IRAQ IS A DISASTER

[Guest BROWNer]

iraq's new flag

 

http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/photos/iraqflag_cp_5757796.jpg'>

i like it. fresh colours.

[dojafx]

new flag bad.

the old one was off the shelf

[villain]

I hope this is not just a cosmetic change.

[Guest imported_El Mamerro]

If anyone cares...

 

World Net Daily, conservative newspaper, claims Saddam's WMD have been found.

[villain]

hmm... well the pesticides are a given (by our country most likely!). The mortar rounds again.... but i thought they were expired. There is a conspiracy theory surrounding the centrifuges that they may have been planted. I dunno... I'm not inclined to beleive it but i suppose it's possible. I've seen too much shit to just swallow all this in one gulp with no shuggah. S'pose it's possible. Maybe the WMD are the election gimmick cause they can't nab Osama.

[Guest BROWNer]

read the article..and.....who the fuck knows.

the conservative, opinion style slant drives me nuts though.

 

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/images/iraq-flag.gif'>

this is quite fresh as well.

i believe the arabic scripting was added by maddass when he came to power..

[PalestineOne]

is that thing really a new flag?

[Fabo 2]

does anyone know what that says on the old flag?

[TheoHuxtable]

Originally posted by can of worms

does anyone know what that says on the old flag?

 

From what I remember from Arabic class it says something like...

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/images/iraq-flag.gif'>

 

Jame... no... I am... something... bitc... I think... looks like... what's that Rick...?.... Oh okay it says "I'm Rick James bitch."

[KaBar2]

Arabic for "God is Great" (Allahu Ahkbar?)

 

Saw it on CNN yesterday morning.

[KaBar2]

All the old flag needed was a swastika, and it would have been perfect for a blitzkreig.

[PalestineOne]

Allah hu Akbar

 

like the hobo said, it translates into "God is Great" which can be interpreted as meaning "God is The Greatest" "God is The Biggest" etc....

 

 

which is true and that was a hot flag, one of my favorites next to the Saudi Arabia flag, which is all green and says "La Illah Ha Illa Allah". which translates into, "There is no God but God". which is a central belief, meaning nothing else should be worshipped, idolized, etc....

 

ummm. another flag I like allot is the British flag, thats a hot fucking flag if you ask me, its very stylish. Jamaicas flag is also hot, but thats a given.

 

fuckit, Im making a new thread for this

[SWIMS]

-RELEASED LAST WEEK-

 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

 

Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge

 

 

Baghdad/Brussels, 27 April 2004: Fundamental change in Iraq is needed soon if the widening gap separating the occupation's governing institutions from the Iraqi people is to be narrowed and a spreading insurgency is to be overcome. 30 June will be an essential turning point, though it will not bring the full transfer of sovereignty that many Iraqis expect.

 

Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge,* the latest report by the International Crisis Group, recognises that the options available in Iraq today are few and bad, a measure of the staggering misjudgements that have plagued U.S. post-war management from the start. The broad plan sketched out by UN Special Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi, the apparent willingness of the U.S. to delegate at least some political responsibility to the UN, and the decision to loosen the de-Baathification decree are all steps in the right direction. Huge challenges remain, and although 30 June was initially an arbitrary deadline, it now represents a key opportunity to be seized, as long as it is defined properly.

 

"The fiction that 30 June will be about 'transferring sovereignty' should be given up", says Joost Hiltermann, Middle East Project Director for ICG. "As a legal matter, sovereignty is already vested in the Iraqi state and 'embodied' in its interim institutions, as provided by UNSCR 1511. But as a practical matter, the sovereign power exercised by the new Iraqi government will remain incomplete".

 

The answer is not to scrap the 30 June date, as some have suggested, but to redefine what will happen on that day, and the lead up to it, as a serious redistribution of power -- more substantial even than the present Brahimi plan proposes -- between the U.S., the UN and the new Iraqi institutions. Four interrelated steps are required.

