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Guest BROWNer

will iran be next?

this is from late last year, a war game conducted by the atlantic monthly featuring

david kay, military strategists etcetry..

 

how iran will fight back

a sobering look at how washinton is cornering iran and how it may react.

 

the coming wars

the recent shitstorm instigated by veteran investigative reporter seymour hersh,

who reports that bush authorized covert commando ops inside iran and up to 10 other

countries.

 

israel's perspective

 

 

if you come across any interesting articles on iran, please post up..

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I was waiting for this thread.

 

the news last night zoomed in on Bush's statement about the best thing for freedom...is to spread it.

 

so I'd say without a doubt numbnuts is planning on further extending our already stretched thin military resources. I'd be willing to bet that Iran will be the next target. Apparently he has already given the ok for covert ops there.

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special ops in iran and or syria are bound to happen and terribly likely to fail.

 

seriously kids, wasn't this kind of a no-brainer?

he's had this in his head since the axis of evil speech and that was three fucking years ago.

 

 

bets on starting date for Official Third World War?

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Guest BROWNer

"so what does everyone want to do about it?

im open for suggestions... "

 

am i the only one that can never quote people properly?

m.i., check those articles.....

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Guest imported_Tesseract

All you have to do is hit the 'quote' button on the lower right of the post to be quoted. It will then turn red like its turned on, activated or some other HUD shit. After that just hit the reply button and it gets embedded in your post.

 

Now, Iran huh? i'm feeling really sick and hatefull at the moment

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This will be a seven part series for those interested in continuity....

 

First: Overview

 

Overview

Armed Forces Structure

Paramilitary Forces

Opposition Forces

Budget

Issues and Notes

Plans and Programs

 

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Islamic Republic of Iran is bordered to the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, to the west by Pakistan and Afghanistan, to the north by Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to the west by Turkey and Iraq.

 

Iran became the focus of American anti-terrorism efforts after U.S. President George Bush included it, along with North Korea and Iraq, in an "axis of evil," during his January 2002 State of the Union speech.

 

The U.S. State Dept. has named Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, saying that Tehran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to plan and execute terrorist attacks around the world and support terrorist groups.

 

The Iranian government has been a long-time supporter of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah and several Palestinian groups -- including Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC -- providing them with funding, safe haven, training and weapons.

 

Regional boundary disputes troubled Iran's relations with its neighbors. Diplomatic relations were reestablished with Iraq in 1990, but both nations were unable to finalize agreements on many of the issues from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), including border demarcation, prisoners of war repatriation and freedom of navigation and sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab waterway.

 

Adding to the instability of the Persian Gulf region has been Iran's conventional military buildup and ongoing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development programs.

 

In December 2000, Russia and Iran agreed to launch a new long-term program of political and military co-operation. This bilateral agreement includes military-technical co-operation (including the 2002 development of Iran's first nuclear reactor -- a cause of great concern for the United States and countries in the region), consultations on mutual security threats such as terrorism and drug smuggling, as well as exchanges of service personnel, including the training of Iranian military officers in Russian academies.

 

Iran criticized the U.S. attack on Afghanistan following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, but stayed neutral during Operation Enduring Freedom. However, Tehran was no doubt pleased to see the Taliban out of power. Iran had opposed the Taliban and armed the Northern Alliance during the Afghan civil war.

 

Iran stayed neutral during Operation Iraqi Freedom in March and April 2003. However, the U.S. accused Iran of sending its agents to interfere in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. It remains unclear how Iran may have influenced outspoken Shi'ite clerics Ayat Allah Al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr and the 2004 Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq.

 

During 2003, concerns from the international community, led by the United States, prompted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to call for immediate inspections of suspected atomic weapons programs in Bushehr, the site of the country's nuclear reactor, and throughout the country. While this round of inspections turned up no evidence of an underground nuclear program, the IAEA rebuked Iran in June 2004 for not fully cooperating with their investigation.

 

In August 2004, reported Iranian threats of a preemptive strike against missile sites in Israel was cause for great concern in the West and symbolized the hostility and uncertainty in the region. Tehran later said the threat had been misquoted.

 

DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

The constitution of 1979, drafted after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi, established a Supreme Defense Council (SDC) to govern all Iranian defense matters. The council consists of the President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, which contains the three regular armed forces commanders. The Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) commander and the commander of the Basij (volunteer militia) are also members of the council.

 

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the Faqih, supervises the Supreme Defense Council. The Faqih names two representatives to sit on the council.

 

The position of armed forces commander-in-chief (C-in-C) (Wali Faqih) is also technically assigned to the Faqih under the 1979 constitution. In 1980, the Faqih delegated the title to the office of the President, with the Faqih retaining supervisory privileges. In 1989, however, the post was returned to the Faqih.

 

ARMED FORCES

The regular armed forces include the army, air force and the navy, including a naval infantry/marine corps.

 

For additional information on the individual services, see separate database entries for Iran

 

Ground Forces

Air Force

Navy/Marines

Special Operations Forces (Revolutionary Guard Corps)

 

CONSCRIPTION

Service in the regular military is by conscription. The period of conscription is 21 months for all services, including the Pasdaran.

 

The army is the only service to maintain an active reserve. Reservists form battalion-sized units known as "qods" during time of war.

 

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The armed forces currently number 540,000 personnel, of which roughly 220,000 are conscripts.

 

 

Paramilitary Forces

The paramilitary order forces, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Army of 2 Million" or the "Mobilization of the Oppressed," are under the operational control of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran). The two main paramilitary forces are the Basij (volunteer militia) and various law enforcement forces under the Ministry of Interior.

 

Ministry of the Interior

The 40,000-strong Ministry of Interior security forces is available to be mobilized for military action if required. In peacetime, interior land and naval border guard units are under the operational control of the Ministry of Interior where they carry out law enforcement in rural areas and in towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Equipment reported to be in use with the interior forces includes:

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 AIRCRAFT

24 # # Cessna 185 utility

5 # # Cessna 310L utility

3 # N/A Commander 690A utility

170 40 24 AB205/206 JetRanger helicopters

 

SHIPS

90 90 90 coastal patrol craft

40 40 40 harbor patrol craft

 

 

Opposition Forces

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO)

The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), also known as the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), includes the National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK) and the Muslim Iranian Student's Society (a front organization used to garner financial support). College-educated children of Iranian merchants founded MEK in 1965. Its ideology, a mixture of Islam and Marxism, emphasizes the need for social change within Iran.

 

Iran carried out strikes against MKO strongholds throughout the 1990s, forcing the MKO leadership into self-imposed exile in France.

