessee-farm> Bird flu found at another Tennessee farm ---------------------------------------- Avian flu has been found at another poultry farm in Tennessee. It is a low-pathogenic form, and the flu virus is the same as that found last week [27 Apr 2009] at another farm in the state. Tennessee and federal authorities are investigating a Lincoln County poultry farm after tests found a strain of avian influenza virus, according to WATE [Channel 6 TV]. The Tennessee Agriculture Department said in a statement on 4 May 2009 that the strain poses minimal risk to human health and is not the strain associated with human and poultry outbreaks in other countries. Officials said the strain can cause slight illness in poultry. A preliminary test on 1 May 2009 indicated the possibility of avian flu on the farm. Additional testing was completed by the US Department of Agriculture. The farm provides breeding stock for poultry farms and none of the poultry have entered the food supply. State officials told WATE this is the same strain found on a poultry farm in Giles County last week [27 Apr 2009] but there is no apparent connection. -- communicated by: ProMED-mail rapporteur Mary Marshall [How fascinating that the strain appears to be the same yet there seems to be no connection. I wonder if there are personnel that are the same between these 2 operations? Are there any birds that have been traded? Is there access to any wild avians that could have passed the virus to these facilities? - Mod.TG The state of Tennessee in the Southern US can be located on the HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map at <http://healthmap.org/r/00bP>. - CopyEd.MJ] [see also: Avian influenza (LPAI), poultry - USA (03): (TN) 20090505.1682 Avian influenza (LPAI), poultry - USA (02): (KY), H7N9 20090408.1361 Avian influenza (LPAI), poultry - USA (KY): H7 20090405.1314] .................tg/mj/sh *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID and its associated service providers shall not be held responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted or archived material. ************************************************************ Become a ProMED-mail Premium Subscriber at <http://www.isid.org/ProMEDMail_Premium.shtml> ************************************************************ Visit ProMED-mail's web site at <http://www.promedmail.org>. Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help, etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. For assistance from a human being send mail to: owner-promed@promedmail.org. ############################################################ ############################################################

Another interesting update from ProMED... INFLUENZA A (H1N1) - WORLDWIDE (19) *********************************** A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> In this update: [1] Triple-reassortant swine flu (ex NEJM) [2] Emergence of novel strain (ex NEJM) ****** [1] Triple-reassortant swine flu Date: Thu 7 May 2009 Source: The New England Journal of Medicine [edited] <http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMoa0903812> Triple-Reassortant Swine Influenza A (H1) in Humans in the United States, 2005***2009 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction ------------ Pigs have been hypothesized to act as a mixing vessel for the reassortment of avian, swine, and human influenza viruses and might play an important role in the emergence of novel influenza viruses capable of causing a human pandemic. Recent reports of widespread transmission of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) viruses in humans in Mexico, the United States, and elsewhere highlight this ever-present threat to global public health. Between the 1930s and the 1990s, the most commonly circulating swine influenza virus among pigs -- classic swine influenza A (H1N1) -- underwent little change. However, by the late 1990s, multiple strains and subtypes (H1N1, H3N2, and H1N2) of triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses -- whose genomes included combinations of avian, human, and swine influenza virus gene segments -- had emerged and became predominant among North American pig herds. Influenza virus infection was identified as a cause of febrile respiratory illness in pigs as early as 1931, 3 years before influenza viruses were identified as a cause of illness in people. Classic swine influenza viruses are enzootic among pigs in North America. Cases and clusters of human infections with swine influenza viruses have been reported sporadically in the United States since the 1970s. Worldwide, more than 50 cases of swine influenza virus infection in humans, most due to classic swine influenza virus, have been documented in the past 35 years, and serologic studies suggest that people with occupational swine exposure are at highest risk for infection. Before the current epidemic of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) viruses, illness from classic swine influenza viruses, including 7 deaths, had been reported in both previously healthy persons and those with preexisting medical conditions (including pregnancy). Signs and symptoms of infection with classic swine influenza virus in humans are often indistinguishable from those of infection with human influenza viruses. Until April 2009, only limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza virus had been reported. Outside the United States, there have been 2 published case reports of human infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses (both subtype H3N2). Before 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had been receiving approximately one or 2 case reports of human infection with classic swine influenza viruses per year. The CDC identified the 1st human infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses in the United States in December 2005. In June 2007, human infection with a novel influenza A virus (including influenza viruses of animal origin) was classified as a nationally notifiable infectious disease in the United States. From December 2005 through February 2009, the CDC received 11 notifications of human infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A(H1) viruses, 8 of which occurred after June 2007. In this article, we characterize the epidemiologic and clinical features of the 1st 11 cases in humans reported in the United States between December 2005 and February 2009. An additional human case of infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses was detected in South Dakota in January 2009 but is not described here, because serologic studies for the patient and the patient's contacts are pending finalization of the serologic assay for infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses. Abstract -------- Background: Triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses -- containing genes from avian, human, and swine influenza viruses -- emerged and became enzootic among pig herds in North America during the late 1990s. Methods: We report the clinical features of the 1st 11 sporadiccases of infection of humans with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses, occurring from December 2005 through February 2009, until just before the current epidemic of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) among humans. These data were obtained from routine national influenza surveillance reports and from joint case investigations by public and animal health agencies. Results: The median age of the 11 patients was 10 years (range, 16 months to 48 years), and 4 had underlying health conditions. 9 of the patients had had exposure to pigs, 5 through direct contact and 4 through visits to a location where pigs were present but without contact. In another patient, human-to-human transmission was suspected. The range of the incubation period, from the last known exposure to the onset of symptoms, was 3 to 9 days. Among the 10 patients with known clinical symptoms, symptoms included fever (in 90 percent), cough (in 100 percent), headache (in 60 percent), and diarrhea (in 30 percent). Complete blood counts were available for 4 patients, revealing leukopenia in 2, lymphopenia in one, and thrombocytopenia in another. 4 patients were hospitalized, 2 of whom underwent invasive mechanical ventilation. 4 patients received oseltamivir, and all 11 recovered from their illness. Conclusions: From December 2005 until just before the current human epidemic of swine-origin influenza viruses, there was sporadic infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses in persons with exposure to pigs in the United States. Although all the patients recovered, severe illness of the lower respiratory tract and unusual influenza signs such as diarrhea were observed in some patients, including those who had been previously healthy. [byline: Vivek Shinde, M.D., M.P.H., Carolyn B. Bridges, M.D., Timothy M. Uyeki, M.D., M.P.H, M.P.P., Bo Shu, B.S., Amanda Balish, B.S., Xiyan Xu, M.D., Stephen Lindstrom, Ph.D., Larisa V. Gubareva, M.D., Ph.D., Varough Deyde, Ph.D., Rebecca J. Garten, Ph.D., Meghan Harris, M.P.H., Susan Gerber, M.D., Susan Vagoski, D.V.M., Forrest Smith, M.D., Neal Pascoe, R.N., Karen Martin, M.P.H., Deborah Dufficy, D.V.M., M.P.H., Kathy Ritger, M.D., M.P.H., Craig Conover, M.D., Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., M.P.H., Alexander Klimov, Ph.D., Joseph S. Bresee, M.D., and Lyn Finelli, Dr.P.H.] -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [2] Emergence of novel strain Date: Thu 7 May 2009 Source: The New England Journal of Medicine [edited] <http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMoa0903810> Emergence of a Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Humans -------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction ------------ Triple-reassortant swine influenza viruses, which contain genes from human, swine, and avian influenza A viruses, have been identified in swine in the United States since 1998, and 12 cases of human infection with such viruses were identified in the United States from 2005 through 2009. On 15 Apr 2009 and 17 Apr 2009, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) identified 2 cases of human infection with a swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) characterized by a unique combination of gene segments that had not been identified among human or swine influenza A viruses. As of 5 May 2009, cases of human infection with the same novel virus have also been identified in Mexico, Canada, and elsewhere. We report the 1st 643 confirmed cases of human infection with this virus in the United States. Abstract -------- Background: Triple-reassortant swine influenza viruses, which contain genes from human, swine, and avian influenza A viruses, have been identified in swine in the United States since 1998, and 12 cases of human infection with such viruses were identified in the United States from 2005 through 2009. On 15 Apr 2009 and 17 Apr 2009, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified 2 cases of human infection with a swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) characterized by a unique combination of gene segments that had not been identified among human or swine influenza A viruses. As of 5 May 2009, cases of human infection with the same novel virus have also been identified in Mexico, Canada, and elsewhere. We report the 1st 643 confirmed cases of human infection with this virus in the United States. Methods: Enhanced surveillance was implemented in the United States for human infection with influenza A viruses that could not be subtyped. Specimens were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for real-time reverse-transcriptase***polymerase-chain-reaction confirmatory testing for S-OIV. Results: From 15 Apr 2009 through 5 May 2009, a total of 642 confirmed cases of S-OIV infection were identified in 41 states. The ages of patients ranged from 3 months to 81 years; 60 percent of patients were 18 years of age or younger. Of patients with available data, 18 percent had recently traveled to Mexico, and 16 percent were identified from school outbreaks of S-OIV infection. The most common presenting symptoms were fever (94 percent of patients), cough (92 percent), and sore throat (66 percent); 25 percent of patients had diarrhea, and 25 percent had vomiting. Of the 399 patients for whom hospitalization status was known, 36 (9 percent) required hospitalization. Of 22 hospitalized patients with available data, 12 had characteristics that conferred an increased risk of severe seasonal influenza, 11 had pneumonia, 8 required admission to an intensive care unit, 4 had respiratory failure, and 2 died. The S-OIV was determined to have a unique genome composition that had not been identified previously. Conclusions: A novel swine-origin influenza A virus was identified as the cause of outbreaks of febrile respiratory infection ranging from self-limited to severe illness. It is likely that the number of confirmed cases underestimates the number of cases that have occurred. -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> [These 2 papers provide well-documented accounts of the nature of the viruses circulating prior to and subsequent to the appearance of the novel 2009 strain of influenza A (H1N1) virus. Interested readers should consult these papers in conjunction. - Mod.CP] [see also: Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (18): case counts 20090509.1728 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (17) 20090508.1722 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (16): case counts 20090507.1715 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (15) 20090507.1709 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (14): case counts 20090507.1702 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (13) 20090506.1695 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (12): case counts 20090505.1681 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (11): coincident H3N2 variation 20090505.1679 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (10): case counts 20090504.1675 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (09) 20090504.1673 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (08): case counts 20090503.1660 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (07) 20090503.1658 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (06): case counts 20090502.1654 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (05) 20090503.1657 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (04): case counts 20090501.1648 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (03) 20090501.1646 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (02): case counts 20090430.1638 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide 20090430.1636] ....................cp/ejp/dk *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. 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Just an update` INFLUENZA A (H1N1) - WORLDWIDE (18): CASE COUNTS ************************************************ A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> [Please note that there may be discrepancies between the various sources of information due to different times of "closure" of daily figures reported. Times of daily report closures where known are listed in the table of contents below. Oftentimes a newswire will mention a confirmed case in a location that has not been on the official reporting entity list as the confirmation arrived after closure of the day's report. - Mod.MPP] In this update: [1] WHO - global update (16:00 GMT) [2] PAHO - Americas regional update (13:00 GMT-4) [3] CDC - USA update (11:00 GMT -4) [4] Mexico - MOH update (08:30 GMT -5) [5] Canada - Health Protection Agency (15:00 GMT -4) [6] News briefs ****** [1] WHO - global update (16:00 GMT) Date: 8 May 2009 Source: WHO Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) [edited] <http://www.who.int/csr/en/> a. Influenza A(H1N1) - update 21 -- 8 May 2009 <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_08/en/index.html> As of 06:00 GMT, 8 May 2009, 24 countries have officially reported 2384 cases of influenza A (H1N1) infection. Mexico has reported 1112 laboratory confirmed human cases of infection, including 42 deaths. The United States has reported 896 laboratory confirmed human cases, including 2 deaths. The following countries have reported laboratory confirmed cases with no deaths - Austria (1), Canada (214), China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1), Colombia (1), Costa Rica (1), Denmark (1), El Salvador (2), France (5), Germany (10), Guatemala (1), Ireland (1), Israel (6), Italy (5), Netherlands (2), New Zealand (5), Poland (1), Portugal (1), Republic of Korea (3), Spain (81), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1) and the United Kingdom (32). ****** b. Influenza A(H1N1) - update 22 -- 8 May 2009 <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_08a/en/index.html> As of 16:00 GMT, 8 May 2009, 25 countries have officially reported 2500 cases of influenza A (H1N1) infection. Mexico has reported 1204 laboratory confirmed human cases of infection, including 44 deaths. The United States has reported 896 laboratory confirmed human cases, including 2 deaths. The following countries have reported laboratory confirmed cases with no deaths - Austria (1), Brazil (4), Canada (214), China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1), Colombia (1), Costa Rica (1), Denmark (1), El Salvador (2), France (12), Germany (11), Guatemala (1), Ireland (1), Israel (7), Italy (6), Netherlands (3), New Zealand (5), Poland (1), Portugal (1), Republic of Korea (3), Spain (88), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1) and the United Kingdom (34). ****** Summary table of cases reported to WHO 30 Apr 2009 / 1 May / 2 May / 3 May / 4 May / 5 May / 6 May / 7 May / 8 May ---------------- Country: No. cases (deaths) 30 Apr 2009 / 1 May / No. cases (deaths) 2 May / 3 May / 4 May / 5 May / 6 May / 7 May / 8 May Austria: 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Brazil: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 4 Canada: 19 / 34 / 51 / 85 / 101 / 140 / 165 / 201 / 214 China, Hong Kong, SAR: 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Colombia: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Costa Rica: 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Denmark: 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 El Salvador: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 France: 0 / 0 / 2 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 5 / 5 / 12 Germany: 3 / 4 / 6 / 8 / 8 / 9 / 9 / 10 / 11 Guatemala: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 Ireland: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Israel: 2 / 2 / 3 / 3 / 4 / 4 / 4 / 6 / 7 Italy: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 2 / 5 / 5 / 5 / 6 Mexico: 97(7) / 156 (9) / 397 (16) / 506 (19) / 590 (25) / 822 (29) / 942 (29) / 1112 (42) / 1204 (44) Netherlands: 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 3 New Zealand: 3 / 4 / 4 / 4 / 6 / 6 / 5 / 5 / 5 Poland: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 Portugal: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Republic of Korea: 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 3 / 3 Spain: 13 / 13 / 13 / 40 / 54 / 57 / 73 / 81 / 88 Sweden: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 Switzerland: 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 United Kingdom: 8 / 8 / 15 / 15 / 18 / 27 / 28 / 32 / 34 United States: 109 (1) / 141 (1) / 160 (1) / 226 (1) / 286 (1) / 403 (1) / 642 (2) / 896 (2) Total No. countries reporting cases: 11 / 13 / 16 / 18 / 21 / 21 / 23 / 24 / 25 Total cases reported: 257 (8) / 367 (10) / 658 (17) / 898 (20) / 1085 (26) / 1490 (30) / 1893 (31) / 2371 (44) / 2500 (46) -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail Rapporteur Marianne Hopp ****** [2] PAHO - Americas regional update (13:00 GMT-4) Date: 8 May 2009 Source: PAHO H1N1 flu website [edited] <http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1329&Itemid=569> Update. Influenza A (H1N1) Regional Report (8 May 2009 1 PM) Epidemiological Alerts Vol. 6, No. 24 ------------------------------------- Two new countries have confirmed cases of Influenza A/H1N1. Yesterday [7 May 2009], Brazil reported 4 confirmed cases of Influenza A/H1N1 and today, Argentina reported one case. As of 8 May 2009, the total number of