the.crooked

this thread

back to subject at hand whatcha got on phenomenology for this case. go.

" but personally calling me "pretentious" is the funniest thing I ever heard... if you even knew me, lol... but majoring in philoshphy? bad idea " Your right, I don't know you. You didnt particularly say you disagree. You said that you found what i wrote "irrelevant." I think the connotation was there. And then you say specifically, "I think most people don't get what im saying because..." If that isn't a dismissal of our ability to understand what your saying then what is it? I am cool with just lettin all this go. But please don't forget to be respectful.

I'd like to get in on this. shape up for a trade with anyone.

dirk nowitzki or however its spelled...

Look dick. I didn't start this thread. It was spam for a gallery opening. I hijacked it and posted a rediculous paper I wrote for a class. I didn't expect anyone to read it. Thus the reason I left it unformatted and without the referrences. Yes, I do understand phenomenology. I was responding to a specific prompt within a class. So fuck off with your pretension. People like you are the reason most people think philosophy is for elitists buffants. I moved into this area from a very different position, and the most contention I've had with it is avoiding the preconceptions people have about me as a philosophy major. I do this stuff because I enjoy it. As for your response to the relevance of what I said because I ignored phenomenology: I am sorry I didn't include the references to the paper I didn't expect anyone to read. Let me give them to you. van Frassen, Bas C. "Constructive Empiricism." The Scientific Image. 1980. Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Theodore Schick. McGraw Hill 1999. Hacking, Ian. "Experimentation and Scientific Realism." Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Theodore Schick. McGraw Hill. 1999 Churchland, Paul. "The Anti-Realist Epistemology of van Frassen's The Scientific Image." Readings in the Philosophy of Science. McGraw Hill. 1999 I answer this way because there is a specific argument as to the dismissal of positivism, instrumentalism and phenomenalism within the arguments discussed in the articles. Read it and fuck off. The reason I didn't name you in that list is cus I have no idea who you are. Not that these people know me personally or I them. But at least I have had some report with them on here. I can only speak to the knowledge of which I have about anyone one person. So, you wanna validate why I should take you seriously? Stop being so fucking pretensious and discuss things. There are very smart people on this board other than yourself, if you in fact are. Do not discredit nor disrespect them by supposing that we do not understand you.

i cant believe you read that unformatted. wow. im propping you for that. i have to say symbols. if there was anyone i expected to read this. it would have been you, mams or fermentor. i wanna say thanks to for yall's input when i decided to switch from physics to philsophy. It gave me a lot to thank about. It was before the board switch. i was shape. dont know if ya remember.. ILL come back and state some other things since this is actually gonna be a real thread. ill explain the whole role of the observer much more when i return

i refer you all to the thread i hijacked in which i posted my paper about the confirmation of unobservable entities in science. THeory confirmation. just as symbols is talking. even if we have some faith within our beliefs, at least we fucking work for it.

Re: POWER IN NUMBERS SHOW: All artwork for $100 i dare someone to read that...