 

In late April 2003, the U.S. concluded a cease-fire agreement with the MKO in Iraq, despite the fact that the group is listed under the State Dept. list of foreign terrorist organizations. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. will allow the MKO to keep its arms, stay in Iraq and continue to fight. The agreement drew sharp criticism from Tehran.

 

The Peshmerga

The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was founded after World War II, as a splinter of an Association for the Resurrection of Kurdistan the party was practically liquidated when a Kurdish rebellion was crushed in 1966-67. It was reinstituted after 1973, when Abd ar-Rahman Qasemlu was elected as the party's secretary-general. The KDPI is the largest and best organized of the Kurdish opposition groups, and seeks autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. It operates from its bases in Iraq against the Islamic regime.

 

Babak Khoramdin Organization (BKO)

Comprised of 100 active and retired army officers, the Babak Khoramdin Organization (BKO) seeks to reverse the fundamentalist stance adopted by the government following the fall of the Shah in 1979. The BKO has been implicated in several notable attacks including the bombing of the home of Ayatollah Khamenei and the assassination of a senior state security official.

 

 

Budget

Defense Budget for FY03: $4.2 billion

 

 

Issues

Iranian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Programs

Chemical Weapons

Despite being a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran has reportedly developed and stockpiled a large arsenal of chemical weapons (CWs) -- including nerve, blood, choking and blister agents -- as well as their delivery systems.

 

Iran began producing chemical weapons in response to Iraqi CW attacks during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Recognizing its inability to respond effectively to Baghdad, Tehran began placing a high priority on CW programs in the early 1990s. This culminated in the building of the country's major CW production facility at Damghan, 186 miles east of Tehran.

 

The U.S. government believes Iran is able to produce as much as 1,000 tons of weapons-grade chemicals a year; including sulfur-mustard, phosgene and cyanide agents. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) maintains that Iran has mastered shell and bomb delivery systems and may be producing CW warheads for its short- and medium-range missiles.

 

Iranian officials claim the CW program was abandoned after the Iran-Iraq War.

Biological Weapons

The Iran-Iraq war was also the catalyst for Iran's biological weapons (BW) program. Tehran is thought to be in the advanced research and development stage, and Western intelligence officials speculate that Iran will have the capabilities to deploy BW weapons in the near term.

 

The Iranian government has qualified personnel as well as the needed military and commercial infrastructure to produce basic BW agents. In 2001, FAS reported that Tehran had built a BW production facility close to its Damghan labs.

 

The U.S. government believes that Iran has started to produce small quantities of mycotoxins , ricin and smallpox , according to a report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

 

While Iran is thought to have only small quantities of weaponized BW agents at the present time, FAS researchers believe Iran could effectively deliver large amounts of biological agents by 2009.

 

Iran denies having a biological weapons program and has ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention of 1973.

Nuclear Weapons Programs

In April 2003, the U.S. called on the international community to stop all trade in nuclear material with Iran. Washington urged the 187 members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare that Iran violated IAEA regulations when it secretly built two nuclear facilities. The IAEA directive states that signatories to the NPT must declare the existence of nuclear facilities before construction.

 

In February 2003, President Mohammad Khatami said that Iran had plans to mine uranium near Yazd. In addition, plants would be built in Isfahan and Kashan to extract uranium composites.

 

While the CIA and other Western intelligence sources do not believe Iran has the capability to launch a nuclear attack now, they think gaining such ability is just a matter of time.

 

Iran is currently receiving Russian support on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. The resulting expertise and technology, as well as the establishment of contacts and commercial channels, could be used to supplement the country's nuclear weapons program, according to analysts at the Dept. of Energy.

 

Iran is also pursuing turnkey facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that would ostensibly provide fuel support for the Bushehr power plant. However, such facilities could also be used to produce fissile material needed for nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Research Facilities (reported)

Bonab (80 km (50 miles) south of Tabriz)

 

Work on the new "Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center" was completed in 1996. Official Iranian sources claim research at this site will be used for agricultural purposes only. Reports of a nuclear reactor being built at Bonab in a concrete bunker with Chinese assistance have not been confirmed.

 

Bushehr

The Bushehr nuclear research facility originally contained two incomplete Siemens 1,250-MWe nuclear reactors built by the Germans in the 1970s. Both reactors, only 75 percent complete when the project was abandoned in 1979, were heavily damaged by Iraqi bombers during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). According to reports, the reactor core areas of Unit 1 and Unit 2 were completely destroyed in the attacks. In January 1995, Russia and Iran signed an $800 million contract calling for completion of Unit 1 by 1999 and Unit 2 one to two years later. Two Russian-built VVER-1000 reactors will replace the destroyed reactors. Construction of two new N-213-type VVER-440 Mwe reactors (Units 3 and 4) at an adjacent site is under consideration. By mid-2002, 600 Russian specialists were working at Bushehr alongside hundreds of Russian-trained Iranian technicians.. The sprawling 6th Fighter Base, home to two squadrons of F-4 and F-7 fighter aircraft, is located north of the Bushehr facility. Bushehr is also the site of Iran's "Nuclear Energy College."

 

In December 2002, the Russian Atomic Energy Agency said it had manufactured 180 fuel rods for the first reactor unit.

 

As of April 2003, the Bushehr facility was not yet operational; however, Russia increased its presence at the facility in 2001 and assists in facility management. Russia also agreed to provide $30 million worth of nuclear fuel every year from 2001 through 2011.

 

Darkhovin (also known as Karun, Ahvaz, Esteghlal)

The Darkhovin facility contains two Chinese-designed 300-MWe Qinshan-type reactors sold to Iran in April 1993. Technical difficulties and increased international pressure on China to cancel the project has delayed construction of the two reactors. The Darkhovin site is said to be under the operational control of Pasdaran. The two 300-MW reactors were to be built by the Chinese at Darkhovin and be operational in the 2002-2003 timeframe, but the deal has been on hold since 1995.

 

Esteghlal (near Bushehr)

Two Chinese-designed Qinshan-type 300-MWe reactors are scheduled to become operational at this site by 2005. Construction began in September 1992 following the signing of a $1.2 billion contract with China.

 

Isfahan (GEMA Energy Center, University of Isfahan )

This facility contains a small 27-kW Chinese-built miniature neutron source reactor, electromagnetic isotope separator and "desk-top-sized" calutron. Construction of the underground facility began in late 1991 and was reportedly completed with Chinese assistance in March 1994. A related site near Isfahan reportedly houses a Chinese-built "nuclear starter device."

 

The center now has a total of four small research reactors. A deal with the Chinese to build a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan was suspected to be part of Iran's nuclear weapons program, because Iran's civilian reactor at Bushehr does not require the uranium product that would be derived from the conversion plant.