confirmed cases of Influenza A (H1N1) recorded is 3067, including 46 deaths, in 9 countries of the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States). The increase in the number of cases in the United States since yesterday is due to the recent laboratory-confirmation of samples that were collected in previous weeks. To date, the United States has confirmed a total of 1639 cases of Influenza A (H1N1), including 2 deaths in Texas, in 43 states (including the District of Columbia): 4 in Alabama, 131 in Arizona, 107 in California, 25 in Colorado, 4 in Connecticut, 39 in Delaware, 6 in Florida, 3 in Georgia, 5 in Hawaii, 1 in Idaho, 392 in Illinois, 29 in Indiana, 5 in Iowa, 12 in Kansas, 3 in Kentucky, 7 in Louisiana, 4 in Maine, 4 in Maryland, 83 in Massachusetts, 49 in Michigan, 1 in Minnesota, 9 in Missouri, 4 in Nebraska, 8 in Nevada, 3 in New Hampshire, 7 in New Jersey, 8 in New Mexico, 174 in New York, 7 in North Carolina, 6 in Ohio, 4 in Oklahoma, 15 in Oregon, 2 in Pennsylvania, 7 in Rhode Island, 29 in South Carolina, 1 in South Dakota, 36 in Tennessee, 93 in Texas, 24 in Utah, 14 in Virginia, 33 in Washington, 1 in Washington D.C. and 240 in Wisconsin. Other suspected cases are being investigated. From [1 Mar 2009 to 6 May 2009], Mexico has reported 1204 confirmed cases of Influenza A (H1N1), including 44 deaths, in 29 of 32 states. The states with the highest number of confirmed cases are the Federal District (Mexico City), Mexico State, San Luis Potosi and Hidalgo. The majority of these cases have occurred in previously healthy young adults. In Canada, to date 214 human cases of Influenza A (H1N1) have been confirmed in 9 of 13 provinces: (33 in Alberta, 54 in British Columbia, 2 in New Brunswick, 53 in Nova Scotia, 11 in Quebec, 1 in Manitoba, 56 in Ontario, 2 in Prince Edward Island and 2 in Saskatchewan). Some of the cases had recent travel history to Mexico. All of the cases developed a mild form of influenza-like illness. Some of the cases also presented gastrointestinal symptoms. Indigenous transmission is not discarded since not all of the confirmed cases have recent travel history to Mexico. On [2 May 2009], Costa Rica notified 1 confirmed case of Influenza A (H1N1). On [3 May 2009], Colombia reported 1 confirmed case of Influenza A (H1N1), while El Salvador reported 2 confirmed cases of Influenza A (H1N1). On [5 May 2009], Guatemala notified 1 confirmed case of Influenza A (H1N1) in a person that had travelled to Mexico. On [7 May 2009] Brazil reported 4 confirmed cases of Influenza A (H1N1), all of them with recent travel history to affected areas. Today, Argentina reported the confirmation of 1 confirmed case of Influenza A (H1N1) with travel history to Mexico. Various countries of the Region are reporting suspected and probable cases. This indicates that surveillance enhancement is producing results. -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [3] CDC - USA update (11:00 GMT -4) Date: 8 May 2009 Source: CDC H1N1 flu website [edited] <http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/> H1N1 Flu (Swine Flu) -------------------- States: Cumulative no. of lab. confirmed cases (Deaths) 30 Apr 2009 / 1 May / 2 May / 3 May / 4 May / 5 May / 6 May / 7 May / 8 May Alabama 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 4 / 5 / 4 / 4 / 4 Arizona: 1 / 4 / 4 /18 / 17 / 17 / 48 / 48 / 131 California: 14 / 13 / 24 / 26 / 30 / 49 / 67 / 106 / 107 Colorado: 0 / 2 / 2 / 4 / 7 / 6 / 17 / 17 / 25 Connecticut: 0 / 0 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 4 Delaware: 0 / 4 / 4 / 10 / 20 / 20 / 33 / 28 / 39 Florida: 0 / 0 / 2 / 3 / 5 / 5 / 5 / 5 / 6 Georgia: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 3 / 3 / 3 Hawaii: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 3 / 3 / 5 Idaho: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Illinois: 0 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 8 / 82 / 122 / 204 / 392 Indiana: 1 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 15 / 15 / 29 Iowa: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 5 / 5 Kansas: 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 7 / 12 Kentucky*: 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 3 Louisiana: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 7 / 7 / 7 / 7 / 7 Maine: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 4 / 4 Maryland: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 4 / 4 / 4 / 4 / 4 Massachusetts: 2 / 2 / 8 / 7 / 6 / 6 / 45 / 71 / 83 Michigan: 1 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 8 / 9 / 49 Minnesota: 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Missouri: 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 4 / 9 Nebraska: 0 / 1 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 4 / 4 / 4 Nevada: 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 5 / 5 / 8 New Hampshire: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 3 New Jersey: 0 / 5 / 7 / 7 / 7 / 6 / 7 / 7 / 7 New Mexico: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 3 / 8 / 8 New York: 50 / 50 / 50 / 63 / 73 / 90 / 97 / 98 / 174 North Carolina: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 7 / 7 / 7 Ohio: 1 / 1 / 1 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 5 / 5 / 6 Oklahoma: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 4 Oregon: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 3 / 15 / 15 / 15 / 15 Pennsylvania: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 Rhode Island: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 7 South Carolina: 10 / 16 / 13 / 15 / 15 / 16 / 16 / 17 / 29 South Dakota: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 Tennessee: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 36 Texas: 26 (1) / 28 (1) / 28 (1) / 40 (1) / 41 (1) / 41 (1) / 61 (2) / 91 (2) / 93 (2) Utah: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 8 / 24 Virginia: 0 / 2 / 2 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 11 / 14 Washington: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 9 / 23 / 33 Washington, DC: Washington: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 Wisconsin: 0 / 0 / 0 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 6 / 26 / 240 Total number of states: 11 / 19 / 21 / 30 / 36 / 38 / 41 / 41 / 43 Total counts, cases (deaths): 109 (1) / 141 (1) / 160 (1) / 226 (1) / 279 (1) / 403 (1) / 642 (2) / 896 (2) / 1639 (2) *Case is resident of KY but currently hospitalized in GA. [For a map of number of cases by state, see <http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/update.htm> - Mod.MPP] -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [4] Mexico - MOH update (08:30 GMT -5) Date: 8 May 2009 Source: Secretaria de Salud website (MOH) [Trans. by Mod.MPP, edited] <http://portal.salud.gob.mx/contenidos/noticias/influenza/estadisticas.html> Case counts: 29 Apr 2009 / 1 May / 2 May / 3 May / 4 May / 5 May / 6 May / 7 May / 8 May Number of confirmed cases: 99 / 397 / 443 / 506 / 727 / 866 / 1112 / 1204 / 1364 Number of deaths: 8 / 16 / 16 / 19 / 26 / 26 / 42 / 44 / 45 Date: 7 May 2009 Source: Secretaria de Salud website (MOH) [edited] <http://portal.salud.gob.mx/> [in yesterday's posting (7 May 2009), the case fatality rates calculated for the 0-9 year old and 10-19 year old age groups were erroneous and off by 2 decimal points. The corrected CFRs are presented below. ProMED-mail would like to thank Dr. Carl N Mayers <CNMAYERS@mail.dstl.gov.uk> and Kristin Choo <kchoo@aol.com> for pointing this out. We regret any confusions this may have caused. - Mod.MPP] Age distribution: No. cases (percent) / deaths (percent) / case-fatality rate (CFR) 0-9 years: 316 (26.2) / 2 (4.8) / 0.6 10-19 years: 303 (25.2) / 2 (4.8) / 0.7 20-29 years: 243 (20.2) / 16 (38.1) / 4.1 30-39 years: 130 (10.8) 9 (21.4) / 6.9 40-49 years: 105 (8.7) / 5 (11.9) / 4.8 50-59 years: 76 (6.3) / 4 (9.5) / 5.3 60 and older: 26 (2.2) / 4 (9.5) / 15.4 ND (not determined) 5 (0.4) Total: 1204 (42) [To download the 8 May 2009 graphics on the status of the epidemic, click on the link 08/Mayo/2009 <Situacion actual de la Epidemia>. There is an epidemic curve, age distribution data, and number of cases by state, with current map available at this link. - Mod.MPP] According to data presented in today's update, 84.1 percent of the fatalities occurred in the 20 - 54 year old age group. A breakdown of the deaths by educational level showed 41 percent of fatal cases had either no schooling, or had completed primary school. Information on the clinical symptoms of the 45 fatal cases shows that 93.3 percent had fever, 86.7 percent had cough, 80 percent had dyspnea (shortness of breath), 33.3 percent had hemoptysis (coughing up blood) and 28.9 percent were cyanotic (bluish discoloration due to low oxygenation). Only 2 of the fatal cases had date of onset of symptoms after 23 Apr 2009. Predisposing illnesses/conditions among fatalities included: Neoplasia: 2.2 percent Autoimmune disorders: 2.2 percent Smoking: 8.9 percent Cardiovascular disease: 11.1 percent Metabolic diseases (diabetes and obesity): 24.4 percent -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [5] Canada - Health Protection Agency (15:00 GMT -4) Date: 8 May 2009 Source: Health Protection Agency [edited] <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/swine-porcine/surveillance-eng.php> Province: Cumulative confirmed cases (deaths) of human swine influenza as of 30 Apr / 1 May / 2 May / 3 May / 4 May / 5 May / 6 May / 7 May / 8 May Alberta: 6 / 8 / 15 / 18 / 24 / 26 / 30 / 33 / 42 (1) British Columbia: 11 / 15 / 22 / 29 / 39 / 46 / 54 / 54 / 60 Manitoba: 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 Nova Scotia: 8 / 14 / 16 / 33 / 38 / 48 / 53 / 53 / 56 New Brunswick: 0 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 Ontario: 8 / 12 / 14 / 16 / 31 / 36 / 49 / 56 / 61 Prince Edward Island: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 3 Quebec: 1 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 3 / 4 / 10 / 11 / 15 Saskatchewan: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 2 Total no. Provinces with cases: 5 / 6 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 8 / 8 / 9 / 9 Total: 34 / 51 / 70 / 101 / 140 / 165 / 201 / 214 / 242 (1) As of [6 May 2009], half the cases