Re: POWER IN NUMBERS SHOW: All artwork for $100 well im gonna hijack this thread. heres the paper i just wrote for a philosophy of science class. Within the debates of scientific realism and anti-realism lies a specific argument about entities that are either observable or unobservable. Ban C. Van Frassen argues from his anti-realist position that the only entities which a person can correctly believe in are those that are observable (Churchland 278). Others like Paul Churchland and Ian Hacking contend that it is just as possible to believe in unobservable entities as observable ones (Churchland, Hacking). While Van Frassen is very convincing in his argument for anti-realism, that the belief of entities outside of our observable realm are either not to be believed in or are not real is disheartening to me. I, like Hacking, feel that by the use of unobservable entities as a tool within experimentation coupled with a process of experimental prior grounding, we can bring validity to the belief in unobservable entities. We would be best served with an explanation of Van Frassen’s position if I am to adequately argue against it. Van Frassen first splits the anti-realist camp into two kinds. The first believes that science may aim to be true while not necessitating a literal construal of its theories. Just as with the first, the second position within anti-realism supposes that science seeks to give theories which are true, but that their account of the world is to be taken literally (Frassen 267). Also specific to the second kind is that the theories mentioned “need not be true to be good” (Frassen 267). Van Frassen claims a position of the second form. In so much as we are to understand the use of the word ‘literal,’ Van Frassen suggests that we look to theology for an accepted use of the term. More specifically that the word can be understood by the difference in interpretation of the bible by fundamentalists and liberal theologians. The former representing the literal construal of the bible, while the latter maintained “allegorical, metaphorical, and analogical interpretations” (Frassen 267). To be taken literally then, should be seen as concrete and substantive rather than mutative. However, the concrete nature of a literal construal does not necessitate only a realist perspective on the implications of that construal. This follows from the idea that a having a literal construal affects “our understanding of what a theory says,” but not the reason we make theories nor “the epistemic attitude” which we put towards those theories (Frassen 268). It follows then, that while we may literally understand a scientific theory, we are not required to believe it is true, or that the entities discussed within are real (Frassen 268). We are now able to discuss the actual position of Van Frassen. He calls this stance ‘constructive empiricism’ (Frassen 268). Van Frassen explains that as an empirical position it entails that: Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate (Frassen 268). It follows that it is necessary to understand what it is for a theory to be empirically adequate. As to what it is to be empirically adequate, Van Frassen states that “a theory is empirically adequate if what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true” (Frassen 2680). As an empirical position, it mandates that those things in the theory that must be true are only those statements about what is in the observable realm. For an empiricist believes that the only things which science and our experience can speak about are exactly those things which we experience, ala the skepticism of Hume et al. Thus we find that should there be a statement about unobservables in a theory; they need not be deemed true or false so long as the implications from that statement, about what is observable, are true. Here we see the content of the disagreement between scientific realists and Van Frassen’s constructive empiricism. Namely that the realists believe what is said in a theory about both observables and unobservables is true. Also true of empirical adequacy, is that there should be within it at least one model which contains all phenomena, or it “saves the phenomena” (Frassen 268). That means there should be at least one model of the world which could be derived from said theory that accounts for all the events and entities within the world. It follows that should the aim of the theories be this idea of empirical adequacy, then any model derived from theories which are constructed with that aim in mind will reflect that aim. As such any empirically adequate statement will imply such as model as discussed or else it would not be an empirically adequate statement to begin with. Naturally, one would be curious then, what is the distinction between what is observable within a theory, and what is unobservable. Van Frassen again splits the issue; this time into that of observable/unobservable entities & phenomena vs. theoretical/nontheoretical language (Frassen 269). Van Frassen and Churchland both agree on the pervasiveness of theoretical terms within all language and as such, I have no complaints. For if one pursues a reduction of terms within language to only those which are not theoretical, you find yourself doing so until you are left with no terms at all (Frassen 269). What one is left with then, is to establish what the distinction between unobservable and observable entities are. To that end, Van Frassen makes the quick distinction of what it is to be an observable thing. As he puts it; “the term ‘observable’ classifies putative entities (entities which may or may not exist)” (Frassen 270). That is to say such things as a talking monkey is observable in the respect that we know a talking monkey does not exist, for we have not seen one and we could directly observe it(Frassen 270). Conversely our concept of any number is not an observable thing. This seems a correlate to Kant’s discussion of a posteriori and a priori knowledge. Namely that those things that are observable are a posteriori and those things that are unobservable are a priori. Frassen is sure to note a connection between human acts and these entities being discussed. For an unrestricted and unaided human perception is an observation, where as something such as extrapolating the temperature of something by calculating its mean kinetic energy is not an observation of its temperature (Frassen 270). Next, Frassen presents us with a general form by which to state those things that are observable to us: X is observable if there are circumstances such that, if X is present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it (Frassen 270). Van Frassen is providing that those things which are observable may not always be observable by circumstance, and as such there is also a converse circumstance by which such an entity is in fact observable. That I may not see the sun during a lunar eclipse does not mean it is not observable for once the moon moves, the sun is once again observable. We are then left with the question of how do we decide at which point an entity is no longer observable but “only detectable in some more roundabout way” (Frassen 270)? This is in reference to Maxwell’s continuum of varying observational degrees (Frassen 270). Frassen answers this question by concluding that the term ‘observable’ is in and of itself a ‘vague predicate’ (Frassen 270). A quick parallel to an argument for the morality of incest is used to show how in the case of vagueness