 

Karaj

The Karaj Agricultural Medical and Research Center houses a Chinese-built calutron and 30-MWe Belgian-supplied Ion Beam Application cyclotron. The cyclotron was completed in January 1995.

 

Tehran (Amirabad - Nuclear Research Center at Tehran University)

The single U.S.-supplied 5-megawatt thermal (MWt) research reactor on site is being replaced by an Argentine-built design. Construction is reportedly still underway.

 

The research center is considered to be the center of Iran's plutonium reprocessing efforts.

 

Saghand, Yazd Province

A uranium mine and processing facility is located in Saghand, Yadz Province. High-grade uranium ore deposits at this site exceed 5,000 tons. Five mining sites are under development with seven additional sites under consideration. A yellowcake uranium plant also is located at Saghand. Smaller uranium deposits are located near Isfahan and in Azerbaijan, Khorasan and Sistan-va-Baluchestan.

 

Ballistic Missile Programs

Iran has advanced capability in the area of ballistic missile production. According to the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge, Mass., Tehran's missile program includes copies of the Russian-made Scud (Shahab 2 in Iranian service) and North Korean No-dong (Shahab 3 ). Iran has also imported the Chinese M-7 solid-fuel missile, with a 93-mile range.

 

Moreover, as noted in a report on foreign-missile development produced for the Central Intelligence Agency, Iran is also developing the Shahab 4 and Shahab 5, based on the North Korea's Taepo-dong missile.

 

 

Plans and Programs

See separate ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, and SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES entries for additional information.

 

LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004

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Air Force

Armed Forces Structure

Equipment

Deployment

Plans and Programs

 

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Iranian air force is organized into the following:

 

 

7 fighter squadrons

9 fighter/ground attack squadrons

1 tanker/transport squadrons

5 transport squadrons

1 reconnaissance detachment

1 training wing

1 maritime reconnaissance unit

1 helicopter unit

 

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The air force has some 52,000 personnel, including a 15,000-man air-defenseforce.

 

 

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms. Equipment is of U.S. origin unless otherwise noted.)

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 AIRCRAFT

 

Bombers

# # # H-6D (China) (Russian Tu-16 Beagle**)

# # # Tu-22M Backfire (Russia)

 

Fighters/Ground Attack

66 65 65 F-4D/-E Phantom attack

60 60 60 F-5E Tiger II fighter

25 25 25 F-14A Tomcat fighter

25 25 24 Shenyang F-7M Airguard attack/training

(Chinese J-7)

5 5 N/A FT-7 fighter (Chinese JJ-7 Mongol)

24 # 24 F-7 fighter (China) (Russian MiG-19 Farmer)

# 12 N/A MiG-23BN Flogger** attack (Russia)

# # # MiG-27 Flogger** attack (Russia)

30 25 25 MiG-29 Fulcrum** fighter (Russia) (incl.

impounded Iraqi aircraft)

# # # MiG-31 Foxhound (Russia) (unconfirmed)

# # # Su-20 Fitter** attack (Russia)

# # # Su-22M Fitter** attack (Russia)

24 # 30 Su-24MK Fencer** (Russia)

7 5 7 Su-25 Frogfoot attack (Russia) (former Iraqi

aircraft)

# # # Falcon 50 ASuW (w/Exocet) (France)

# 24 24 Mirage F1EQ (France)

 

Reconnaissance

15 6 6 RF-4E Phantom tactical

1 1 1 Il-76 Adnan AEW (Russia)

5 5 5 C-130H-MP (Maritime Patrol)

 

Transports

10 # 10 B707-3J9C (Boeing 707)

1 3 3 B707-3J9C tanker

7 5 4 B747F-131/-2J9F (Boeing 747)

1 1 1 B727-81 VIP transport (Boeing 727)

18 18 18 C-130E/-H Hercules

15 10 10 F27 Mk 400M Troopship/600 Friendship

(Netherlands)

# # 3 Turbo Commander 681B liaison

1 2 2 Jetstar II VIP transport

4 1 1 Falcon 20F VIP transport (France)

# # # Il-76MD Candid (Russia) (former Iraqi

aircraft)

# # 11 Xi'an Y7/Y7H/Y12 (China)

 

Trainers

# 20 20 F-5F Tiger II

26 20 20 F-33A/C Bonanza

7 7 7 T-33A Shooting Star

5 5 15 MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Russia)

25 15 15 EMB312 Tucano (Brazil)

35 40 40 PC7 Turbo Trainer (Switzerland)

25 22 22 MFI-17 Mushshak (Pakistan)

# # # FC-6 Farmer (China J-6)

2 # # Rockwell Commander 112/114

6 4 4 Socata TB200 Tobago XL (France)

6 8 8 Socata TB21 Trinidad TC (France)

 

Helicopters

2 2 2 AB206A JetRanger utility (OH-58A Kiowa)

17 # N/A AB212 transport (UH-1N Twin Huey) (Italy)

39 30 30 AB214B/C Super Transporter SAR

5 2 N/A CH-47C Chinook heavy cargo

# # N/A AS-61A4 VIP transport (UH-3)

12 30+ 32 Mi-17 (Russia)

17 # N/A BK-117 A-3 (Germany/Japan)

 

MISSILES

Surface-to-Air

100 100 150 MIM-23 HAWK (U.S.)

15 15 15 Tigercat (U.K.) (many non-operational)

60 45 # HQ-2J (Red Flag 2) launchers (Chinese SA-2)

45 30 30 Towed Rapier launchers (w/Blindfire radar)

(U.K.)

10 10 10 SA-5 Gammon** (Russian S-200 Angara)

25 # # SA-6 Gainful** (Russian 2K12 Kub)

(unconfirmed)

# # # SA-10 Grumble** (Russian S-300P)

(unconfirmed)

# # # SA-11 Gadfly** (Russian 9K37 Buk 1M)

(unconfirmed)

# # # SA-15 Gauntlet** (Russian Tor)

(unconfirmed)

# # # CPMIEC FM-80 Launchers (Chinese)

# # # Bofors RBS 70 Low-altitude SAM (Sweden)

4 4 # Hongqi-2/2B (CSA-1) Launchers w/ 45+

missiles(Chinese)

 

Air-to-Air

# # # MIM-23 HAWK (U.S.) (modified for air-to-air

role)

# # # AIM-54 Phoenix

# # # AIM-9 Sidewinder

# # # AIM-7 Sparrow

# # # AA-8 Aphid ** (Russian K-60)

# # # AA-10 Alamo ** (Russian R-27)

# # # AA-11 Archer ** (Russian R-73)

# # # PL-2 (China)

# # # PL-7 (China)

 

Air-to-Surface

# # # AS-10 Karen ** (Russian Kh-25)

# # # AS-11 Kilter ** (Russian Kh-58)

# # # AS-14 Kedge ** (Russian Kh-29)

# # # AGM-65A Maverick (U.S.)

 

ARTILLERY

Anti-Aircraft

# # # 57-mm SZ-60 towed (Hungary)

20 20 # 40-mm M1 towed (U.S.)