 

First, political responsibility should be handed over to the UN, acting through a Special Representative empowered to break deadlocks within or between Iraqi institutions. Secondly, a Provisional Government of technocrats should be appointed by the UN Special Representative, marking a clear break in character and membership from the Interim Governing Council. Thirdly, to widen political participation, a National Conference of Iraqis should be convened to elect a Consultative Assembly, which would vote on the composition of the government and could block any decrees that it passes. Fourthly, security arrangements should be redefined by a Security Council Resolution which re-authorises the U.S.-led Multinational Force from 30 June 2004 until an elected government takes office and decides on its future, but which also requires joint approval from the U.S. command and the Iraqi Provisional Government for major offensive operations.

 

What Iraqis should be getting after 30 June, is more power -- and the space to create a more inclusive and cohesive polity -- but still necessarily incomplete sovereign power until proper general elections are held. To minimise the friction associated with such a transition, residual civilian powers should be exercised during the transitional period by the UN, not the U.S.

 

"With each false start and failed plan, realistic options for a successful and stable political transition have become narrower and less attractive", says Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa Programme Director at ICG. "Getting it right this time is urgent and vital. There may not be any opportunities left".

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) 32 (0) 485 555 946

Jennifer Leonard (Washington) 1-202-785 1601

To contact ICG media please click here

*Read the report in full on our website: http://www.crisisweb.org/

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

 

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

 

Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

The situation in Iraq is more precarious than at any time since the April 2003 ouster of the Baathist regime, largely reflecting the Coalition's inability to establish a legitimate and representative political transition process. The broad plan sketched out by UN Special Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi, the apparent willingness of the U.S. to delegate at least some political responsibility to the UN and the decision to loosen the de-Baathification decree are all steps in the right direction. But critical questions remain both unanswered and, in some cases, unasked.

 

The history of post-Saddam Iraq is one of successive, short-lived attempts by the U.S. to mould a political reality to its liking. With each false start and failed plan, realistic options for a successful and stable political transition have become narrower and less attractive. Getting it right this time is urgent and vital. There may not be many, or any, opportunities left.

 

In undertaking his mission, Brahimi inherited several stark and in some ways conflicting political constraints: the U.S. commitment to "transfer sovereignty" to an unspecified Iraqi body by 30 June 2004; the unrepresentative character of the existing Iraqi institution, the Interim Governing Council; the absence for the foreseeable future of a credible and reliable Iraqi security force and therefore the need for a continued U.S.-led force; strong objection by the most influential Shiite representative, Ayatollah Sistani, to endowing any non-elected government with genuine authority; and the practical impossibility of holding national, democratic elections before January 2005.

 

Added together, these factors lead to two clear conclusions: first, fundamental change is needed soon if the growing vacuum separating the occupation's governing institutions from the Iraqi people is to be narrowed; and secondly, whatever happens on 30 June will at best involve a delegation of something far less than full sovereign powers to a body falling far short of being representative.

 

The answer is not to scrap the 30 June date, as some have suggested, but to redefine what will happen on that day, and the lead up to it, as a serious redistribution of power -- more substantial even than the present Brahimi plan proposes -- between the U.S., the UN and the new Iraqi institutions. Four interrelated steps are required:

 

Political responsibility for the transition should be handed over to the UN, acting through an appropriately empowered Special Representative. Before 30 June 2004, that empowerment should involve the capacity to appoint a provisional government (subject to later rejection by the proposed Consultative Assembly: see further below). After 30 June, it should involve certain residual powers to supervise the political process; break a deadlock between Iraqi institutions; act as a check on Iraqi executive decisions that may exceed its limited mandate; or, in the event a very broad consensus exists among Iraqis, approve of amendments to the Temporary Administrative Law (TAL).

The UN, worried that it lacks the capacity and fearing that it would be setting itself up for failure, is manifestly reluctant to play this latter role. However, the post-30 June Iraqi provisional government clearly will not be exercising full authority; nor do Sistani and others want it to. The powers vested in the Special Representative would be those, and only those, needed to maximise stability and the prospects of national, democratic elections in January 2005. The UN would enjoy far greater legitimacy than the U.S. in fulfilling this role. Even so, such powers ought to be used extremely sparingly and cautiously. The real check on governmental decisions is likely to come from its multi-headed structure (president, vice-presidents and prime minister), and due deference should thus be accorded Iraqi governmental actions.