are 22 years of age or younger (median: 22 years; range: 2 *** 66 years). To date, 3 cases have been hospitalized and one death has been reported. The most recent date of onset of illness is [3 May 2009]. [There is an epidemic curve available at the above URL link. The graph illustrates the course of the current H1N1 Flu Virus (Human Swine Flu) outbreak in Canada. It shows the date when symptoms of H1N1 Flu Virus (Human Swine Flu) began for each of the laboratory-confirmed cases. - Mod.MPP] -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> ****** [6] News briefs Date: 8 May 2009 [below are links to newswires with information on confirmed cases in countries not included in official updates from 6 May 2009, and other events of potential interest. The newswires are full of reports of suspected cases in many countries. Reports have been filtered and discarded as more information becomes available during the day. - Mod.MPP] Americas: Brazil: 1st person to person transmission in Brazil <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20090509-204045/Domestically-transmitted-flu-case-in-Brazil> Panama: 1st confirmed case, history of travel to the USA Mexico: fatalities due to late health care seeking behavior <http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Australia-Sees-First-Swine-Flu-Case-H1N1-Virus-Infects-People-In-27-Nations/Article/200905215278467> Asia: Japan: 1st confirmed cases (3), all with history of travel to Canada and USA <http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090508/wl_asia_afp/healthflujapan> Oceana: Australia: 1st confirmed case, history of travel to the USA <http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Australia-Sees-First-Swine-Flu-Case-H1N1-Virus-Infects-People-In-27-Nations/Article/200905215278467> -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail rapporteur Mary Marshall [To summarize the current situation, as of 8 May 2009 there have been a total of 2500 cases and 46 deaths of influenza A (H1N1) infection officially reported to WHO/PAHO coming from 25 countries, up from 2371 confirmed cases and 44 deaths from 24 countries yesterday (7 May 2009). The newly added country is Brazil. (According to the PAHO update, Argentina has officially confirmed a case. According to the newswires, there have been confirmed cases in Japan, Australia and Panama as well, and Brazil has confirmed person to person spread in Brazil, but official reports are still pending.) The USA has officially reported 1639 laboratory confirmed cases coming from 44 states (compared with 896 cases from 43 states on 7 May 2009), and 2 deaths (one in a Mexican child with pre-existing illness visiting in the USA and a 2nd in a resident of Texas with known pre-existing illness). Canada has reported 242 cases from 9 provinces with 1 death in an individual with pre-existing illness, up from 214 cases and no deaths reported from 9 provinces on 7 May 2009. Mexico has reported 1364 confirmed cases with 45 deaths (compared with 1204 cases and 44 deaths on 7 May 2009. For a map of reported confirmed cases, worldwide, as of 18:00 GMT 8 May 2009, see <http://www.who.int/csr/don/GlobalSubnationalMaster_20090508_1815.jpg>. For an interactive map of reported confirmed cases in the Americas, as of 13:00 GMT -4, showing burden of disease by state/province, see <http://ais.paho.org/flu/sm/en/atlas.html>. For a static map of reported cases in the Americas, as of 13:00 GMT -4 see <http://new.paho.org/hq/swine_files/mapeng.htm> - Mod.MPP] [see also: Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (17) 20090508.1722 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (16): case counts 20090507.1715 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (15) 20090507.1709 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (14): case counts 20090507.1702 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (13) 20090506.1695 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (12): case counts 20090505.1681 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (11): coincident H3N2 variation 20090505.1679 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (10): case counts 20090504.1675 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (09) 20090504.1673 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (08): case counts 20090503.1660 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (07) 20090503.1658 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (06): case counts 20090502.1654 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (05) 20090503.1657 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (04): case counts 20090501.1648 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (03) 20090501.1646 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide (02): case counts 20090430.1638 Influenza A (H1N1) - worldwide 20090430.1636 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": worldwide (07), update, pandemic 5 20090429.1622 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": worldwide (06) 20090429.1614 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": worldwide (05) 20090428.1609 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": worldwide (04) 20090428.1601 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": worldwide (03) 20090428.1600 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": Worldwide (02) 20090427.1586 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": Worldwide 20090427.1583 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human: worldwide 20090426.1577 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - New Zealand, susp 20090426.1574 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America (04) 20090426.1569 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America (03) 20090426.1566 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America (02) 20090425.1557 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America 20090425.1552 Acute respiratory disease - Mexico, swine virus susp 20090424.1546 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - USA (02): (CA, TX) 20090424.1541 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - USA: (CA) 20090422.1516 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - Spain 20090220.0715 2008 ---- Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - USA (TX) 20081125.3715 2007 ---- Influenza A (H2N3) virus, swine - USA 20071219.4079 Influenza, swine, human - USA (IA): November 2006 20070108.0077] ......................mpp/ejp/dk *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID and its associated service providers shall not be held responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted or archived material. ************************************************************ Become a ProMED-mail Premium Subscriber at <http://www.isid.org/ProMEDMail_Premium.shtml> ************************************************************ Visit ProMED-mail's web site at <http://www.promedmail.org>. Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help, etc. to: majordomo@promedmail.org. 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INFLUENZA A (H1N1) - WORLDWIDE (17) *********************************** A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> Date: Fri 8 May 2009 From: Marcel Jonges <Marcel.Jonges@RIVM.NL> Travel-associated influenza A (H1N1) with a virus containing a mutation in PB2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ In the Netherlands, the 2nd laboratory confirmed human case of influenza A (H1N1) virus infection was reported on 7 May 2009. A 53-year-old woman returned on the 30 Apr 2009 from Cancun, Mexico. During the flight she developed an unproductive cough. Then, 2 days later on 2 May 2009, she had a temperature of 38.6C and a sore throat and consulted a general practitioner. Samples were submitted for diagnostic evaluation and both the patient and her husband were treated with oseltamivir. The patient recovered completely and uneventfully, and samples collected 4 days later tested negative. The virus was analyzed for presence of antiviral resistance markers in the neuraminidase and for human adaptation markers in the PB2 protein by direct sequencing. The sequence data suggested that the virus was susceptible to both oseltamivir and zanamivir. The amino acid 627 in PB2 (glutamicacid) was not human-host-adapted, similar to recent swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses. However, a glutamic acid to glycine amino acid substitution was detected at position 677 in PB2. This mutation was not observed in any of the A (H1N1) sequences submitted since 27 Apr 2009. Lam et al. (2008) postulated that this substitution could reflect adaptation to mammalian hosts of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses (1), as it was found to be under positive selection based on phylogenetics of Indonesian viruses. Based on the position of the mutation it might contribute to more efficient human-to-human transmission by enhanced replicative efficiency of the polymerase of the influenza A (H1N1) virus in humans [PB2 is a polymerase component. - Mod.CP]. Experiments are underway to test the relevance of this finding. Marcel.Jonges National Institute for Public Health and the Environment Centre for Infectious Disease Control P.O. Box 1 3720 BA, Bilthoven The Netherlands <Marcel.Jonges@RIVM.NL> [The identification of a single mutation in the PB2 gene (encoding the major component of the viral polymerase) of this Netherlands isolate of the novel 2009 strain of influenza A (H1N1) virus is an interesting finding only previously reported in the case of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus. It is conceivable that such a mutation might influence the transmissibility and the host range of the virus. However, it would be premature to draw such a conclusion since there appears to have been no onward transmission of the virus to any other person. Nonetheless this is clearly a site which should be kept under surveillance in future studies. - Mod.CP] [The Netherlands can be located on the HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map at: <http://healthmap.org/r/00by> -CopyEd.EJP]

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/executiveorder040403.htm one possible place I found it.....