# # # 40-mm L/70 towed (Sweden)

# # # 23-mm ZSU-23 twin towed (Russia)

 

**Editor's Note: Much of Iran's Western-supplied aircraft inventory is in a state of disrepair, due to the inability to secure parts as well as undertake necessary upgrades. Iran's F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft suffer from wear, and many of the aircraft's avionics are obsolete. Iran also lacks advanced air force capabilities such as beyond-visual range air-to-air combat and airborne sensors.

 

 

Deployment

The Iranian air force operates from 11 tactical air bases (TAB), most of which are located close to major urban centers. Most of the operational airbases have hardened shelters for aircraft. Operational units are assigned to the following locations:

 

 

TAB 1 Mehrabad (Tehran)

11 Fighter Squadron

(MiG-29)

14 Fighter Squadron

(Su-24)

11 Transport Squadron

(C-130)

12 Transport Squadron

(C-130)

Boeing 707, Boeing 747 squadron

Falcon, F27 squadron

 

TAB 2 Tabriz

21 Fighter Squadron

(F-5)

22 Fighter Squadron

(F-5)

23 Fighter Squadron

(MiG-29)

 

TAB 3 Hamadan

31 Recce Squadron

(RF-4E)

32 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

33 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

 

TAB 4 Dezful

41 Fighter Squadron

(F-5)

42 Fighter Squadron

(F-5)

43 Fighter Squadron

(F-5)

 

TAB 5 Birjand

51 Fighter Squadron

(F-7, FT-7)

52 Fighter Squadron

(F-7, FT-7)

53 Fighter Squadron

(F-7)

 

TAB 6 Busher

61 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

62 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

82 Fighter Detachment

(F-14)

 

 

TAB 7 Shiraz

71 Fighter Squadron

(F-5)

72 Fighter Squadron

(Su-24)

71 Helicopter Transport Squadron

(AB212, CH-47)

83 Fighter Detachment

(F-14)

71 Transport Squadron

(C-130)

72 Transport Squadron

(C-130)

73 Transport Squadron

(Il-76)

71 ASW Squadron

(P-3)

 

TAB 8 Isfahan

82 Fighter Squadron

(F-14)

F-5 squadron

Su-24 squadron

 

TAB 9 Bandar Abbas

91 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

92 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

 

TAB 10 Chah Bahar

101 Fighter Squadron

(F-4)

 

TAB 11 Aghajarin

Training Squadron

(MFI-17, F-33, EMB312, PC-7)

 

Secondary Airfields:

Abu Musa

Aghajari

Ahvaz

Bandar Abbas

Birjand

Bushehr

Chah Bahar

Dezful

Doshan-Tappeh/Tehran

Ghaleh Morghi/Tehran

Hamadan

Isfahan

Kermanshan

Kharg Island

Mashhad

Mehrabad/Tehran

Nou Shahr

Shiraz

Sirri Island

Tabriz

Zahedan

 

Air Defense Sector Bases:

Babol Sar

Bandar Abbas

Bushehr

Dezful

Hamadan

Jask

Mashhad

Shahabad Kord

 

 

Plans and Programs

Aircraft Acquisition and Modernization

The delivery of 14 Xian Y-7 transports is scheduled for completion in 2006.

 

Iran is reported to be producing a locally developed fighter aircraft called the Azarakhsh, or Lightning. The aircraft is a light fighter and ground attack plane with avionics and radar of Iranian design and some Russian components. The new Iranian-designed plane is believed to resemble the F-5.

 

Iran is developing an advanced trainer/light attack jet known as the Shafagh, reported Air Forces Monthly For January 2003. The aircraft has been designed by the Aviation University Complex. It is a subsonic aircraft composed of radar-absorbing materials that weighs about 11,000 pounds. The Shafagh is expected to enter production in 2008.

 

Iran has been negotiating with Russia over the possible procurement of the S-300 PMU-1 air defense system, Su-25 ground-attack aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters.

 

Air Defense

There are some reports that Iran is looking to modernize its Rapier and Tigercat units. Also, Iran may be producing ZSU-23-4 radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, and may have acquired between 100 and 200 Strela low-altitude SAMs.

 

LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004

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Army

Armed Forces Structure

Equipment

Deployment

Plans and Programs

 

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Iranian army is organized into:

 

 

4 corps headquarters

14 military districts

4 armored divisions, each with

3 armored brigades,

1 mechanized brigade

4-5 artillery battalions

6 infantry divisions, each with

4 infantry brigades

4-5 artillery battalions

2 commando divisions

1 airborne brigade

5 artillery groups

12 SAM missile battalions

1 independent commando brigade

1 army aviation group, with

1 light attack helicopter squadron

1 light/medium transport squadron

1 utility helicopter squadron

 

A typical armored division has from 10,000-15,000 personnel; an infantry division has about 16,000 troops.

 

Air defense forces are divided into three air-defense regions: northern, central and southern. All anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile systems are under the operational control of the army. Air force and Pasdaran units have retained some man-portable and towed surface-to-air missiles systems for base protection.

 

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Active army manpower is approximately 350,000, of which 220,000 are conscripts.

 

 

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms).

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES

Tanks

# 10 100 Zulfiqar MBT (Iran)

120 # 480 T-72M/S MBT (Russia)

75 75 75 T-62 medium (Russia)

500 500 500 T-54/T-55/T-59 medium (Russia)

# # N/A PT-76 amphibious light (Russia)

# # N/A PT-91 Tvardy MBT (Poland) (Russian T-72)

# # N/A Type 69-II MBT (China)

# # N/A Type 62 MBT (China)

140 200 200 Chieftain Mk 3/Mk 5 medium (U.K.)

# 150 150 M47M/M48A5 Patton medium (U.S.)

150 150 150 M60A1 MBT (U.S.)

80 80 80 FV010 Scorpion light (U.K.)

# # # TOWSAN Light Tank (90-mm main gun) (Iran)

 

Armored Vehicles

# # N/A BTR-40 (incl. variants) (Russia)

300 300 300 BTR-50/BTR-60 APC (incl. variants) (Russia)

# # # BTR-152 APC (incl. variants) (Russia)

300 300 350 BMP-1 mechanized infantry (Russia)

140 140 400 BMP-2 (Russia)

# # # BRDM-2 reconnaissance (Russia)

250 250 250 M113A1 APC (U.S.)