 

A provisional government of technocratic experts should be appointed by the UN Special Representative, marking a clear break in character and membership from the Interim Governing Council. This government would be essentially a caretaker one, charged with running day-to-day affairs, focusing on public order, economic reconstruction and public services, and preparing general elections with the UN Special Representative's advice and assistance. Many Iraqis fear that those in charge today will do everything they can to perpetuate their rule tomorrow and that unelected politicians will take decisions with long-lasting impact. Limiting to the degree possible the participation of partisan, political leaders in the provisional government, strictly confining its powers and providing UN oversight will help assuage those fears. In presenting the outlines of his plan, Brahimi endorsed this view, speaking of a caretaker government composed of people of competence and integrity.

To widen political participation, a National Conference of Iraqis should be convened, which would elect a Consultative Assembly. At a minimum, the Consultative Assembly should have the power to reject the composition of the new government and any decrees that it passes. Should the Assembly reject the government, the UN Special Representative would be tasked with proposing another; should the Assembly reject a government decree and, after resubmission in a modified form, reject it again, the Special Representative would step in as an arbiter to overcome the deadlock.

Since the ouster of the Baathist regime, Iraq has lacked any sense of political cohesion. As the U.S. has sought to micro-manage the political process, individual groups have at best struck separate agreements with the Coalition. The proposed National Convention could be an important first step toward creating a sense of collective ownership, and elaboration of a common political platform that eschews violence and commits participants to work for a democratic political system. Religious and tribal Sunni leaders as well as followers of Moqtada al-Sadr, who have felt excluded, will need to be brought in, regardless of their opposition to the occupation.

 

In Brahimi's proposal, both the National Conference and the Consultative Assembly it elected would come into being only after creation of the provisional government. This is cause for understandable concern among some Iraqis: hand-picking a government and depriving these bodies of any role in its establishment risks undermining their credibility even before they have begun. But Brahimi is justifiably worried that reversing the sequence may unduly delay establishment of a government and overly politicise it.

 

Security arrangements should be redefined by a Security Council resolution which re-authorises the U.S.-led multinational force from 30 June 2004 until an elected government takes office and decides on its future but requires joint approval from the U.S. command and the Iraqi provisional government for major offensive operations. While an international force presence is an indispensable necessity during the transition period, recent events in Fallujah and elsewhere have made clear that major offensive operations are potentially counterproductive unless undertaken with significant local support. If 30 June is to involve any power shift at all back to the Iraqis, and not be totally empty and cosmetic, some element of control over major security decisions must be involved. Clearly, operational matters involving force protection and responses dictated by immediate events must continue to remain the sole r esponsibility of the U.S. command. But where strategic choices are involved, and the multinational force is acting after deliberation, it is both possible and necessary that operations be jointly approved. And the only body capable in practice of giving that approval -- until general elections are held -- will be the provisional government.

The fiction that 30 June will be about 'transferring sovereignty' should be given up. As a legal matter, sovereignty is already vested in the Iraqi state and 'embodied' in its interim institutions, as provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1511. But as a practical matter, the sovereign power exercised by the new Iraqi government will remain incomplete, and to pretend otherwise could do lasting damage to the very notion of sovereignty in Iraqi eyes. What Iraqis should be getting after 30 June, is more such power -- and the space to create a more inclusive and cohesive polity -- but still necessarily incomplete sovereign power until proper general elections are held. To minimise the friction associated with this necessarily incomplete power transfer, residual civilian powers should be exercised during the transitional period by the UN, not the U.S.

 

So far, the Iraqi people have been virtual observers to a pas-de-deux between the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Interim Governing Council: if they are not truly involved in the process, they can hardly be expected to defend it. The fact that Iraqis who heretofore had not supported either Moqtada al-Sadr or the insurgents in the so-called Sunni Triangle joined or tacitly backed the April uprisings gives credence to the notion that as long as basic grievances are not addressed, and a far wider spectrum of Iraqis is not included in the political process, violence will increase rather than diminish.