Seven - not 159 - swine flu deaths in Mexico 06 May 2009 http://www.wddty.com/03363800372602779674/seven-not-159-swine-flu-deaths-in-mexico.html How many people have died from swine flu so far? If you believe what you read in the newspapers, you might think around 159 people have died in Mexico from the H1N1 virus. They haven’t – it’s just seven. Both the World Health Organization (WHO) and Mexico’s own health minister Jose Angel Cordova have confirmed the figure. The WHO’s Vivienne Allan, from its patient safety program, says: “Unfortunately that (150-plus deaths) is incorrect information and it does happen, but that’s not information that’s come from the World Health Organization. I repeat, the death toll is seven and they are all from Mexico.” Since her announcement, the first American citizen has died, but it’s hardly the stuff of a pandemic. Nonetheless, the WHO has now elevated swine flu to a ‘phase five’ pandemic, where there has been human-to-human spread in at least two countries. Despite the facts, the UK government’s health officials have predicted that up to 750,000 Britons could die in a flu pandemic, and its health minister, Alan Johnson, has told the House of Commons that there have been 89 deaths from the virus in Mexico, so he’s off by a factor of 12. Unless you’re a drug company, you have to wonder why governments – and the media - are acting so irresponsibly. If you’re interested in a conspiracy theory, look no further than Indonesia and its health minister Siti Faldilah Supari who says she has not ruled out the possibility that the H1N1 virus is man-made.

http://www.flickr.com/groups/751234@N22/pool/ Abstract Videos

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2009/05/taxi-driver-philosophizing-on-swine-flu.html Quick Links: Cuba. Current affairs. Immigration. Mexico. « Mexican alt-rockers Zoe are tearing down musical borders | Main | Mexico's illegal-reefer madness » Taxi-driver conspiracy theory on swine flu outbreak If you've spent any time in Mexico, especially Mexico City, then you'll be acquainted with Mexicans' love of conspiracy theory. As Ken Ellingwood wrote last year, "many Mexicans feel their leaders have lied so many times about so many things over the years that it's hard to believe them, even when they might be telling the truth." The H1N1 / swine flu outbreak that descended on Mexico more than a week ago has provided an abundance of inflammable fuel for those partial to conspiracy theories here in Mexico City. You don't have time to read, and I don't have time to write, all of the theories that I've heard over the last 10 days. But I would like to share my favorite with you, which came out during a conversation I had with Raul Camacho, a 62-year-old taxi driver, on Tuesday last week. I asked him why he wasn't wearing a face mask. At the beginning of last week, face masks and plastic gloves were yet to be mandatory for taxi drivers (that happened on Thursday), but everyone had been asked by the government to cover their noses and mouths as a precaution. Camacho said he wasn't worried about protecting himself because he didn't believe the risk was as high as both the federal and city governments would have us believe. "People in power do or say whatever they like to get what they want," he said. Camacho then went on to explain to me that Mexico President Felipe Calderon was, in fact, making up the whole flu story to give Mexicans the impression that he was taking care of them and saving them from certain and gruesome death. Camacho referred back to Mexico's controversial 2006 elections during which Calderon beat the left-leaning Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in a voting process that many still claim was fraudulent and referred to Calderon as "el espurio" (the illegitimate one). Calderon is trying to gain legitimacy with this swine flu "story," Camacho said. OK, I asked, if that's the case, why is Mexico City Mayor Marcelo Ebrard, also a member of the opposition PRD party, going along with Calderon's flu-stopping strategy of closing schools and nonessential services? Camacho had an answer for that. "It's not convenient for Ebrard to fall out with Calderon right now. There are elections coming up in July, and he doesn't want any trouble before then." My ride came to an end before I could ask Camacho why the World Health Organization was also in on the plot, but no doubt he'd have had an explanation for that too. — Deborah Bonello in Mexico City

http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/2009/501/1?rss=1 Exclusive: Interview with Head of Mexico's Top Swine Flu Lab By Jon Cohen ScienceNOW Daily News 1 May 2009 Microbiologist Celia Alpuche heads the laboratory in Mexico that has become ground zero for the country's outbreak of swine flu. Alpuche spoke to Science yesterday from her office at the Instituto de Diagnóstico y Referencia Epidemiológicos (InDRE) in Mexico City. Many people have raised questions about whether Mexico could have detected this outbreak earlier and contained it before it spread elsewhere. But as Alpuche explains, InDRE had a confusing situation because the virus surfaced in the middle of flu season--and it may not have originated in Mexico anyway. Alpuche also sets the record straight about why it took several weeks to link the outbreak to the first case with symptoms, a 4-year-old boy from La Gloria in Veracruz state. And she frankly describes the limitations of her own lab. InDRE has worked closely with the Public Health Agency of Canada and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to identify the virus as the cause of the outbreak, and Mexico continues to collaborate to test samples of suspected cases. As of 1 May, Mexico had 156 confirmed cases and nine deaths, more than any country in the world. Mexico has identified another 1918 suspected cases, as described in the CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report yesterday, and InDRE is rushing to sort out how many are actually swine flu. Influenza is caused by two strains, A and B, and several different subtypes that are designated by the two proteins that stud the viral surface, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, followed by a number. The outbreak is caused by an influenza A virus of the subtype H1N1. Science: There have been many questions about the origin and the timing. When was there an indication that there were an unusual number of respiratory cases? Alpuche: On April 7, we heard that the National Institute of Respiratory Disease was having unusually severe cases of pneumonia in young adults who were previously healthy. Immediately, we started to get the data around this cluster. We also started to do a retrospective analysis of the influenza data we had. We looked at all data that we had regarding influenza detection since January up to this month and also to compare to the past season of influenza. In addition to the unusual pneumonia, we started to have rumors there were other cases that were not pneumonia, it was like a respiratory disease, an influenza-like illness. Science: Did you see anything from your analysis of influenza trends that told you anything? Alpuche: The first thing that it told us is that we were still detecting influenza in the country, not just in Mexico City. It was pretty much the same as we see every year except it was a prolongation of the flu season. Then we analyzed the subtypes of the strains of influenza, and one of the unusual things we saw was that in this season, we had the first peak in the last part of November and December and another one in February. Over the season, we started having more influenza B than we had the year before. Science: Which had nothing to do with this outbreak. Alpuche: Nothing to do with this. It was very confusing. We found that 37% of cases were B and the year before we only found up to 15% were B. Then we looked at data that they have in the influenza surveillance system at CDC to see if were having something unusual. We saw also in United States something kind of similar--a prolonged period of influenza and increases of strain B. So we thought that we were having something related to influenza, and we were still concerned about the pneumonia cases. We went back immediately to look at all the influenza outbreaks we had in the country since the season started to see if this was more related to the prolonged influenza or there was something else we were seeing. We had small outbreaks in some states in the central part of Mexico, Tlaxcala, and then the last outbreak we had was in Veracruz state, in the town of La Gloria, near Perote. That was in the last 2 weeks of March. Science: Why didn't that trigger concern in the last 2 weeks of March? Alpuche: It was influenza-like illness, no fatalities and no pneumonia cases. This outbreak was deeply studied with state epidemiologists. The secretary of health of Veracruz did a wonderful job during the outbreak in the last 2 weeks of March. Science: What capability did they have for typing subtypes? Alpuche: The influenza, laboratory-based surveillance network in Mexico is using immunofluorescence--that's the screening test, and it's using antibodies against A and B. So that's what the public health state lab is doing. Science: So they don't have subtype tests and had to refer the samples to you? Alpuche: Yes. Not immediately, because if there's nothing unusual, they wait to get accumulated cases and then send to the national referral center. One of the interesting things in this outbreak is they were testing, but the onset of symptoms was after 4 or 5 days. The sensitivity of the immunofluorescence test is low after 72 hours. Most of the tests, which were nasopharyngeal swabs, were negative. Science: You later did more sampling from La Gloria, right? Alpuche: In the last part of the outbreak in La Gloria, children started having symptoms April 1. They took the samples April 3. They sent the samples to the public health state lab, and they were processed April 4. These arrived at my lab on April 8. Science: What were the positive ones? Alpuche: They only identified three influenza strains at the end of the period. One turned out be H3N2. The other was A, but it was not heartening. Here at our lab, we were considering that it could be H1, but it looked indeterminate. To be honest, we were not able to type it. And then we had a B. Science: The one that you weren't able to type, did you send that anywhere else? Were you concerned that you couldn't type it? Alpuche: At that moment, we didn't have any information about the untypeable A's that they saw in the