# # # M-8 Greyhound (U.S.)

# # # Ferret 80 Scout Car (U.K.)

35 35 35 EE-9 Cascavel armored car (Brazil)

# # # Half-track APC (Iran)

# # # RBY Command Cars (Israel)

# # # VEB-IFA (4 x 4) (w/DF gear)

# # # Wheeled APC (4 x 4) (Iran)

40 40 120 Boragh amphibious APC (Iran)

# # # Cobra APC (w/ZU-23-2 twin AA)

 

Artillery

Guns

30 30 30 175-mm M107 self-propelled (U.S.)

10 # 10 175-mm M1978 self-propelled (Russia)

# # # 130-mm Type 59-1 towed (China)

1,100 1,100 1,100 130-mm M46 towed (Russia)

# # # 122-mm Type 60 towed (China)

# # # 106-mm M40 anti-tank recoilless (U.S.)

# # 200 85-mm D44 FG towed (Russia)

# # # 75-mm M20 anti-tank recoilless (U.S.)

# # # 57-mm M18 anti-tank recoilless (U.S.)

# # # 89-mm (3.5-in) M20 anti-tank recoilless

(U.S.)

# # # 82-mm B-10 recoilless

# # # 107-mm B-11 recoilless

 

Howitzers

20 20 20 203-mm M115 towed (U.S.)

30 30 30 203-mm M110 self-propelled (U.S.)

# 70 70 155-mm M114A1 towed

160 180 180 155-mm M109/A1 self-propelled (U.S.)

80 120 120 155-mm GHN-45 towed (Austria)

# # N/A 155-mm G5 towed gun/howitzer (South Africa)

# 15 15 155-mm NORINCO Type WAC 21 (China)

# # # 155-mm Thunder-2 SP (Iran)

# # # 122-mm Thunder-1 SP (Iran)

100 100 100 122-mm Type 54-1 towed (China)

60 60 60 122-mm 2S1 Gvozdika SP (Russia)

400 500 500 122-mm D30 towed (Russia)

130 130 130 105-mm M101A1 towed (U.S.)

# # N/A 75-mm M116 pack towed (U.S.)

 

Air Defense Guns

20 20 30 152-mm D-20 GH (Russia)

(1,700 of the following:)

# # # 100-mm KS-19 (Russia)

# # # 85-mm KS-12 (Russia)

300 300 # 85-mm M1939 towed (Russia)

80 # # 57-mm ZSU-57-2 self-propelled (Russia)

200 200 # 57-mm S-60 towed (Russia)

# # # 40-mm L/70 towed (Sweden)

# # # 40-mm L/60 towed (Sweden)

# # # 37-mm M1939** towed (Russia)

# # # 35-mm GDF-003 Skyguard twin towed

(w/Skyguard radar) (Switzerland)

100 100 # 23-mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled

(Russia)

300 300 # 23-mm ZU-23-2 twin towed (Russia)

(incl. IRGC)

# # # 14.5-mm ZPU-2/4 (Russia)

# # # 37-mm NORINCO Type 55 LAAG (China)

 

Mortars

(5,000 of the following:)

# # # 120-mm Soltam M65 towed (Israel)

# # # 120-mm (Iran)

# # # 107-mm (4.2 in) M30 towed (U.S.)

# # # 81-mm M29 towed (U.S.)

# # # 60-mm (Iran)

# # # 60-mm M19 (U.S.)

 

Multiple Rocket Launchers

# # # 333-mm Shahin 1 (Hawk 1) towed

(Iran)(incl. IRGC)

# # # 333-mm Shahin 2 (Hawk 2) towed

(Iran)(incl. IRGC)

# # # 320-mm Oghab (Eagle) self-propelled

(Iran) (incl. IRGC)

9 9 9 240-mm Oghab (Eagle) self-propelled

(Iran) (Chinese Type 83)

100 100 100 122-mm BM-21 (Russia)

# # # 122-mm Hadid (30-round) self-propelled

(Iran)

# # 50 122-mm Hadid variant (40-round) self-

propelled (Iran)(incl. IRGC)

# # N/A 122-mm Arash self-propelled (Iran)(incl.

IRGC)

# # N/A 122-mm Noor (Light) self-propelled

(Iran)(incl. IRGC)

# # # 122-mm Type 81 (China)

# # # 122-mm Fadjr 6 minelaying rocket (Iran)

# # # 107-mm FADGR (12-round) self-propelled

(Iran) (Chinese Type 63) (incl. IRGC)

500 700 700 107-mm Haseb SP (Iran) (Chinese Type 63)

 

MISSILES

Anti-Tank

# 130 # BGM-71A TOW air-to-ground (U.S.)

# # # BGM-71A TOW (U.S.)

# # # M47 Dragon launchers (U.S.)

# # # MGM-32A ENTAC (France)

# # # AT-4 Spigot** (Russian 9K111 Fagot)

# # # AT-3 Sagger** launchers (Russian 9K11

Malyutka) (incl. some self-propelled)

# # # RPG-7V (Russia)

# # # SAGHEGH 80-mm (Iran) (improved RPG-7)

# # # RPG-22 (Russia)

# # # NAFEZ 73-mm recoilless (Iran) (based on

Russian SPG-9)

# # # Shahin 1 (Hawk) (Iran)

 

Surface-to-Surface

# 300 300 SS-1 Scud B/Scud C (Russian R-17E)

(17 launchers) (incl. IRGC)

# # # Scud Mod B variants (North Korea)

(8-15 MAZ-543 TELs)(SHAHAB-1)

# 100 # Scud Mod C variants

# # # SHAHAB-2 (extended range Scud Mod C

variant)

# # # Iran-700 (North Korean Nodong-1 SSM)

(see SHAHAB-3)

# # # FROG-7 (Russian 9K21 Luna-M)

# # # CSS-7 (Chinese DF-11/M-11)

# 175 175 CSS-8 (Chinese M-7) (30-35 launchers)

(Mushak-120, Iran-130, Nazeat-10)

# # # MGM-52 Lance (U.S.)

# # # RIM-66B Standard (U.S.) (modified for land

attack mission, fired from HAWK)

# # # SHAHAB-3 (limited operational units)

 

MRBM

# # # SHAHAB-4, SHAHAB 5 (under development;

possibly North Korean Nodong-2, Taepodong-2

derivatives)

 

Surface-to-Air

# # # FIM-92A Stinger MANPADS (U.S.)

# # # MIM-23A Hawk launchers (U.S.)

# # # MIM-23B I-Hawk (U.S.)

# # # RBS-70 (Sweden)

# # # SA-16 Gimlet** (Russian 9K310 Igla-1)

# # # SA-14 Gremlin** (Russian 9K34 Strela 3)

# # N/A SA-10 Grumble** (Russian S 300PMU Fakel)

# # # SA-7 Grail** MANPADS (Russian 9K32 Strela-2)

# # N/A SA-6 Gainful** (25 launchers)

# # N/A SA-5 Gammon** (Russian S-200 Angara

(10-15 launchers)

# # # HQ-23/2B (CSA-1) (four launchers)

# # # HN-5A MANPADS (China)

 

Army Aviation

 

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms. Equipment is of U.S. origin unless otherwise noted.)