 

The options available today are few and bad, a measure of the staggering misjudgements that have plagued U.S. post-war management from the start, and there is no guarantee that even these steps can stem Iraq's descent toward instability and civil war. Nor is there any guarantee that this approach will find takers. The Bush administration may resist yielding ultimate control over developments in Iraq just when its electoral fortunes may turn on them. With anger spreading and strong-arm military operations in Fallujah, Sadr City and elsewhere likely to generate tomorrow's even stronger-willed insurgency, the UN may baulk at getting dragged into what it once was kept out of, and a growing number of countries may be tempted to follow Spain and leave the Coalition rather than strengthen it.

 

But a U-turn from a stubborn administration, and engagement from a sceptical international community, may represent the last remaining chance of success.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

To the United States, Other Coalition Members and the UN Security Council:

 

1. Agree as soon as possible to a new Security Council resolution that would vest primary authority and responsibility in a UN Special Representative to advise, assist and oversee the political transition, with powers as here defined.

 

2. Give the Special Representative, for the period prior to 30 June 2004, the powers to:

 

(a) appoint a provisional government to hold office until general elections, empowered to conduct day to day administration and, with the advice and assistance of the Special Representative, prepare those elections; and

 

(B) approve the Annex to the Transitional Administrative Law.

 

3. Give the Special Representative, for the period after 30 June, the powers to:

 

(a) convene a National Conference and oversee its election of a Consultative Assembly;

 

(B) propose a new provisional government in the event that the Consultative Assembly rejects the one initially appointed;

 

© break any deadlock within government institutions (should the Assembly reject a government decree and, after resubmission in modified form, reject it again);

 

(d) reject any decisions of the provisional government which exceed its caretaker mandate; and

 

(e) assist Iraqi authorities to organise elections in January 2005 (including elections to the National Assembly, and regional elections in Iraqi Kurdistan to the Kurdistan National Assembly, and local elections).

 

4. Renew authorisation for a multinational force led by the U.S., whose mandate would expire upon the establishment of an elected government but which could then remain should that government so request, and encourage member states to contribute to the multinational force and provide adequate security for a UN presence.

 

5. Limit the mandate of the multinational force by requiring it to consult with and have the approval of the provisional government for major offensive operations, while leaving to the military command sole responsibility for operational matters involving force protection and responses dictated by immediate events.

 

To the (Newly Appointed) United Nations Special Representative:

 

6. On or before 30 June 2004, after consultation with a broad range of Iraqis, appoint a provisional government whose members are non-partisan and technocratic, with choices made on the basis of competence rather than sectarian or ethnic affiliation, and avoiding as much as possible current members of the Interim Governing Council when appointing the prime minister, president, and vice presidents.

 

7. Oversee the convening of a broadly based and inclusive National Conference that would aim at including all components of Iraqi society that pledge to work together for the common goal of managing the transitional period until the general elections, building a democratic Iraq and forswearing violence; and that would elect a Consultative Assembly.

 

8. Consult broadly and transparently in the process of putting together the National Conference in coordination with a preparatory committee, taking into account the need to:

 

(a) include Iraqis who have been excluded and have expressed their opposition to the occupation, such as religious and tribal Sunni Arab leaders, former Baathists and the Shiite urban underclass to whom Moqtada al-Sadr appeals; and

 

(B) build on the fledgling local structures established by the Coalition Provisional Authority at the municipal and governorate levels and to give adequate weight to grass-roots forces, above all business and professional and trade associations, as well as other civil society representatives such as human rights and women's movements.

 

9. Make clear that the Transitional Administrative Law is an interim document governing the transitional period only; should members of the National Conference want to amend it, the UN Special Representative would make the final decision, taking into account the degree of consensus, the impact on Iraq's stability and the high presumption against amendment.