California children. Science: In the surveillance program here in California, if you cannot type it, you send it on to CDC. Alpuche: That's what we do. Our collaboration center is CDC. We have three different deadlines to do the accumulation of samples to send to CDC during the season. When we had that first indeterminate strain from La Gloria, we were not worried. By that time, the outbreak was controlled. Science: On April 12, Mexico notified the Pan American Health Organization as per the International Health Regulations about the influenza-like outbreak in Veracruz. Initially, did you think these cases looked like influenza? Alpuche: No, our initial thinking, as we reported according to the International Health Regulations, was that we were having intensification and prolongation of the influenza period. We thought the outbreaks of Tlaxcala and Perote were nothing unusual in terms of the pneumonia. Those were later on, and then we started to consider that there was something unusual. Science: On 17 April, Mexico started to increase its surveillance for influenza. What triggered the switch to enhanced, active surveillance? Alpuche: We got a notification of an isolated case, a 37-year-old woman, diabetic, who died because of respiratory disease and pneumonia in Oaxaca. The woman had onset of symptoms April 4. There was no connection at all with Perote. We got samples, and it was a lung biopsy because the relatives didn't allow an autopsy. They intensively investigated the contacts around these deaths. They found some with respiratory diseases but no fatalities. Nothing unusual, okay? They were tested, and all were negative for influenza and other viruses. Science: When did you first contact Frank Plummer, head of the National Microbiology Lab at the Public Health Agency of Canada? Alpuche: I contacted him April 17 by e-mail, and he answered immediately. He wanted to know more about this, and we had a long conversation on Saturday, April 18. Science: Frank told me that he initially didn't think influenza. He thought it would be an unknown pathogen. Alpuche: Exactly. And we discussed that with Dr. Plummer. In fact, I was the one who called him because I'm the lab person. I met him through the Global Health Security Action Group. And we've been talking about different collaborations, and immediately when we began discussing this and the epidemiology, we wanted to rule out everything we could. Science: Why did you contact him? Alpuche: Canada had a lot of experience with the screening of the severe acute respiratory syndrome, SARS, of unknown pathogenesis. Science: When did you learn of the first two California cases of swine flu that were reported in the MMWR on April 21. Alpuche: CDC sent me a preprint. I'm not sure exactly when. Science: When were samples sent to Canada and CDC? Alpuche: April 21. We asked for help from both at same time. The CDC is my collaborating center in the WHO network. They always help us, doing quality assessment for us, giving us reagents, doing training, transferring technology. But to do shipping for both of them, it was kind of hard. It was a little delayed to get all the permission from the U.S. Science: Was your decision to send it to Canada also because U.S. authorities were holding up your samples? Alpuche: No, not at all. I sent these samples to the CDC because they are my collaboration center. That's the way to do it. We get all the help we need from the CDC. Science: But I think it's important for the United States to learn from this. How long were your samples held up and why? Alpuche: It was just 1 day difference. I cannot tell you if this is because it is more difficult to send things from Mexico to the U.S. instead of Canada. To be honest, I cannot explain that. Science: I imagine you were frustrated by the delay. Alpuche: Yeah, but we knew we were going to get the help that we needed, and we got it. It was just a small difference. Science: When did you first hear back from Frank Plummer about your samples? Alpuche: We got the preliminary results April 22. Dr. Plummer got the samples at 3:00 in the afternoon, and by midnight he was calling me to say we had influenza A. Some of the samples I sent him, we knew they were influenza A. That week, we started seeing the A's and we started to change our mind about this influenza B prolongation of the seasonal influenza. Science: When did you learn that they were positive for a new swine flu virus? Alpuche: I first learned that it was swine from Frank Plummer; that was in the afternoon of April 23. And later that night Dr. Nancy Cox [of CDC] in a teleconference we had with Mexican experts, we were discussing this and she gave us the preliminary results that we have some swine strains, the ones that just arrived that day at CDC. Science: What do you think of the criticism that Mexico didn't do enough earlier on to catch this? It's coming from both the Mexican press and the international press. Alpuche: There's always going to be something to find guilty people in everything. This is a new, unknown virus. We've been growing so much in terms of diagnostics and epidemiological surveillance lately. We still have limitations, that's for sure. We really need to accept that. And we're working very hard to overcome those limitations. We, along with all the health authorities, did everything possible to try to define this as soon as possible. We're working so hard to try and control this. And we were very open since the beginning. When I received the confirmation from Dr. Frank Plummer, I was immediately in contact with my superior Dr. Mauricio Hernández, and he spoke immediately with Secretary Córdova and he was basically open. Science: Many laboratories in Mexico City I've visited are very sophisticated. What are the limitations that prevented your lab from identifying the new H1N1? What did CDC and Canada have that you didn't have? Alpuche: The only place in Mexico doing subtyping is this lab here. We are able to sequence and subtype, but we are overwhelmed with samples of influenza and other things from all around the country. It's a little bit slower than in the U.S. or Canada. Science: But what were the limits in your lab to isolate the virus and sequence it? Alpuche: Since this week, we have experts from CDC and Canada helping us to set up a real-time PCR [polymerase chain reaction] technology to test for swine H1N1 directly. Science: Is your lab the only lab in the country at this point that can do the confirmatory test with the real-time PCR machines? Alpuche: At this point, yes, but we're working with CDC and Canada to train molecular biologists in different institutions in six different states in Mexico. We have two real-time PCR machines we were able to get immediately--we borrowed one from the company. And now we bought 10 more machines. We are working full-time to speed up the diagnostics. Science: How many samples do you have waiting to be tested? Alpuche: Right now, we have a backlog of around 1000 tests that we're rushing to do on time. We're having three shifts of people working, during the morning, afternoon, and overnight. Science: You have 1000 samples waiting to be tested, but there are nearly 2000 suspected cases. Alpuche: Not all of the cases that were tested at the hospitals had samples that were referred to us. And not all of the 1000 samples we have are suspected cases. Science: Are you still sending samples to CDC and Canada? Alpuche: Yes, we sent more samples to Canada this week, and we are just arranging with the person here from CDC to send more samples to CDC. We want to rule out all these samples we're holding so that we can keep going with the new ones. Science: A lot of Mexican press and now press outside of Mexico has written about La Gloria and the large pig farm in nearby Perote, Granjas Carroll. There are all these allegations and even conspiracy theories. Alpuche: I don't know, there are so many rumors. Science: What about the boy in La Gloria who has received so much attention? Alpuche: It was mild disease, no problem. Science: Is it accurate that he is the index case? Alpuche: We're not sure about that. By the onset of symptoms, he's the first we're seeing in our database, that's all. Science: What's the onset for him. Alpuche: April 1. Science: There have been all these stories of Perote as the epicenter, or the originator. Do you believe that? Alpuche: We've been asking agriculture authorities, and they ensured us that they didn't detect any problems with outbreaks with animals in these farms near Perote. And the farm is 80 kilometers from La Gloria. Science: So it's very far. Alpuche: Even far for a person working there to make the commute. But we are investigating that. We are doing epidemiological surveillance. And we asked the other authorities, and there was basically nothing wrong. Science: Is there a confirmed case in any employee of Granjas Carroll? Alpuche: Not that I know so far. Science: One of the theories is that this originated in the United States or elsewhere and a human came to Mexico, possibly a migrant. The assumption that it was a big pig farm could be very misleading. Alpuche: Could be. That's the same thought we have. We need more data to prove it. One of the interesting thing is, we're seeing these cases isolated in Oaxaca and Perote, they are well-known for migration. And also the other state that we're seeing several cases now during the active epidemic is San Luis Potosí, and it's like the corridor for migration. It's hard to believe that it's going to be associated with this farm, but I know that the authorities are thoroughly investigated it. Science: Do you think if this surfaced somewhere other than Mexico it would have been contained, or does influenza just move too quickly anyway? Alpuche: Considering it was the end of the season, maybe that confused the fact a little that something else could grow, but probably influenza moves too quickly anyway. Science: The United States detected cases very early, and the United States was not able to contain it. It tells me that the virus is smarter. Alpuche: Yes, that's for sure. Science: One last thing. How many hours a night are you sleeping. Alpuche: [laughter] At the most two. Science: This has been going on for 2 weeks now. Alpuche: Yeah, so some days we're getting 2 hours and then a nap of half an hour. And there's Latte. Double shots. Espresso. Science: Anything you need, anything right now from the international community? Alpuche: We're okay now in the way we're working, and our collaborators. But at some point if we need it for sure I'll ask. But now, we're okay.