a distinction can not be drawn. However, Frassen answers with a counter case to that of direct observation as to show that there is in fact an opposite to it. More specifically, he posits the phenomena of a charged particle passing through a cloud chamber. The disturbance in the cloud chamber of the passing of the particle is indicative of its affect on the environment contained within the chamber, but is not an observation of the existence of that particle. It merely reflects that there was some disturbance within the chamber by some unobservable thing (Frassen 271). Let me summarize to this point in the argument. Van Frassen’s constructive empiricism provides an alternative perspective to the realist position within the evaluation of science. Within that is the belief that theories only entail their validity by that which is observable within a theory, thus they meet a criterion of empirical adequacy. It is this empirical adequacy that causes an issue to be had with the realists from Van Frassen’s perspective. For the realist would not have the validity of their claims be contained within only the realm of the observable, but encompass both that of observable and unobservable phenomena. Ian Hacking is one of these realists, and he presents a view which is in direct contention with that of Van Frassen, but also offers a means to verify those claims. On the surface, his argument is for the validation of experimentation as supportive of realism, and that the use of unobservable entities as a tool within experimentation to learn about other unobservables is indicative of the reality of that unobservable entity. I will discuss each part separately. Hacking makes his first move in establishing that experimentation has a role in the discussions of realism and anti-realism. Entities which are unobservable in principle are still regularly used within the context of experimentation as more than tools of thought, but tools of practice (Hacking 280). Here he uses this to split the issue of realism into that of realism about theories, and realism about entities. For, in the case of experiments only a belief in entity realism is needed (Hacking 280). He makes this distinction as to separate his argument from the shaky ground of realism in regard to theories and models. Hacking supposes that the act and aim of experimentation as inducing phenomena is directly tied to the belief in the entities used to do so (Hacking 281). That experimenters use entities which are in principle observable and unobservable without discriminating as to the reality of the two shows their dedication to entity realism. This is true in so much as the act of experimentation loses validity if the means of experimentation do not exist. Hacking contends that there is validity in experimentation as most of its phenomenological results are later translated into technology (Hacking 281). If there is validity within experimentation, then there must also somewhere lay validity within the belief that the entities used within such, observable or otherwise, are also real. Hacking makes a small argument as to the linguistic aspect of this discussion. Specifically he speaks to the ambiguity with the terms designating the entities themselves. He relies upon Putnam’s position that while we may always have some subjective disparity in the actual interpretation of term which describes an entity, we are all referring to the same entity (Hacking 282). This ends up being the case because what is shared between our different interpretations of the term is enough to elicit a common understanding of what is meant when one invokes such a term. Also, that different sets of theories which may on the surface not deal with the same entities, do so in the actual content of their respective theories (Hacking 282). The difference between descriptions of the electron by Thomson comparative to that of the electron discussed by Stern and Gerlach does not really matter because, at the heart of it, they are both discussing the shared concept of an ‘electron’ (Hacking 282). Next is Hackings consideration of why interference into the natural world is important in this situation. As experimentation is just that, an unnatural situation caused by manipulation of natural factors, then the relation of experimentation to this discussion is also that of interference(Hacking 283). In so much as this is affected by unobservables, Hacking states that we are “convinced of the reality of entities” by virtue of the use of their “causal properties” to “interfere elsewhere in nature” (Hacking 283). That is to say by the use of a set of theories around an entity to create another experiment, we are necessarily believing that those entities exist, or that their causal properties are true. Hacking gets to the point when he states that we know that macroscopic objects are real “because of what we do with them, what we do to them and what they do to us” (Hacking 283). This provides the base for his future arguments. If we know such observable things exist in the world because of our personal interaction with them, then it follows that that same form of interaction should be a viable means to establish the reality of such unobservable entities. Hacking then posits that it is our use and utility of unobservable things within experimentation that allows us to believe that those unobservable things do exist (Hacking 283). So far we have established that validity within experimentation is tied to the belief that the entities used within an experiment exist. Also that interference as the principle of experimentation is the means through which we come to believe in entities. And finally that experimentation as a form of interference is parallel to our interactions with observable macroscopic entities. This is all a set up for his specific example of experimentation that necessitates the existence of the entities contained within. Perhaps a quick review of the disparity between Hacking and Van Frassen is in order. Namely that Van Frassen feels that those entities which Hacking is trying to validate, can not be so. For Van Frassen, it is only the implication of those experiments on what is in fact observable that matters. However, if Hacking were to provide a base unto which to validate belief in unobservable entities, Van Frassen would be forced to give that there is more to the acceptance of theory within science than his focus on empirical adequacy. Let us now see whether or not Hacking can accomplish that goal. He starts his argument by acknowledging that “even if experimenters are realists about entities, it does not follow that they are right” (Hacking 283). Indeed the burden lies on Hacking to produce such an argument otherwise. He also gives that even within experimenters there are typically those that believe “neutral bosons as merely hypothetical entities, while electrons are real” (Hacking 283). Why the distinction? How can we validate any unobservables existence, if even within the context of experimentation there is no standard as to which entities we are to be realists about? The answer, he contends, lies in that : There are an enormous number of ways to make instruments that rely on the causal properties of electrons in order to produce desired effects of unsurpassed precision (Hacking 283). That is to say that we can use the exhibited properties of what we call electrons to build instruments that will interfere with natural world in a predicted and given manner. This is the foundation