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Hua Guofang

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Hua Guofang last won the day on April 26

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1,024 Someone you can trust to help bury a body in the woods

About Hua Guofang

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  1. This is how long it took IT to remote in and work on my desktop today.
  2. I try not to post MSM articles here because people tend to disbelieve anything they say as biased....., which is the epitome of irony, when you think about it! But this article puts paid to the claim that 1) ISIS is dead. They are not dead, they are still carrying out insurgent operations. Yes, the caliphate has been toppled but that does not, by any means suggest that the fight is over. Just as when Saddam was toppled, the military reverted to insurgency tactics. 2) The fight is long over. No, the fight is still clearly going on with attacks and operations being carried out by either side. This is not a mopping up operation, this is a counter-insurgency operation. Mopping up operations mean arresting and capturing individuals on the run, not trying to disrupt operations and take down cells. I'm not saying this means the US should remain there, that's a discussion that goes much wider than "what to do about ISIS". What I am saying is that ISIS is not dead, the fight is still under way and there will be (have already been) consequences to pulling the US out now as it changes the balance of all actors in the region. Now, that might be a risk worth taking, I'm not arguing that it isn't. I am saying that if you argue that ISIS has been defeated, that Trump finished ISIS or that the death of ISIS is reason to pull the troops out, you are demonstrably wrong. ISIS Reaps Gains of U.S. Pullout From Syria The troop withdrawal ends American operations against the terrorist group conducted jointly with a Kurdish-led militia. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/isis-syria-us.html American forces and their Kurdish-led partners in Syria had been conducting as many as a dozen counterterrorism missions a day against Islamic State militants, officials said. That has stopped. Those same partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces, had also been quietly releasing some Islamic State prisoners and incorporating them into their ranks, in part as a way to keep them under watch. That, too, is now in jeopardy. And across Syria’s porous border with Iraq, Islamic State fighters are conducting a campaign of assassination against local village headmen, in part to intimidate government informants. When President Trump announced this month that he would pull American troops out of northern Syria and make way for a Turkish attack on the Kurds, Washington’s onetime allies, many warned that he was removing the spearhead of the campaign to defeat the Islamic State, also known as ISIS. Now, analysts say that Mr. Trump’s pullout has handed the Islamic State its biggest win in more than four years and greatly improved its prospects. With American forces rushing for the exits, in fact, American officials said last week that they were already losing their ability to collect critical intelligence about the group’s operations on the ground. “There is no question that ISIS is one of the big winners in what is happening in Syria,” said Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a research center in London. Cutting support for the Syrian Democratic Forces has crippled the ability of the United States and its former partners to hunt down the group’s remnants. News of the American withdrawal set off jubilation among Islamic State supporters on social media and encrypted chat networks. It has lifted the morale of fighters in affiliates as far away as Libya and Nigeria. And, by removing a critical counterforce, the pullout has eased the re-emergence of the Islamic State’s core as a terrorist network or a more conventional, and potentially long-lasting, insurgency based in Syria and Iraq. Although Mr. Trump has repeatedly declared victory over the Islamic State — even boasting to congressional leaders last week that he had personally “captured ISIS” — it remains a threat. After the loss in March of the last patch of the territory it once held across Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State dispersed its supporters and fighters to blend in with the larger population or to hide out in remote deserts and mountains. The group retains as many as 18,000 “members” in Iraq and Syria, including up to 3,000 foreigners, according to estimates cited in a recent Pentagon report. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliph, is still at large. “Our battle today is one of attrition and stretching the enemy,” Mr. al-Baghdadi declared in a video message released in April. Looking comfortable and well fed, he sat on the floor of a bare room, surrounded by fighters, with an assault rifle by his side. “Jihad is ongoing until the day of judgment,” he told his supporters, according to a transcript provided by SITE Intelligence Group. Against the benchmark of the Islamic State’s former grip on a broad swath of geography, any possibility of a comeback to that extent remains highly remote. Changes in the political context in Syria and Iraq have diminished the Islamic State’s ability to whip up sectarian animosity out of the frustrations of Sunni Muslims over the Shiite or Shiite-linked authorities in Syria and Iraq — the militants’ trademark. The government in Baghdad has broadened its support among Sunni Iraqis. President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, by crushing the revolt against him, has left