Thirty-Six Thousand People Do Not Die Each Year from "Regular Flu" (Confirmed)by Mike Adams, the Health Ranger, NaturalNews Editor (NaturalNews) Read just about any news report on swine flu deaths, and you'll come across a line that claims "36,000 people die each year from flu-related causes." It sounds authoritative. It's even a nice, round number. But where is this number coming from? And is it based on any actual science? This statistic is being paraded around by almost everybody, as if to say that swine flu isn't so bad because regular flu kills so many people each year anyway. The truth is that the only standard by which the CDC and WHO are quoting deaths from swine flu is if they are confirmed deaths from a particular viral strain. To them, if a death has not been confirmed in their labs, it does not count as a death from that flu. Got that? Only "confirmed" deaths count. And they must be confirmed in a laboratory using a rigorous method of comparing samples taken from the deceased with a known database of viral patterns. As it turns out, virtually none of the 36,000 people said to die from regular flu each year have been confirmed in any lab whatsoever. Thus, according to the guidelines of the CDC and WHO, they don't count. Based on their own rules, it is technically accurate to say that regular flu kills virtually no one. It's not true, of course, because people do die from the "regular flu" each year, but it is technically accurate according to the CDC and WHO rules for scientific evidence. Again, that's because nearly all of these "regular flu" deaths aren't confirmed by a CDC or WHO-recognized lab. Thus, they have no scientific standing. Infectious disease double standard I find it interesting that when talking about swine flu, the criteria for inclusion in statistics is positive identification in a rigorous laboratory. But when talking about regular flu, the criteria for inclusion is -- technically speaking -- anybody's wild guess. The 36,000 number, it turns out, was pulled out of thin air. It has no scientific validity whatsoever, even according to the CDC's own standards. I tracked down the origins of this number on CDC.gov, by the way. Turns out it was an estimate derived by the CDC in 2003 (http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pres...). It's an estimate, mind you, not a "confirmed" number of deaths. And that estimate has stayed exactly the same through 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Not a budge. Before the number was 36,000, it was 20,000 for many years. That tells you right off the bat this isn't some confirmed laboratory number -- it's a guesstimate! I'm not disagreeing with the number. It's probably a fairly accurate guess (the CDC folks are a smart bunch). But it doesn't meet the criteria by which these infectious disease organizations report influenza deaths. As the CDC even says on their own website, "This estimate came from a 2003 study published in the Journal of the American Medication Association (JAMA), which looked at the 1990-91 through the 1998-99 flu seasons [10]. Statistical modeling was used to estimate how many flu-related deaths occurred among people whose underlying cause of death on their death certificate was listed as a respiratory or circulatory disease. During these years, the number of estimated deaths ranged from 17,000 to 52,000." In other words, they took a look at how many people died from respiratory or circulatory disease, and from that they extrapolated "flu-related deaths." This is all accomplished through "statistical modeling," which is the equivalent of statisticians waving magic wands to create new numbers where none exist. Based on the sample size, it can be quite accurate (plus or minus a few percentage points), or it can be way off base depending on the accuracy of the statistical sample. Notably, if the same methodology were used to calculate swine flu deaths, it might currently show 300 or more deaths (and such methodologies would be widely criticized, of course, for being "just wild guesses," which they are). As the CDC admits itself, "CDC does not know exactly how many people die from flu each year." And... "It has been recognized for many years that influenza is infrequently listed on death certificates [12] and testing for influenza infections usually not done, particularly among the elderly who are at greatest risk of influenza complications and death. Some deaths – particularly in the elderly – are associated with secondary complications of influenza (including bacterial pneumonias)." (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/diseas...) In other words: Influenza isn't listed on death certificates and influenza testing isn't even done on most patients! Thus, it is not possible for these 36,000 influenza deaths to be confirmed at all. Swine flu may escape detection, too What else is interesting in all this is when the CDC explains that viral strains aren't even detectable in patients after the first few days of infection: "Influenza virus infection may not be identified in many instances because influenza virus is only detectable for a short period of time and many people don't seek medical care until after the first few days of acute illness." - The CDC If this is true, then isn't it also true that most swine flu patients can NEVER be confirmed in a lab? I find this quite curious, because according to what the CDC is saying here, it is impossible to ever get an accurate "confirmed" count of swine flu patients because the influenza virus isn't detectable after a "short period of time." Thus, by limiting swine flu death reports to only those patients who have been confirmed in a laboratory, the CDC is essentially eliminating the very possibility that many swine flu patients will ever be tested and identified as carrying the strain. Put another way, the criteria for identifying and reporting swine flu deaths is, itself, limiting the number of swine flu deaths that will ever be counted. Essentially, the system is rigged to under-report swine flu deaths by eliminating anyone who wasn't tested in time to identify the strain. This, I believe, is why the swine flu death count remains magically low even as doctors on the ground in Mexico City are reporting much larger numbers of real-world swine flu deaths. Different strains The other important thing to realize here is that the 36,000 figure is not talking about just one strain of influenza: It's a cumulative figure from ALL the other strains of influenza combined! "Regular flu," you see, isn't just one flu. It's a collection of potentially hundreds of different flu strains. So assigning the 36,000 deaths a year figure to "regular flu" is misleading because it makes it sound like a single strain of influenza. The truth is that nobody really knows how many deaths each year occur from the different strains of flu circulating in the wild. Some top-notch CDC officials can probably take a pretty good guess at it, but it's still just that: A guess. The real numbers are, frankly, unknown. It's also unknown how many people die from the viral load vs. how many die from secondary infections (such as bacterial pneumonia) that often follow viral infections. Technically, a lot of those 36,000 people (or so) might have been killed by various strains of common bacteria, not by the viruses. Yesterday morning, Mexico was reporting 159 deaths from swine flu. According to the WHO, that number is not only 7. How does 159 magically become 7? By including the word "confirmed" in front of it. Fine. Let's all go with the "confirmed" modifier. All infectious disease deaths must now be confirmed in a CDC or WHO laboratory in order to count. So that means the 36,000 number needs to be revised down to however many have been "confirmed" in that group. And how many is that? Only the CDC knows. I'm guessing it's a two-digit number. So much for the myth of "36,000 flu-related deaths a year." If you believe that number, I'm sure there's a job waiting for you at the U.S. Treasury Dept., too, where numbers are materialized out of thin air on a daily basis in order to finance the national debt.