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 AIRCRAFT

Utility/Observation

19 12 2 F27 Mk 400M Troopship / F27 Mk 600

Friendship transport (Netherlands)

7 4 4 Turbo Commander 690 liaison

# 10 10 Cessna 185A Skywagon utility (U.S. U-17)

6 6 N/A Cessna 310 liaison

# 16 N/A PC6B Turbo Porter liaison (Switzerland)

8 2 1 Dassault Falcon 20E-2 (France)

 

Helicopters

100 50 50 AH-1J Cobra attack

40 20 20 CH-47C Chinook heavy transport

9 # N/A RH-53D Sea Stallion assault (U.S.)

130 50 50 Bell 214A/C Isfahan transport/SAR

(U.S. Bell 214 Super Transporter)

12 # N/A AB212 transport (U.S. UH-1H Huey)

30 # N/A Bell 204 transport (U.S. UH-1N Huey)

# 40 40 AB205A-1 transport (U.S. UH-1H Huey)

130 10 10 AB206A/-B Jetranger scout (OH-58A Kiowa)

5 5 N/A Hughes 300C training (U.S. TH-55)

# # N/A Zafar 300 attack (modified U.S. AB206A

Jetranger)

# 25 25 Mi-8/17 transport (Russia)

# 7 7 Eurocopter Super Puma SA332 (France/Germany)

 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

# Mohajer II/III/IV

 

 

Deployment

 

 

Military Districts

Central

East Azerbaijan

Esfahan

Fars

Gilan

Ilam

Kerman

Kermanshahan

Khorasan

Khuzitan

Kordestan

Mazandaran

Persian Gulf

West Azerbaijan

 

Field Headquarters

Northern Sector Mahabad

North Central Sector Hamadan

Central Sector Dezful

Southern Sector Ahvaz

 

1st Army Headquarters Tehran

2nd Army Headquarters Esfahn

3rd Army Headquarters Shiraz

18th Armored Division Tehran

23rd Special Forces Division Tehran

28th Mechanized Division Kerman

30th Infantry Division Tehran

40th Infantry Division Hamadan

55th Airborne Division Tehran

58th Infantry Division Ahvaz

64th Infantry Division Bandar e Mah Shahr

77th Infantry Division Tabriz

81st Armored Division Qazin

84th Mechanized Division Khorramabad

88th Armored Division Ahvaz

 

Army Aviation Bases

Mashhad

Isfahan

Tehran/Mehrabad

 

Training Centers

Infantry and Armor School Shiraz

Signals School Tabriz

Missiles and Army Aviation School Isfahan

Airborne and Special Forces School Shiraz

Officers School Tehran

Ballistic Missile Testing Facility Semnan

 

Additional Army Bases

Abadan

Aghajari

Ahvaz

Bandar Abbas (garrison)

Bushehr

Chah Bahar

Dezful

Fao Peninsula (Silkworm sites)

Hamadan

Hormuz (12+ Silkworm sites)

Isfahan

Khorramshahr

Mahabad

Mashhad (garrison)

Queshm Island (Silkworm sites)

Shiraz

Tabriz (garrison)

Tehran

Zahedan

 

 

 

Plans and Programs

Ground Combat Vehicles

Mass production of the locally built Zulfiqar main battle tank for regular army and Pasdaran units continues, but the exact status of the program is not publicly known. According to Iranian officials, the tank weighs 40 tons and has a top speed of 43 mph (70 kph) over flat terrain. During test firings, the main gun did not appear to be stabilized nor do there appear to be any sighting mechanisms on the turret. Production timetables and numbers have not been made public. A domestically built tank trailer known as the "Baber 400" has been developed specifically to transport the Zulfiqar to the battlefield.

 

A large number of T-54 MBTs captured from Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) have been rebuilt and modernized using locally produced parts. Renamed the Safir-74 (Messenger-74), the modified T-54 incorporates an upgraded engine, transmission, internal fire extinguishing systems and fire control systems. According to Iranian officials, target acquisition and accuracy against mobile and static targets have been greatly improved. The Safir-74 can reportedly operate in water up to 16.4 feet (5 m) deep when fitted with special underwater equipment, and up to 4.9 feet (1.5 m) without special equipment. A number of regular army and Pasdaran units have already taken delivery of the Safir-74.

 

Helicopters

Some of the army's remaining U.S.-built RH-53Ds have been transferred from navy service and converted for use as assault helicopters. Most are reportedly attached to a special forces brigade. Several Bell 204 and AB 205A-1 helicopter units are being brought back to full strength now that spares have been acquired on the open market. Preliminary discussions have been held with Russia concerning the purchase of an undisclosed number of Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters and heavy-lift Mi-26TM helicopters.

 

**Editor's Note: For information on Iran's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, see the Issues and Notes section of the Iranian Overview.

 

LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004

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Navy

Armed Forces Structure

Equipment

Deployment

Plans and Programs

 

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The maritime forces of Iran consist of the regular navy, a naval air arm and a naval infantry force. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) or Pasdaran operates a separate naval force to reinforce the navy and marines. (See separate database entry for Iran/Special Operations Forces for additional information.)

 

The Iranian navy is organized into three operational zones: the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The Gulf Operational Zone is divided into three operational areas with headquarters at Bandar Abbas, Khorramshahr and Bushehr. The Caspian Sea and Indian Ocean Operational Zones are headquartered at Bandar Anzali and Chah Bahar, respectively. Iran's operational headquarters is at Bandar Abbas, as is its primary ship repair facility. A second operating base and ship repair facility is located at Bushehr.

 

The naval infantry/marine force consists of three battalions with approximately 2,600 active troops. Although the marines are responsible for amphibious operations, it is the Revolutionary Guard Marine Force that carries out most of the amphibious special operations.

 

Three navy brigades and one Pasdaran brigade make up Iran's extensive coastal defense anti-ship missile system. At least 12 batteries of HY-2/HY-4 Silkworm and SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile sites are operational at sites along the Strait of Hormuz and on Kharg Island.