Sunni militants less space to mobilize. And many Syrians and Iraqis who lived under the harsh dominion of the Islamic State strongly oppose its return. But as an underground insurgency, the Islamic State appears to be on the upswing. Militants have been carrying out “assassinations, suicide attacks, abductions, and arson of crops in both Iraq and Syria,” according to a report this summer by the Pentagon inspector general for operations against the Islamic State. It is establishing “resurgent cells” in Syria, the report said, and “seeking to expand its command and control nodes in Iraq.” The militants have been burning crops and emptying out whole villages. They have been raising money by carrying out kidnappings for ransom and extorting “taxes” from local officials, often skimming a cut of rebuilding contracts. Their attacks on village headmen — at least 30 were killed in Iraq in 2018, according to the Pentagon report — are an apparent attempt to scare others out of cooperating with Baghdad. “The high operational tempo with multiple attacks taking place over a wide area” may be intended to create the appearance that the Islamic State can strike anywhere with “impunity,” the report said. Mr. Trump first said last December that he intended to withdraw the last 2,000 American troops from Syria; the Pentagon scaled that back, pulling out about half of those troops. Military officials, though, say that helping the Syrian Democratic Forces hunt down underground cells and fugitive fighters required more training and intelligence support than an open battle for territory. Even the partial drawdown, the Pentagon inspector general’s report found, could be “detrimental” to the American mission in Iraq and Syria. Last month, as if to prove its continued vitality, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for a minibus bombing that killed a dozen people near the entrance to a Shiite pilgrimage site in the Iraqi city of Karbala. It was its deadliest attack since the loss of its last territory. And within hours of Mr. Trump’s announcement almost two weeks ago that American forces were moving away from the Syrian border with Turkey, two ISIS suicide bombers attacked a base of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the Syrian city of Raqqa. “The crusaders have given up,” Islamic State supporters crowed, according to Laith Alkhouri of the business risk consulting company Flashpoint Global Partners, who monitors the group’s online messages. Other messages “urged ISIS ‘soldiers’ everywhere to double their efforts,” Mr. Alkhouri said. The missions against the Islamic State conducted by the Syrian Democratic Forces — sometimes as many as two dozen a day — had included both counterterrorism patrols and raids on militant cells. Some were carried out jointly with American soldiers, others alone, according to United States officials. But the Kurds, an ethnic minority sometimes disparaged by Arab Syrians, faced resentment among the Arab residents of northeastern Syria. In part to try to win support from those communities, the Kurdish-led forces pardoned and released hundreds of detained ISIS fighters or supporters in so-called reconciliation deals, relying on informal relationships with community leaders to handle their reintegration. The Kurdish-led militia even incorporated some of the released Islamic State detainees into its own forces, said Dareen Khalifa, a researcher with the International Crisis Group who has traveled to the region extensively and documented the “reconciliation” pardons in a report last summer. The Kurdish militia leaders said: “What do you want us to do, kill them all? Imprison them all? The best way forward is to keep a close eye on them by keeping them within the S.D.F.,” Ms. Khalifa said in an interview. She said that those enlisted had not been Islamic State leaders and that so far there had been no recidivism. But now the American withdrawal and the Turkish incursion are threatening the informal supervision of those former prisoners, Ms. Khalifa said, creating a risk that some might gravitate back to fighting for the Islamic State. Turkey, which has battled Kurdish separatist militants at home for decades, launched the invasion primarily to push back the Kurdish-led forces in Syria. Without American protection, the Kurdish leaders are now switching sides to ally with Mr. al-Assad. In Iraq, too, some say opportunities may be emerging for the Islamic State to revive its appeals to Sunni resentments in the areas it once controlled. Promises of postwar reconstruction have gone unfilled. And Shiite militias that rose up to defeat the Islamic State remain in place, sometimes seeking to profit off the local populations. “People in the liberated areas say: ‘Why are all these armed groups still around? Why do they still call us all ISIS, and why are they taxing us or extorting us and taking all of our money?’,” said Renad Mansour, the director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House. The campaign against the Islamic State, he said, “was a military solution to what is a social and political problem.” Mr. Trump, for his part, has insisted repeatedly that Turkey should take over the fight against the Islamic State in Syria. “It’s going to be your responsibility,” Mr. Trump said he told the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But current and former United States officials say the Turkish military has a bleak track record at counterterrorism and little hope of filling the void left by the Americans and the Syrian Democratic Forces. “That is wishful thinking as far as I can tell,” said Dana Stroul, co-chairwoman of the congressionally sponsored Syria Study Group and a former Pentagon official.