you are NOT alone! I too -am.......freaking out.

Swine Flu Outbreak Could Be Linked to Smithfield Factory Farms Tue, 28 Apr 2009 12:44:46 -0500 Summary: Those of you who are dead-set on framing this as some sort of NWO lab-created virus intended for global depopulation will undoubtedly dismiss this as propaganda, smokescreen, or cover-up, but the potential for the origins of this deadly new flu strain being factory farms is quite substantial. Many have long been warning about the dangerous conditions of factory farming, and how, when combined with the now globalized movement of people and goods, we are presented with an unprecedented situation for outbreak and pandemic. Had such global movement of people and goods been present during the 1918 outbreak, the casualties would undoubtedly been much higher. http://www.guerrillanews.com/headlines/20353/Swine_Flu_Outbreak_Could_Be_Linked_to_Smithfield_Factory_Farms

http://www.whale.to/vaccine/sf1a.html

INFLUENZA A (H1N1) "SWINE FLU": WORLDWIDE (03) ********************************************** A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org> In this update: [1] Some questions [2] New Zealand [3] Israel [4] Comment on seasonality ****** [1] Some questions Date: Tue 28 Apr 2009 From: Roger Morris <R.S.Morris@massey.ac.nz> Some questions -------------- For those of us who are involved in international work on influenza epidemiology and control and responding to the many media enquiries, there is a very large information gap in relation to diagnosis and epidemiology of the Mexican influenza. What is known of the genetic structure of this virus? It has been called a swine flu, but no evidence has been put forward to allow this statement to be evaluated. I have received information that it is a reassortant, which has genetic components from 4 different sources, but nothing official has been released on this. Where does it fit phylogenetically? Is there any genetic variation of significance among the isolates investigated? Would this help to explain the difference in severity of disease between Mexico and other countries? It is also stated that it should be diagnosed by RT-PCR, without clarifying which PCR. I have received information that the standard PCR for H1 does not reliably detect this virus. Is this true? What is an appropriate series of diagnostic steps for samples from suspect cases? Could we have an authoritative statement on these issues from one of the laboratories, which has been working with the virus? -- Professor Roger Morris Emeritus Professor of Animal Health Massey University EpiCentre, PN623 Institute of Veterinary, Animal and Biomedical Sciences Massey University, Palmerston North New Zealand <R.S.Morris@massey.ac.nz> [The genome sequences of several US isolates are now available at GenBank: see <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/SwineFlu.html>. - Mod.CP] ****** [2] New Zealand Date: Tue 28 Apr 2009 Source: Ministry of Health, New Zealand, Media Release [edited] <http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/results-of-h1n1-swine-flu-testing-280409> Results of H1N1 (swine flu) testing ----------------------------------- Director of Public Health, Dr Mark Jacobs announced tonight [28 Apr 2009] that results from some of the Rangitoto College party who tested positive to influenza A on Sunday [25 Apr 2009], have also tested positive for swine flu H1N1. Results from 3 of the samples were received earlier this evening [28 Apr 2009] from the World Health Organization regional laboratory in Melbourne and all tested positive for the same strain of swine flu. Testing continues on a 4th sample. On the basis of these results, we are assuming that all of the people in the group who had tested positive for influenza A have swine flu. As a result we are continuing with the current treatment, which has been based on this assumption. We were advised that the lab in Melbourne selected 4 of the best samples of the very delicate genetic material to analyse. They found 3 positive results and one is still to be confirmed. Staff from Auckland Regional Public Health are getting in touch with those affected and informing them of the results. This is expected to be completed by 10:00 pm tonight [28 Apr 2009]. All 10 are understood to be recovering at home. There is no need to change the treatment and follow-up of the Rangitoto College group. The Tamiflu treatment will continue and they will remain in home isolation and should complete 72 hours of Tamiflu before they can return to normal activities. -- Communicated by Dr Patricia Priest Senior Lecturer, Epidemiology Department of Preventive and Social Medicine University of Otago Dunedin New Zealand <patricia.priest@otago.ac.nz> [The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of New Zealand is available at <http://healthmap.org/r/00aG>. - CopyEd.MJ] ****** [3] Israel Date: Tue 28 Apr 2009 Source: Haaretz News Service [edited] <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1081774.html> Israel confirms 1st case of swine flu, raises alert level to 4 -------------------------------------------------------------- Israel confirmed its 1st case of swine flu on Tuesday [28 Apr 2009], Israel Radio reported, as the Health Ministry raised its level of alert to 4 out of 6. A 26-year-old man who recently returned from Mexico was diagnosed with the virus, after 2 days of quarantine in a Netanya hospital pending results of his health tests. After the diagnosis, he was listed in good condition at the hospital. World health officials, racing to extinguish a new flu strain that is jumping borders, raised a global alert to an unprecedented level as the outbreak claimed more lives in Mexico. The US prepared for the worst even as president Barack Obama tried to reassure Americans. With the swine flu having already spread to at least 4 other countries, authorities around the globe are like firefighters battling a blaze without knowing how far it extends. At this time, containment is not a feasible option, said Keiji Fukuda, assistant director-general of the World Health Organization, which raised its alert level on Monday [27 Apr 2009]. Another Israeli man has also been quarantined until further notice in hospitals in a Kfar Sava, after he too returned from Mexico with fu-like symptoms. The Health Ministry said Monday [27 Apr 2009] that it had embraced the recommendation of the European Commission to postpone nonessential travel to Mexico and recommends that travelers be alert to reports regarding other countries. Health Ministry officials said Monday they were not issuing any special instructions to the public for now, including individuals returning from Mexico. The ministry did recommend that such travelers seek medical assistance if they develop flu-like symptoms within 7 days after their return. These individuals would be quarantined at local hospitals until their condition is determined. [byline: Ran Reznick, Yair Ettinger, Zohar Blumenkrantz] -- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org> The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Israel is available at <http://healthmap.org/r/00aH>. - CopyEd.MJ] ****** [4] Comment on seasonality Date: Mon 27 Apr 2009 From: EA Gould <eag@ceh.ac.uk> Swine influenza and the UK -------------------------- I haven't been able to read every single ProMED-mail report covering the new "swine" influenza outbreak but it is possible that the reports have missed an important point concerning the UK and the rest of Northern Europe. I apologise if you or someone have already pointed it out, but for the time being at least, we should have a breathing space in the sense that influenza virus epidemics don't normally occur in Northern Europe during the late spring and summer period. So it would have to be totally outside precedent if this virus caused significant infections at this time of the year in the UK. -- Professor EA Gould CEH Oxford Mansfield Road Oxford OX1 3SR United Kingdom <eag@ceh.ac.uk> [Analysis of previous pandemics show that transmission in the Northern hemisphere stops in the beginning of May. The best analysis I have found is this paper: Viboud et al. JID 2005;192:233-48. Even if the present A/H1N1 has pandemic potential it is therefore highly likely that the outbreak will fade out within the next 2 to 3 weeks, but it will reappear in the autumn. As pointed out in an earlier posting, the second wave can be more pathogenic than the first wave, and inclusion of the present virus in the vaccine for the autumn therefore should have the highest priority (I am sure it does). - Mod.EP] [see also: Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": Worldwide (02) 20090427.1586 Influenza A (H1N1) "swine flu": Worldwide 20090427.1583 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human: worldwide 20090426.1577 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - New Zealand, susp 20090426.1574 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America (04) 20090426.1569 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America (03) 20090426.1566 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America (02) 20090425.1557 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, human - N America 20090425.1552 Acute respiratory disease - Mexico, swine virus susp 20090424.1546 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - USA (02): (CA, TX) 20090424.1541 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - USA: (CA) 20090422.1516 Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - Spain 20090220.0715 2008 ---- Influenza A (H1N1) virus, swine, human - USA (TX) 20081125.3715 2007 ---- Influenza A (H2N3) virus, swine - USA 20071219.4079 2006 ---- Influenza, swine, human - USA (IA): November 2006 20070108.0077] ...................................cp/mj/lm *##########################################################* ************************************************************ ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the information, and of any statements or opinions based thereon, are not guaranteed. 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