 

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The total active strength of the Iranian navy is approximately 18,000 personnel, including the naval air arm, and 2,600 marines.

 

 

Equipment

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms.)

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 SHIPS

 

Submarines

3 3 3 TAREQ-class (Russian Kilo design)

 

Frigates

3 3 3 ALVAND-class (U.K. VOSPER Mk 5 design)

 

Patrol Boats

2 2 2 BAYANDOR-class (U.S. PF 103 design)

10 10 10 HUDONG-class missile patrol boat (China)

10 10 10 KAMAN-class missile craft (France LA

COMBATTANTE II design)

3 3 3 PARVIN-class (U.S. Improved PGM 71

design)

3 3 3 KAIVAN-class (U.S. Coast Guard Cape design)

3 # 3 ZAFAR-class

 

Patrol Craft

# # # Boghammar 12.8-m design special forces craft

# # # Boston Whaler 6.7-m design motorized

launches

11 9 # U.S. Mk III-class Marinette Marine 20-m

design

# # # U.S. 50-ft-class (Peterson Builders design)

# # # U.S. Swift Mk II-class (Peterson Builders

15-m design)

12 # # U.S. Enforcer-class (Bertram Yacht 9.5-m

design)

# # # MAHNAVI-HAMRAZ-class (Stewart Seacraft 40-ft

design)

# # # MIG-G-1900-class costal (Iran 20-m design)

# # # MIG-S-1800-class coastal (Iran 19-m design)

# # # PBI type coastal (Iran 15-m design)

3 # 3 PARVIN PCI

 

Amphibious

2 2 2 FOQUE-class landing craft (Iranian 36-m

design)

2 2 3 37-m Iranian-design landing craft (Iran)

1 2 N/A 62-m Iranian-design (Iran)

4 4 4 HENGAM-class logistic landing ship (ex-U.K.

Yarrow 92-m design)

2 2 N/A IRAN ASR-class tank landing ships (Japanese

Teraoka SY 53-m design)

3 3 3 IRAN HORMUZ 24-class LST (South Korean 73-m

Inchon design)

# 3 3 IRAN HORMUZ 21-class (Netherlands 65-m

Ravenstein design)

# 8 6 Type 412 Sea Truck utility landing craft

(U.K. Rortork 12-m design)

# 4 # BH7 WELLINGTON-class hovercraft (U.K.)

# 1 N/A YUNUS-class hovercraft (Iran)

 

Mine Countermeasure

1 1 1 SHAHROKH-class minesweeper (ex-U.S. FALCON

MSC 268-class)

1 1 2 RIAZI-class inshore minesweeper (ex-U.S.

CAPE-class)

2 1 2 292 MSC

 

Mine Laying

2 2 2 HEJAZ (LST)

 

Auxiliary

2 2 2 BANDAR ABBAS-class oiler (German 108-m

Luhring design)

2 1 1 KHARG-class replenishment oiler (U.K. OLWEN-

class design)

1 1 1 47-m Iranian-design logistics ship (Iran)

7 7 3 DELVAR-class support (Karachi SY 63-m

design)

4 2 2 KANGAN-class water tanker (Indian Mazagon

Dock 148-m design)

1 1 1 KISH training ship (German 37-m design)

1 1 1 ABNEGAR-class survey (Malahide SY 20-m

design)

12 12 12 BAKHTARAN-class tender (Damen, Gorinchem 47-

m design)

2 2 2 Ex-German design tugs

5 5 5 HAMOON-class harbor tug (Netherlands 22-m

design)

2 2 2 ARAS-class harbor tug (BV Scheepswerf K.

Damen 22-m)

 

MISSILES

Surface-to-Surface

# # # TONDAR anti-ship

# # # MM38 Exocet (France)

# # # RGM-84A Harpoon (U.S.)

# # # C801 (CSS-NX-4 Sardine) (China)

# # # C802 (CSS-NX-8 Saccade) (China)

# # # HY-1 Silkworm (SS-N-2B/C Styx)(China) (incl.

coastal batteries)

# # # HY-2 Seersucker (Chinese CSS-3)(8-10 mobile

launchers/coastal batteries)

# # # HY-4 Silkworm (China)

# # # Gabriel (Israel)

# # # Sea Killer Mk 2 (Italy)

 

Surface-to-Air

# # # Standard SM-1 MR (U.S.)

# # # SA-7 Grail** MANPADS (Russian 9K32M Strela-

2)

# # # Seacat (U.K.)

 

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

# # # 107-mm Fadgr self-propelled (Iran) (Chinese

Type 63)

# # # 107-mm Haseb self-propelled (Iran) (Chinese

Type 63)

 

Naval Aviation

 

(For additional information on the equipment listed below search Weapons/Systems/Platforms.)

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 AIRCRAFT

 

4 4 4 Turbo Commander 690 liaison (U.S.)

4 4 4 F27 Mk 400M Troopship/Mk 600 Friendship

transport (Netherlands)

1 4 3 Falcon 20E VIP transport (France)

3 5 P-3F Orion (U.S.)

5 Do-228

 

Helicopters

# # 2 AB206A-1 Jetranger liaison/training (U.S.)

# # 5 AB205A-1 transport/SAR (U.S.)

6 6 6 AB212AS ASW (U.S. UH-1)

3 3 10 SH-3D Sea King ASW (U.S. UH-3)

2 2 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion MCM/transport (U.S.)

4 Mi-171

 

 

Deployment

Iranian navy ports and facilities are located at:

 

 

Navy Headquarters Tehran

Operational Headquarters Bandar Abbas

Naval Aviation Headquarters Tehran

1st Naval District Tehran

2nd Naval District Bushehr

3rd Naval District Bandar-e-Khomeini

4th Naval District Bandar-e-Anzelli (Caspian Sea)

Coastal Defense Missile Sites:

8 SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile sites near Bandar Abbas

At least 12 Silkworm anti-ship missile sites near Bandar Abbas and

Kharg Island

Additional Bases:

Abadan (patrol craft)

Abu Musa (inshore patrol craft)

Bandar Abbas (surface ships, HY-2 Silkworm development/maintenance

facility)

Bandar-e-Anzali (Caspian Sea) (minesweepers, coastal defense

forces, training)

Bushehr (surface ships, ship repair facilities, naval aviation)

Chah Bahar (Bandar Beheshti) (submarines)

Chalus (Caspian Sea) (patrol craft)

Farsi (inshore patrol craft)

Isfahan (naval aviation)

Jask (submarines)

Kharg Island (light forces)

Mahshahr (patrol craft)

Nowhsahr (Caspian Sea) (patrol craft, naval infantry, Naval

Academy)

Shiraz (naval aviation)

Sirri (inshore patrol craft)

Tehran (naval aviation)

 

 

Plans and Programs

Iran's HUDONGs and HEUGUs are primarily operated by the Pasdaran rather than the navy. The ALVAND, HUDONG and KAMAN classes carry C-802 anti-ship missiles. The HEGUs reportedly carry the TONDAR missile, but this is probably the local version of the C-802.