of Hackings argument against anti-realism. Let it not be confused that this process does not confirm the reality of electrons from that we infer their existence with the successful completion of the experiment. But that confirmation lies in that we construct “new kinds of devices that use various well understood causal properties of electrons to interfere in other more hypothetical parts of nature” (Hacking 283). To that end he gives the specific experimental example of Peggy II. I would refer the reader to Hacking for a full explication of the science contained within the experiment, but I will summarize it here. Specifically, Peggy II is an apparatus designed to study weak neutral currents. An explanation as to what weak neutral currents are is not needed for they are not being considered as a candidate for being validated, but is merely the concept which the experiment is set out to gain empirical information about. To continue, the actual apparatus is a particle gun which shoots polarized light at a crystal, which in turn emits polarized electrons. These electrons are then checked for their respective direction of polarization, right or left. Beyond that, the rest of the experiment “requires other devices and detectors of comparable ingenuity” Hacking (284). What the results of the experiment produced was the first empirical evidence “of parity violation within weak neutral current interactions” (Hacking 285). The success of the experiment does not imply then that electrons do exist. However, it is that the experiment ran at all, that does so. For, the creation of phenomena through manipulation of what we understand to be electrons, is where the distinction lies. The realist in regard to entities does not believe in their existence because “the save phenomena. On the contrary, we believe in them because they create new phenomena” (Hacking 284). Such is the case with this experiment, that through the causal relations of electrons the phenomena of “parity violation in weak neutral current interactions.” Finally the argument against Van Frassen stands. I would like to further the argument, however. While Hacking shows how we may come to believe in the existence of unobservables through their experimental utility, I think that another argument presents itself. As an empiricist, Van Frassen may ask Hacking to what end we can experimentally substantiate some of these causal properties we speak of about electrons. I contend that there are a multitude of experiments which do so. More specifically there is one that not only helped further the claims of Hacking, but also shows a direct role of the observer on such unobservable entities. The double slit experiment was executed to learn about the interference patterns of particles and how that expresses wave-particle duality. Simply stated, the experiment consists of light or a beam of electrons being shot at an interface that has two open slots by which the particles may pass through. After the particles pass through they expressed rather curious tendencies. Namely that the patterns were not that of a single source, particles, but that of an interference patter, waves. The results reflected the assumption that unobservable particles such as photons and electrons may act within what we call wave particle duality. This experiment was derived one step further for the uses of quantum mechanics, and it is in this derivation that we find the importance of the experiment. At the quantum level consideration of wave particle duality is expressed by many different interpretations and theories, but is all predicated upon the general implications of this one experiment. Modify the initial double slit experiment so that there is some sort of direct observational tool at the point of interface between the slits and the particles. This tool can either be a human eye, or some other means by which we are to ‘witness’ the passing of these particles through the barrier. What we end up finding is that the act of ‘observing the passing of the particles through the barrier’ causes some action to happen in which no longer do we see an interference pattern on the observing screen, but that it acts as if it had not been from a point source. This has had major implications within quantum theory. Namely that the role of the observer has a direct impact on the reality within which the particles exist and act. I am not claiming that the theories proposed pre and post experimentation are necessarily correct by virtue of the experiment. To me, what is of real interest is what this small change in experimental procedure from the initial set up implies about what is being ‘observed.’ The determinable and repeatable outcome of not producing an interference pattern by merely observing at a point in the experiment, indicates to me, that something is being observed. Perhaps not in respect of a sense organ such as the eye, but in so much as we see an effect of our observation on something. For while we do not directly observe the passing of the particle through the slit, we witness that our attempt to do so impacted the experiment in a determinable fashion. Even if that thing which was affected by the act of observation is unobservable, it necessitates that something was indeed affected. And as such there is perhaps some validity to believe that those things which are directly unobservable can be said to be ‘observed’ by our affect on them. This is also continuous with Hacking’s claim that we come to know even those things which are observable by our interactions with them. This is true in so much as the interaction of the observer to the ‘unobservable wave/particles’ parallels our interactions with macroscopic observable things. While the effect of the observer in this experiment lies entirely within the ambiguity of that which is unobservable and that which isn’t, it at least shows that that ambiguity can also provide solutions to the problem of verifying the existence of unobservable entities. While Van Frassen’s constructive empiricist stance is quite welcoming to science and its theories, it does not bode well for the part of experimentation. As experimentation is seemingly more and more the act of science, it would follow that some reconciliation is needed. Hacking offers that in the form of being a realist about entities within experimentation and by providing a guideline by which to establish when unobservable are candidates for existence. Supportive of Hacking’s claims are previous experiments that when considered, seem to imply that the vagueness inherit to the observable/unobservable distinction offers the solution to the problem of confirming unobservable entities’ existence. As for the ontological importance that each of these positions hold, I feel that the realist position taken by Hacking and myself presents the more interesting implications for science, and as such seeks to further the aim of science more than that of its anti-realist counterpart. The limitations of truth to observables by Van Frassen’s notion of empirical adequacy seem to imply that one of the most basic means through which we conduct science, experimentation, is not geared towards truth at all. I think most within the scientific community, including myself, would first look for an option that would reconcile that expression of science rather than exclude it. And if we can find such substantial positions that do allow for that reconciliation, as that of Hacking and myself, then I will choose that.