  3. Some U.S. troops may stay in Syria: Pentagon chief https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-pentagon/some-u-s-troops-may-stay-in-syria-pentagon-chief-idUSKBN1X010M KABUL (Reuters) - The United States is considering keeping some troops in northeastern Syria to stop oil falling into the hands of Islamic State or others but no decision has yet been made, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said. President Donald Trump decided earlier this month to withdraw all 1,000 U.S. troops from the region, a move widely criticized as a betrayal of Kurdish allies who had fought for years alongside them against Islamic State. U.S. troops crossed into Iraq early on Monday as part of the withdrawal process. Trump began pulling U.S. troops back from northeastern Syria in early October, opening the way for Turkish troops to launch an offensive against the Kurdish fighters. “We have troops in towns in northeast Syria that are located next to the oil fields, the troops in those towns are not in the present phase of withdrawal,” Esper told reporters during a visit to Afghanistan. “The purpose is to deny access, specifically revenue to ISIS (Islamic State) and any other groups that may want to seek that revenue to enable their own malign activities,” he said. Esper said there had been discussions about keeping some of the U.S. troops, who were with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in place. He said he had not presented that option yet, but the Pentagon’s job was to look at different options. The SDF, spearheaded by the Kurdish YPG militia, has been the main partner for the U.S.-led coalition in Syria. “There has been a discussion about possibly doing it (keeping some troops), there has been no decision with regard to numbers or anything like that,” Esper added. A Reuters cameraman saw more than 100 vehicles carrying U.S. troops crossing from the northeast tip of Syria, where Turkey has agreed to pause its offensive for five days under a deal agreed between Washington and Ankara. The truce expires late on Tuesday. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has warned that Ankara will resume its military assault in Syria when the deadline expires if the SDF have not pulled back from its proposed “safe zone” area spanning the border. Ankara considers the YPG a terrorist group because of its links to Kurdish insurgents in southeast Turkey.
  4. They are largely considered the leading organisation by think tanks, the IC and similar organisations. You can google the name and read what people say about them. The advisory council is made up of people from both sides of the house, intelligence professionals, former diplomats, political hacks (can't be ignored), internationals from Spain, Estonia, etc. The operational team is made up of data scientists, political operators from both parties and subject matter experts from numrous fields. I know two of those people personally, and for what it's worth, they're both overtly partisan (one Rep and one Dem) but see that the US interest is an overiding factor here and are working together for the desired goal of democratic resillience. Regards the metrics, you can go over their methodology here: https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/
  5. This is the best place to check that out is here: https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/ She's not showing up in the top messages but if you search Tulsi you can see that RT and Sputnik are firing on the subject, just nowhere near as much as other stuff.
  6. Obama's foreign policy record is not great at all, especially in East Asia. His admin allowed China to get the jump on them and they have the upper hand in the South China Sea and are really pressuring Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc. Russia has been probing everyone's airspace over the last few years, it's not solely that of the US. The US has not just been sitting on its hands when it comes to Russia either. Many would say that the greatest mistake was during the Bush/Clinton era in pushing NATO into the Baltics and everything after that is a foregone conclusion. The Deal with Iran was based on a good strategy. Iran, is a far better potential ally than Saudi Arabia. It would take generations to make the change and the clergy over there are a bit of a problem but the US would be much better to drop KSA and move closer to Iran as it has been KSA that has been exporting jihadism and causing serious harm in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe. Iran is pretty fucked up as well, but far less fucked up than KSA. Iran is a modern country with a very educated population that if not threatened by Sunni states (like Iran and Saddam's Iraq) has little reason to export instability. The JCPOA was the first cut at moving in that directions, it was not an end in and of itself and when seen as a stepping stone, it's a pity that it was trashed and things are moving backwards. I'm keen to see what your reason is for saying that Trump did what Obama wasn't able to do with ISIS. I haven't seen many people other than Trump saying things like that and keen to read some stuff if you have credible folk saying otherwise.