 

10. Facilitate the establishment of the Consultative Assembly elected by the National Conference, whose powers would include:

 

(a) endorsing the composition of the provisional government (should the vote be negative, the UN Special Representative would be charged with nominating an alternative government and submitting this for Assembly approval); and

 

(B) rejecting decrees of the caretaker government (should it vote against a decree, the government would have the opportunity to submit it in amended form; should it again be rejected, the UN Special Representative would break the deadlock as he or she sees fit).

 

To All Iraqi Political Actors:

 

11. Accept the Transitional Administrative Law as an explicitly interim document governing the transitional period only, and make a public pledge to abide by it during this period; contemplate amendments to it only if there is a broad consensus among all constituencies.

 

Baghdad/Brussels, 27 April 2004

 

 

__________________

[PalestineOne]

^^^ damn you talk allot

[8onus]

This is my take:

 

"GEORGE BUSH LIED ABOUT SADAM HAVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION"

 

SADAM lied, not bush, he told his generals(who were the ones feeding us our intelligence), that he had wepons of mass destruction to get their spirits up and keep them believing in him as a leader. that lie came back to our intelligence and in we went.

 

OH YEAH AND HERE'S WHAT REALLY TWISTS MY SACK: when people say that the US would not reveal the source of their intelligence because they had none and lied to get to iraq's oil....BULLSHIT!

 

1. anyone who know anything about intelligence knows that when you reveal the source, you LOOSE IT. and we needed those sources badly.

 

2. IT IS REDICULOUSLY CHEAPER TO BUY OIL, THAN TO START A WAR AND STEAL IT.

 

I passed by the anti war protest last march 2003, and most of the people there were just liberal volkswankers who wanted an opportunity to dump on bush, i dont like the bush either, but i wanted to fuck clap every mother fucker there.

[villain]

Originally posted by 8onus

2. IT IS REDICULOUSLY CHEAPER TO BUY OIL, THAN TO START A WAR AND STEAL IT.

 

 

Wrong. It's expensive for the government. It's free for Bush and Halliburton. Bush doesn't give a fuck about the government and it's debt. This is like the most extreme republican shit i've probably ever seen in my life.

[8onus]

guilty as fucking charged,

 

^^^that shit is ignorant, if you think bush would really do all this for halliburton and bp and all them, your conspiracy theory idea belongs in hollywood.

 

besides, bush is too dumb to pull that shit off.

 

bush is not a republican, but he likes to think he is.

[villain]

Originally posted by 8onus

guilty as fucking charged,

 

^^^that shit is ignorant, if you think bush would really do all this for halliburton and bp and all them, your conspiracy theory idea belongs in hollywood.

 

besides, bush is too dumb to pull that shit off.

 

bush is not a republican, but he likes to think he is.

 

Bush might be dumb but not the people he's catering to and his elitist buddies. His dad was former chief of the CIA for crying out loud.

 

I'm sorry but you're argument is not well grounded. I have posted pages upon pages of facts to support my position and you are saying that 1) bush is not evil enough to do this and 2) bush is too dumb to do this. I'm sorry this will not hold up in my court.

[8onus]

Originally posted by villain

Bush might be dumb but not the people he's catering to and his elitist buddies. His dad was former chief of the CIA for crying out loud.

 

I'm sorry but you're argument is not well grounded. I have posted pages upon pages of facts to support my position and you are saying that 1) bush is not evil enough to do this and 2) bush is too dumb to do this. I'm sorry this will not hold up in my court.

 

1. the newly set iragi oil board has NO us officials on it. no US control of the oil

 

2. there are no us board members beacuse the US failed to form an advisory to the baord,I THINK IF THIS WAR WAS ABOUT OIL, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN RIGHT ON TOP OF THAT.

 

2. Royal dutch and Total have been givin the first contracts(which are still in negotiation), to the oil. THESE ARE NOT US COMPANIES

neither bush nor his administration have any connections to these companies either.

chenny was connected to halliburton and rice was connected to chevron, all competitors of these these companies.

 

3.HITLER was evil, bush is just a doushe.