Re: American Tranny will end soon.... maybe its just me, but people have been on top of their game with the witty replies lately. Id like to thank, swedish erotica, CACash, lens, Smart, Mar and a few other for this recent trend. also when you consider the trade deficite, we are so fucked. hey look at that. jim kramer just told me to buy qaulcom... i think i will... BOOYA

Re: the nature of the creator of the heavens and earth ^haha. Dawood, dude, I respect your position in here and from time been one of the few trying to support your position, but I think smart is right. Umm I have a couple responses. First to Smart. I think you misrepresented a couple of the asian philosophies. Not by purpose but just general misconception Specifically, Taoism is a very hard thing to understand when translated into english. One of the unfortunate by products of having a non ideographic language is that we are force to the reduction of concepts into specific parts and terms such as subject/predicate form. However languages which express entire concepts with a given context and connotation in the form of a single character are much better suited to express the concepts contained within their respective philosophies. As such things like Taoism are treated with a general apathy for the content contained within their texts are usualy misinterpreted by the person not reading it in its original form. However the basic structure of Taoism is much like the diest ethical position maintained by that of Spinoza. The way, or Tao, is expressed in the seminal text Tao Te Ching as a set of statements of which seem completely ludicrous upon first examination. But when compared to the thought puzzles called Koans within Buddhism, a sneaking similarity is noticed. The comparitive expressions of what the Tao is and is not is formulated to instil and intuited interpretation of the tao. For one of the main tenets of Taoism is that one can not know the way by consideration of it, but by allowing the Tao to act through them. The reason I related it to Spinoza is that human action within Taoism is governed by allowing oneself to not full assess the conditions one is in within their life and to act without human consideration. This is reminiscent of Spinoza in that as our lives are the continual and ephemeral acting out of God's infinite essense, so is the action of allowing the way to work through you. Thus one arrives at mostly the same moral standard between them, act as you will in so much as you are not governed in that desicion by the human limitations posed to your perception. Next you spoke of confucianism. Confucianism was a reaction to Taoism in so much as many people felt there were certain obligations one is expected to fulfill in ones life. Where as Taoism obviously leaves room to act as one may without giving credence to anyone else. Confucianism is much more an explication of what it is to be a citizen. Speaking of Morals, the ideal man within confucianism is expected to reflect all that is righteous in the world through his fulfillment of the obligations layed down with its doctrine. Namely that of the importance of family, and then civic duty. I would venture to say that Confucianism is not a religion but a theological exploration into the ethics of Taoism. Next is Bhuddism. Now your ascription of Bhuddism is only one form of such. Many schools of bhuddism do not believe that the attainment of enlightenment is possible. While the original doctrine of bhuddism is geared towards the removal of ones self from samsara (the process of rebirth), contemporary and practiced buddhism has been transformed more towards its philosophical perspective on the world rather than its religious ascriptions to the many dieties that existed within its Indian incarnation. I personally think that the best version of Buddhism within which to find its main ideas is Zen Buddhism. The focus on all that is within oneself to the dedication of a single act is rather elegant in its translation of its indian predecessor. Also, I would argue that the main tenet within contemporary buddhism is that of impermanence. While this was traditionally reflected in what you described as the rejection of worldly things, asceticism has long since been seen as an outdated means to enlightenment. Many felt that by starving themselves to death and by rejection of all that there was but sitting was a direct path to "enlightenment." You hit shintoism on the head though.