  7. That was a lot of fun, thanks! Anyway, in the attempt to repair hurt feelings I'll put some markers down. Should the US remain in Syria? I have no idea, but the first thing that has to be answered is "to achieve what". If it's to block Iran gaining ascendency in the region, there's a serious discussion to be had there. To say that it's not the US's fight is to ignore the fact that when a whole region is controlled by an organisation that is against you they have the capability to fuck you up, regardless of where you are in the world. Is that a risk you want to take? Again, its a serious discussion that needs to be had because there are credible positions either way, it's not black and white. Why is the battle in Syria largely about Iran? It's largely geopolitical - Iran is allied with Hezbollah in Lebanon and has a big hand of control in Iraq, thanks to the disaster of the US invasion. Should Iran gain control in Syria (by resting Assad's survival on the presence of Al-Quds Brigade and Hezbollah), Iran will then control territory from the Persian Gulf to the Mediteranian, cutting a "Shia arc" across the Middle East. If you're a Sunni, a Jew or any other that the Iranians threaten, this is an existential crisis. This is an excellent piece that explains the religious affiliations between the Alawi and Shia and goes into detail how that transfers onto a map and becomes geopolitical. This article here also talks about Iranian geographical interests but details how and where that support has occurred - although it's very dated and goes back to early in the current unrest. There is another layer on this in that Assad has Russia as an ally and Russia and Iran are only friends of convenience. Russia has a base at Tartus, which is its only warm water port in the Mediterranean. But should Assad's survival only rest on Russian supprt, the Syrian government will support Russian interests over Iranian interests. Therefore, Iran also competes with Russia to be the #1 ally of Syria. This article details how Russia and IRan compete, where there have been many clashes on the ground between Russian backed forces and Iranian backed forces, competition to influence appointments in the military/militia and the competition to control strategic assets such as ports and airports. So when you consider the US pullout, you have to place it into a full context, not just the immediate situation on the ground. Has the US deployment to Syria been a success? Largely no, partly yes. It failed spectacularly to remove Assad and to curb Iranian influence. Indeed, it provided an opportunity for Russia to display to its allies that when Russia says it will support you, it will support you to the end. Where as the US has just shown that if you ally with the US in combat, you risk being fucked over. This is a major fail and countries like Korea, Japan, Philippines, India etc. are all taking note as they watch China expand in the Indo-Pacific. One of the biggest problems is that the US has to choose an ally and stick with it. This piece here that I posted in another thread goes into detail how the US can get trapped between allies and end up damaging its reputatioin with all involved, it's a good and short read, give it a go. The US deployment in Syria/Iraq partly succeeded as it destroyed the ISIS caliphate. However, it has not destroyed ISIS and the fight does go on. I've listed up the page numerous people who operate in the region, who work in the region and who have worked on the M/E all their professional careers who say that ISIS is still a threat and if we take our eye off the ball they will reconstitute from a scattered organisation back into a serious and coherent force. The fight is not over, at all. ISIS is still a threat and I will reinforce that fact in this thread as time goes on by posting evidence. Good times!
  8. Hahaha, holy shit, semantics? @MercerISIS is dead, the fight is over. @Everyone else: ISIS is not dead, we will keep fighting them. HA, where have I argued that the US should stay in Syria? And now I want to continuously blow up and kill brown people. All because I pointed out that you were wrong when you said that ISIS is dead and the fight is long over. You sure don't like being called on your bullshit, do you? RIP sane discussion. .
  9. Oh get over yourself dude, I was clearly just having a laugh. Stop taking yourself so seriously and lighten up a touch. BTW, it's not trolling, it's posting qualified analysis from credible sources. .