 

 

you shoud read this:

"The connection between the war on Iraq and the desire for oil raises an important ideological consideration. Millions of college students are taught the Leninist idea that capitalist economies are inherently imperialistic. This is supposedly because exploitation exhausts capital values in the domestic economy, and hence capital owners must relentlessly seek to replenish their funds through grabbing foreign resources. It takes war to avoid the final crisis of capitalism, in this view.

 

College students might be forgiven for thinking there is some basis for this in the real world. In American history up to the present day, the onset of war tends to track the onset of economic doldrums. Might war be just the ticket to revive a moribund capitalist class? Recall that it was then-secretary of state James Baker who said the first Iraq war was all about "jobs, jobs, jobs." The line between the owners of capital and the warfare state has never been that clean in American history, and it has arguably never been as conspicuously blurred as it is today. "

-by lew rockwell

[villain]

Originally posted by 8onus

1. the newly set iragi oil board has NO us officials on it. no US control of the oil

 

2. there are no us board members beacuse the US failed to form an advisory to the baord,I THINK IF THIS WAR WAS ABOUT OIL, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN RIGHT ON TOP OF THAT.

 

2. Royal dutch and Total have been givin the first contracts(which are still in negotiation), to the oil. THESE ARE NOT US COMPANIES

neither bush nor his administration have any connections to these companies either.

chenny was connected to halliburton and rice was connected to chevron, all competitors of these these companies.

 

3.HITLER was evil, bush is just a doushe.

 

 

you shoud read this:

"The connection between the war on Iraq and the desire for oil raises an important ideological consideration. Millions of college students are taught the Leninist idea that capitalist economies are inherently imperialistic. This is supposedly because exploitation exhausts capital values in the domestic economy, and hence capital owners must relentlessly seek to replenish their funds through grabbing foreign resources. It takes war to avoid the final crisis of capitalism, in this view.

 

College students might be forgiven for thinking there is some basis for this in the real world. In American history up to the present day, the onset of war tends to track the onset of economic doldrums. Might war be just the ticket to revive a moribund capitalist class? Recall that it was then-secretary of state James Baker who said the first Iraq war was all about "jobs, jobs, jobs." The line between the owners of capital and the warfare state has never been that clean in American history, and it has arguably never been as conspicuously blurred as it is today. "

-by lew rockwell

 

Now you are bringing something to the table! However I don't know where you're resources are I'm going to take your word for it since I will probably hear more about this in the future. Why royal dutch and total? I don't know. Shouldn't the iraqi's decide who they are going to sell their oil to?

 

 

These quotes are from old articles but I'm trying to exemplify the complexity of the oil dealings. Surely it was never ALL going to Halliburton. And France had contracts with Iraq before we went to war. It could be make up time for all we know.

 

 

'The hidden stakes in the war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil. The map of terrorist sanctuaries and targets in the Middle East and Central Asia is also, to an extraordinary degree, a map of the world's principal energy sources in the 21st century.... It is inevitable that the war against terrorism will be seen by many as a war on behalf of America's Chevron, Exxon, and Arco; France's TotalFinaElf; British Petroleum; Royal Dutch Shell and other multinational giants, which have hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in the region.''

 

"Among today’s transnational corporations, the modern day heirs of the colonial chartered corporations, the oil and gas giants are some of the most politically and economically powerful players in the world. The ancestor of the Royal-Dutch Shell group was 'Royal Dutch Company for the Exploitation of Petroleum Wells in the Netherlands East Indies'. With so much of the world’s economy dependent on oil, the colonial exploitation and genocide continues, on an unprecedented scale. The lyrics may have changed a little, but the tune remains much the same."

 

"BP and Shell will each send one very large tanker every month to Iraq to pick up their two million barrels. Among the other companies that have signed deals to buy the oil are ConocoPhillips, Valero Energy and Marathon Oil, Total of France, Sinochem of China and a company from the Mitsubishi group, which is buying for Japanese refineries."

 

This could also support my theory that power is shifting to europe.

[villain]

According to this it could be because Bush and the Cronies are finally getting in trouble!

[8onus]

Originally posted by villain

According to this it could be because Bush and the Cronies are finally getting in trouble!