consumerism also breed classism and other isms. I watched ann coulter talk on msnbc today about immigration reform. I wish I could hit that woman in the face with a bat that had the word reason stamped into it. I really can't even begin to discuss the implications of everything they said... There was one very good point brought up though. Most of these people are not fucking criminals coming over here to kill and pillage, these people are following the same principles as any of our families when they initially moved here (however many generations ago that may be). The language used in this entire discussion is so fuckin alienating as to dehuminize this concept as though it almost makes it seem like the arbiting of commodities. Speaking of, if anyone wants to understand how value is ascribed to both labor and product, I refer you to our friend Carl Marx and his "fetishism of commodities." But yes, fuck people who make this an issue of labor commodity. these are people. I also love the discussions of entitlement to citizenship that are occuring. Citizinship itself is just a fucking tool used to create an arbitrary connection between the welfare of a polity and those that it represents. Not in so much as we have certain inalienable rights, but that "we need to have those rights protected by means of citizenship." blah blah blah... talkie talkie talkie. im gonna go smoke a blunt.

said he was expendable...

Re: the nature of the creator of the heavens and earth and now for a bullshit paper on kant's transcendental argument for the pervasivness and reality of space...

Re: the nature of the creator of the heavens and earth no worries on the paper, just finished it. 13 pages of complete and udder bullshit on the verification of unobservable entities within experimentation. back to morality. I guess this again comes down to our fundamental difference in perception of man. I dont see man as any different from animal except in our ability to reason. But, I do not think that differentiates us as the reason we are here or in so much as that ability to reason is just another sense organ. As to your question of what then is moral. I felt that we had already established that any distinction of what it is to be moral is arbitrary and subjective. However, I do not think that the establishment of morality is contained within religion. I think the distinctions that we create for morality, at their very base are just guidelines for survival within social settings. When I said self control as well as morality are only known via interaction, I mean that they are dialectic in nature. Control is only expressed over something. We have self control in so much as we have free will and can decide to do what we want, but self control as far as morality is only seen in so much as the decision (free will) to act according to those moral guidelines we have created. While I recognize that morality at this point is steeped within historical context, I feel one an extrapolate from that a general idea of Morality. Not so much the specific guidelines set down in each religion or whatever, but more to the concept of morals as a whole.