  10. But, just when you thought it was safe to get out of the forever wars....... Trump’s Needlessly Dangerous Saudi Arabia Deployment https://www.cato.org/blog/trumps-needlessly-dangerous-saudi-arabia-deployment The Trump administration has approved the deployment to Saudi Arabia of Air Force F-15s, new air defense systems, and other military hardware, along with U.S. troops to operate and maintain those weapons systems. These new measures the Pentagon announced on October 11 will bring the total U.S. troop deployment to the kingdom to 3,000 since a mid-September attack on Saudi oil facilities. Speaking to reporters after the announcement, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said that it is now “clear that Iranians are responsible” for the attacks and warned that Washington has additional units “on alert” that can provide increased security to both the U.S. forces and Saudi Arabia “if necessary.” U.S. leaders have taken an unsavory step deepening Washington’s support of an odious, duplicitous Saudi regime that brutalizes its own people and has committed an appalling array of war crimes in Yemen. It also puts the United States in the middle of an escalating political and military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The direct confrontation between Riyadh and Tehran is merely one component of a larger struggle for regional dominance pitting major Sunni powers against a loose alliance of Shia factions led by Iran. Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain are other arenas in which that power struggle continues to be waged. The administration’s decision to elevate the U.S. military role in Saudi Arabia is all the more bizarre and indefensible in light of President Trump’s repeated condemnations of the Iraq War and other U.S. Middle East entanglements. In defending his recent decision to withdraw U.S. forces from northern Syria, the president stated bluntly that “it is time for us to get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars, many of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home.” Trump is correct, but he needs to follow his own advice throughout the region, not just in Syria. Instead, he has taken a step that boosts America’s risk exposure in an especially reckless manner. Given the animosity between Riyadh and Tehran, the ongoing Saudi-Iranian confrontation could explode into a major war at any time. With the administration’s latest decision, U.S. military personnel are on the front lines between those feuding powers, acting as a tripwire. The new deployment could endanger America in another way. Many devout Muslims regard a U.S. military presences on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia—the location of the sacred sites of Mecca and Medina—as an insult to their faith. Indeed, Osama Bin Laden cited the stationing of U.S. troops in the kingdom following the Persian Gulf War as a key reason why he ordered the 9-11 attacks. Other jihadi zealots likely hold similar views, increasing the risk to the American homeland of another revenge attack. Trump’s policy, therefore, is unwise on multiple levels. Critics of his decision to move U.S. troops out of harm’s way in northern Syria and begin a complete withdrawal from that country implicitly want to keep America in a forever war. Unfortunately, even as he makes a prudent move on the Syria front, President Trump may be initiating another, even more dangerous, forever war entangling the United States in Saudi Arabia.
  11. @Mercer@misteraven@abrasivesaint@Fist 666 Posting in here as nobody wants full articles in the political memes thread. So, I'd reckon that this article below properly articulates what @Mercer's politically illiterate ass could not. Posting here to assist the poor lad in putting a coherent argument together. Keep trying kid, you...., might get there one day 🧐 America’s Ill‐Fated Syria Intervention: The Lessons Washington Must Learn By Christopher A. Preble and Doug Bandow This article appeared on National Interest (Online) on October 15, 2019. https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/americas-ill-fated-syria-intervention-lessons-washington-must-learn News that Turkey had sent its military into northeast Syria, after receiving a tacit green light from President Trump, marked a grim low point in U.S. involvement in the lengthy, multisided Syrian civil war. The fate of Kurdish forces who battled ISIS and civilians sheltered in refugee camps have generated understandable concern. But there has been too little reflection on how we arrived at this unhappy place. Americans should learn from the experience and pledge to avoid similar debacles in the future. The many problems with U.S. intervention in Syria began with an extraordinarily ambitious, and ultimately irreconcilable, set of goals. U.S. officials wanted to take advantage of the Arab Spring reform movements that erupted in early 2011 to oust Bashar al-Assad's regime, while also thwarting Russian and Iranian ambitions in Syria and beyond. Both the Obama and Trump administrations relied on some violent extremists to defeat other radical groups, especially the Islamic State, which sought to establish its so-called Caliphate. Supporting regime change in Damascus undercut efforts to counter ISIS. Moreover, as ISIS gained strength, the United States enlisted the help of—and armed—Kurdish fighters, which contradicted promises to NATO ally Turkey. Particularly worrisome to Ankara was U.S. support for fighters