 

haha, i love that first thing u posted there, i actually made a mistake, BP isn't a US company, and neither is shell.

i say fuck i raq i got too many close friends in FOULuja,

 

IT BOILS DOWN TO: iraq hates bush, the US hates bush, and the oil companies REALLY HATE BUSH, .....bad day for the bush.

 

i'm gonna go change my major now, fuck recording arts, ima be the next cochran.

[SWIMS]

Originally posted by 8onus

This is my take:

 

 

 

2. IT IS REDICULOUSLY CHEAPER TO BUY OIL, THAN TO START A WAR AND STEAL IT.

 

 

Since the discovery of the vast oil fields in Iraq, euro/american interests have always acted to stop the develoment of the fields. Since the british occupation after ww1 the fields bacame an asset that could be held onto, much like the reserves in the US that are left idle, as long as the our (euro/american) influence in the region was strong enough to enforce this.During the cold war Russian and French contractors began assisting the development of the fields, especially in the south where british interests were extracting from the same field, only across the border in kuwait. This is one of the major problems today, the soviet hardware is obsolete requireing a complete re-construction of the industry. On a monetary level the cost of the war is a major factor in the taxapyers eyes, but politicaly the fields are now under our direct influence, which means 1) we have a monopoly on the reconstuction. 2) we control the level of production which can be used to satbilize our own oil economy and act to upset OPEC in a similar way that saddam did by overproducing and driving down the prices (althought kuwait got them back for that one).

Now we don't have to steal it because we own it. As our companies rebuild the oil economy, Iraqis get to pay off the debt we created for them. And we can controll how this happens, and no matter what UN or NATO army descends upon Baghdad we will still have a monopoly on our oil fields. We hedged a bet on hell of a game of war, and a forien force now controlls baghdad by military means again, and the fragile social construct that holds it all together is not being balanced, but is bieng wheighed to one side in favor of economic and political gains just as it has been for over 6 centuries. Civil War is brewing and anarchy is everpresent, but we have a monopoly on the oil so in our nations political culture were doin alright.

-The idea of peace in the middle east seems more distant than ever and our level of understanding for the region falls far below our level of involvment. The mass perception of the situation is so transparent that it is very hard to understand what is going on based on the information provided in the mass media and public conversation.

-Educate Yourself_

-http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_ipm_index.html

+for your trip

-http://html.wnbc.com/sh/idi/news/iraq/maps/iraqmaps-baghdad.inc

[villain]

^^^^^^^^^on point

[8onus]

first off.

i don't need a god damn history lesson.

 

second. give me facts!!!

what you gave me links to were intitutions and media reports, who bend the truth like a mother fucker,

 

look beyond "msnbc" for once in your life.

go find me facts to back up you opinion which isn't quite clear to begin with.

 

fuck it i'll humor you.

 

1. we dont own those feilds. i raq owns them!

 

and since you dont seem to grasp this i will help.

 

THERE ARE SEPERATE BOARDS WITH IN THE COMMITY FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION, THE OIL BOARD HAS NO US OFFICIALS.

(didn't i already go over this when me and villian we're fighting? :confused: )

 

and since you wanna bring OPEC into this....you should check thier website.

http://www.opec.org/Member_Counrties/Iraq/HOD.htm

 

2. if you watched the press confrence a while ago, congress is passing a bill to GIVE I REPEAT GIVE 84 billion dollars to iraq for thier reconstruction so NO WE WONT BE MAKING THEM PAY FOR IT. and whats left they will be paying from thier oil revenue.

which will be very abundant.

 

3.GET EDUCATED? :lol: don't fuck with a goverment son on a mountain dew binge.

there....now You're educated.

[8onus]

http://www.comedycentral.com/gallery/chappellesshow/images/cs_seas2pics_11.jpg'>

[PalestineOne]

^^^ thats Michael Jackson in his early 20s

[Guest BROWNer]

whoa! i guess the war really was about

liberating the iraqi's and bringing down saddam!

[PalestineOne]

^^ and weapons of mass destruction, dont forget that

[PalestineOne]

and 9/11 was Iraq too