Re: the nature of the creator of the heavens and earth morality and ethics as i see them, are the set of guidelines which determine social interaction, for morality has no meaning in a solitary sense. I only know that which is moral by virtue of my interaction with others. And your absolutely right in your assesment of all those things being animal in nature. But i also contend that morality is but an offshoot of those instincts. Everything we do, is in regards to continue to eat, to continue to sleep, to continue to fuck. Soo, anything that would further that exploit, e.g. morals, are not particularly above animal instinct even if they are a reflection of the rationality of man. I ask you what is self control? again, it is only in relation to other people. These are but guidelines intuited to assure a standard form of communication on a very very basic level. I'm not talking ten commandments. I mean i know in my head that if I attack you, you will retalliate. Thus as to prevent such an attack from you, I will not attack you, and expect on some instictive level that you will understand the same thing. This is what I meant when I say that morals and ethics are just intuited guidelines. And that they are intuited causes the subjectiveness from which we contemporarily discuss them. It fits with even your descriptive of their subjective nature (I refer you to your previous post of finding the concept of Criminality interesting). I think the reason you find this stuff fascinating is that perhaps you intuit there is something beyond the religious ascription your giving them. Morality if it is necessitated by religion, is pretty rediculous and arbitrary then. Anywho... back to my paper.

tittays. umm no. im sorta with you symbols as far as the cynicism is concerned. While I mostly look to understand whats going on in the world as just a means to maneuver easily through it, i can't help but be upset at what is happening. Even though I dont agree with our friend here's plan to fight the system with the painting of explicit anti-administration/materialism/etc. messages, I do see the validity in personal change. Not so much in that it creates an outward efficacy about the events of the world, but that if I and others who are of a similar mindset are merely aware of these goings on, then by virtue of being aware of such things, I am combating those seemingly harmful ideologies. I suppose its more so a rationalization of apathy towards action while maintaining an ideological stance contentious to the current one.

homeboy popped up on crossfire with a quickness.

Re: the nature of the creator of the heavens and earth i still think you are missing what smart and I are saying. morals are a natural reaction to the animalistic need to acquire and retain resources. be it out of fear or some other modal predecessor, it is not that morality needs religion to maintain itself. it would seem to me to be quite the contrary. remove morals from religion and what do you have? also I dont think that the golden rule is specifically derived from that passage in the torah. I think if anything it shows it as a universally understood perception of humanity. That there are qualifying statements like that in most religions suggests that credit shouldnt be given to them, but unto humanity itself as the cause of morality.

viacom, turner, newscorp, etc. there are like six of them

sure as hell wont. DoD is one shady ass place as of late. Also, as towards the loose change statement. Watch both. There are two loose change films.

yeah. and now his decision to allow full oversight? my ass. public pacification...

Re: the nature of the creator of the heavens and earth smart and mar- as far as economic construals of morality are concerned I saw a very interesting presentation last year. It was having to do with game theory and altruism. Basically a friend of mine set up an experiment that allowed on person to decide how much money to give themselves and another person. They had the full ability to make it whatever split they want. But, If they gave themselves more, they were up for "review" If they gave themselves less than, they could immediately take the money. The review aspect was that for ever situation that was given where a person took more than, the decision was reviewed by another person, whom seeing only the decision to take more than decided whether to let it occur or to redistribute the wealth as they saw fit, among the initial two players and then themselves. All of this was blind of course. What he ended up finding was that more often then naught the choice was that altruism is rewarded and in fact is predicated by another altruistic act. That is to say those that chose to take more than, were punished in so much as the people reviewing either took all their wealth away and gave it to the other person, or took most of it for themselves. Where as those that took less than, their situations were also reviewed, but in almost every case, the third entrant into the equation would either subtract the difference from the higher value and put that to himself as to make it "even." Thus we find that altruism is rewarded and acts as a sort of causal base towards another act of altruism. So, what that says to me. Which is in slight contention with what Smart says, as this experiment is a derivation of the ones used in the economic studies he is discussing, is that it supports what I originally said about ethics as a means of protecting resources. While fear of not having those resources does necessitate the developement of ethics, it does not govern them.

have any of you people even attempted to listen to what i posted?