associated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Marxist-Leninist organization which the U.S. government still lists as a terrorist organization. In other words, successive administrations adopted policies toward a new and informal partner which conflicted with the long-held security concerns of a treaty ally of nearly sixty-eight years. In recent months, President Donald Trump has reiterated his desire to withdraw all U.S. forces from Syria and hinted that he might give in to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s demand that the United States withdraw support from the Kurds along Turkey’s border. In both cases Trump encountered fierce resistance from within his administration and throughout the Washington foreign-policy establishment, and he retreated from that pressure. The White House’s latest announcement suggests that he still wants to wash his hands of the entire Syria imbroglio. Policymakers should commit U.S. forces to wage war only when vital interests are stake, the mission is clear, and the objectives are attainable. The Syrian escapade never met any of these criteria. The ensuing bipartisan inside-the-Beltway furor was entirely predictable. Reflexive Republican hawks, such as Rep. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Liz Cheney (R-WY), and even on-again, off-again Trump supporters like Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), blasted the president’s decision. Leading Democrats got in their digs, too. Sen. Bernie Sanders called Trump’s decision “extremely irresponsible” and predicted it was “likely to result in more suffering and instability.” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi denounced the president for betraying the Kurds and “deserting an ally in a foolish attempt to appease an authoritarian strongman.” Such opposition seems partly rooted in revulsion at Trump’s utter disregard for the effect that his decision is likely to have on millions of people—including, in this case, Kurds who fought alongside U.S. forces in the region. But this decision is little different than many others that he has issued as president. Trump appears unable or unwilling to consider others’ well-being. Reince Priebus, Trump’s first White House chief of staff, observed that “the president has zero psy­chological ability to recognize empathy or pity in any way.” An anonymous senior administration official noted “the president’s amorality ... he is not moored to any discernible first principles.” Trump's hamfistedness may also make more difficult a military withdrawal that is not only justified but inevitable. Bashar al-Assad survived eight years of civil war, and, with the aid of Moscow and Tehran, has consolidated control over much, though not all, of Syrian territory. A small U.S. presence cannot force Assad to yield, ensure free elections, limit Russian influence, oust Iranian forces, prevent an Islamic State revival, or protect the Kurds. And yet too many in Washington hope that it can. A renewed commitment and additional resources, including troops, money, and diplomats, would struggle to deliver on even a few of these goals, but there is no appetite for such an undertaking. Americans outside of Washington oppose yet another open-ended mission in the Greater Middle East. Moreover, the U.S. mission in Syria does not advance a vital U.S. national-security objective; the threat from ISIS has always been overblown, and claims that a few hundred—or even a few thousand—U.S. ground troops are all that stand between the group and a global resurgence defy all logic. The Islamic State challenged every government in the region, and was ultimately thwarted: it beggars belief that Iraq, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and multiple Gulf States cannot deal with the radical remnant. After all, ISIS and other violent extremists pose a greater threat to them than to the United States. Even more unrealistic is the notion that the United States can transform the Syrian political order, or that a few thousand troops give us much leverage over the process. Assad survived his moment of greatest peril and Washington cannot force Iran and Russia to abandon him now. More to the point, the United States survived much of the Cold War with a hostile Syria allied with a globe-straddling Soviet Union. A much-weakened Assad is more liability than asset for Vladimir Putin's Russia. Washington should be reducing its permanent overseas presence and expecting local forces to secure their own interests. Going forward, U.S. officials should choose allies more carefully and drop former friends when circumstances change. Additionally, NATO needs a process for expelling members no longer committed to the alliance's common purpose. In any case, the United States should avoid making conflicting commitments to multiple allies. Even more important, Washington should choose its fights more carefully. Not every problem is America's to solve, and not every problem can be solved by U.S. military power. Policymakers should commit U.S. forces to wage war only when vital interests are stake, the mission is clear, and the objectives are attainable. The Syrian escapade never met any of these criteria. Alas, it likely will take more than a couple of Trump tweets to cure the U.S. government of its interventionist addiction.
  12. The front page of every mainstream Australian newspaper today (granted, there's not a lot of diversity in ownership of Australian print media anymore....):
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