 

The MOWJ, the first ship in a new-class of 1,000-ton destroyers, is reportedly under construction.

 

The navy launched the Sina 1, a new frigate missile frigate, in early 2003.

 

LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004

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Special Operation Forces

Armed Forces Structure

Equipment

Deployment

 

Armed Forces Structure

OVERVIEW

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Pasdaran Inqilab, was formed following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new regime, and to counter the influence and power of the regular military.

 

The Pasdaran consists of ground, naval and aviation troops that parallel the structure of the regular military.

 

The Pasdaran's naval wing operates largely from bases along the coastline of southern Iran and from many of the islands and oil production platforms that dot the Persian Gulf. Naval assets once under the control of the Pasdaran, including many small patrol boat and numerous coastal defense missile batteries, were transferred to or placed under joint operational control of the regular navy beginning in 1991. Many jointly controlled assets continue to be manned by Pasdaran personnel.

 

The Pasdaran's small air corps is used primarily for airfield defense. In the early 1990s, more than 100 Chinese F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft were ordered for the Pasdaran, with fewer than 10 going to the regular air forces. Most of the aircraft operated by the Pasdaran's air wing are of Chinese manufacture.

 

The Basij (also known as the Popular Mobilization Army) is under the operational control of Pasdaran, as are a number of units drawn from 175 of Iran's ancient tribes and clans.

 

A secret military organization known as the Guards Special Qods Force also is also under Pasdaran control. This force reportedly controls Iran's vast network of external terrorist activity.

 

Basij forces are organized into two regionally based commands comprising 741 Ashura (male only) light infantry battalions and 134 al- Zahra (female only) light infantry battalions of 300-350 personnel each, plus a number of local reserve battalions. Ashura and Zahra battalions are named for the day marking the death of the prophet Mohammad's grandson Hussein and the prophet Mohammad's daughter and mother of Hussein, respectively.

 

These battalions are supplemented by 2.2 million college students organized into reconnaissance and advance guard units. Most Basijis are now given regular military training. Volunteers range from 14 to 70 years of age and are usually only lightly armed.

 

In the early 1990s, the Basij was "reconstructed" with substantial grants from the federal treasury to act as a moral police force and defender of fundamentalist Islam's code of conduct. New uniforms and weapons were issued and an accelerated recruitment drive undertaken within universities and secondary schools. Beginning in early 1993, the Iranian government allotted 40 percent of available university admissions to Basij members as an incentive to join and as a reward for service.

 

U.S. officials in April 2003 accused Iranian agents in the Badr Brigades of infiltrating Basra, Karbala and Najaf to extend Tehran's influence in southern Iraq. Tehran insists that the Badr Brigades are entirely an Iraqi movement.

 

At full strength, Pasdaran comprises:

 

 

13 regional commands

2 armored divisions

5 mechanized divisions

10 infantry divisions

1 special forces division

15-20 independent brigades, incl.

special forces brigades

infantry brigades

armored brigades

parachute brigades

6 artillery groups

5 artillery/surface-to-surface missile groups

border defense brigades

aircraft units

independent infantry groups

1 marine brigade

 

 

Note: The size of these units vary greatly.

 

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The Pasdaran currently numbers approximately 125,000 personnel, including 100,000 ground forces personnel, 20,000 naval personnel and 5,000 marines. Basij forces number approximately 300,000, which can be expanded to 1 million during crises.

 

 

Equipment

The following list contains equipment operated independently of the regular army. Pasdaran forces continue to be integrated into the regular army structure and operational doctrine. The Pasdaran primarily operates equipment that is already in use with the regular armed forces. New military equipment acquisitions are in support of its mission as a coastal defense force and special operations force.

 

It is difficult to give accurate numbers on the equipment listed below, as it is most often included in the Iranian army's inventory. To avoid duplication, much of the equipment is listed "N/A," meaning that there has been no concrete figures made available to confirm the exact type and number of a given piece of equipment.

 

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms.)

 

 

APRIL02 MAY03 SEPT04 SHIPS

 

N/A N/A N/A Midget submarines (North Korea) (probably

scrapped)

40 40 40 BOGHAMMAR-type fast-attack craft (Sweden)

5 10 10 HUDONG-class missile patrol boats with C-802

SSM (China)

 

AIRCRAFT

N/A N/A N/A F-6 fighter (China J-6)

N/A N/A N/A F-7 Airguard fighter (China J-7)

N/A N/A N/A MFI-17 Mushshak trainers (Pakistan)

 

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES

N/A N/A N/A Zulfiqar MBT (Iran)

 

Note: Iran's Pasdaran operates approximately 470 tanks and 620 APCs, but

as is the case with nearly all of its equipment, these are dispersed for use

in Iran's regular army as well.

 

ARTILLERY

N/A N/A N/A 107-mm Type 63 MRL (China)

360 360 360 Artillery pieces

40 40 40 Recoilless rifles

140 140 140 Air defense guns

 

Note: All above equipment is also listed in army inventory.

 

MISSILES

Anti-Tank

N/A N/A N/A BGM-71 TOW (U.S.)

 

Surface-to-Surface

N/A N/A N/A HY-2/HY-4 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm** (China)

N/A N/A N/A Fei Lung 7 (China C801 Ying Ji 6)

N/A N/A SS-N-22 Sunburn** launchers (Ukraine)

3 Shihab-3 IRBM (Iran)

 

Surface-to-Air

N/A N/A N/A FIM-92A Stinger (U.S.)

N/A N/A N/A MIM-23 HAWK (U.S.)

N/A N/A N/A RBS70 (Sweden)

N/A N/A N/A SA-6 Guideline** launchers (Russian 2K12

Kub)

N/A N/A N/A SA-7 Grail** launchers (Russian 9K32 Strela-

2) (600 missiles)

 

 

Deployment

The Pasdaran ground and air forces are relatively mobile, operating from established military bases and at least five island bases in the Persian Gulf, including Larak (Silkworm sites), Abu Musa (Silkworm sites), Sirri, Al Farsiyah islands and the Halul oil platform. Pasdaran naval headquarters and main operating base is located at Bandar Abbas.

 

Pasdaran airbases are located in Tehran and Isfahan . Land and air defense units are concentrated for the most part in and around Tehran and the military districts adjacent to the Iraqi border.

 

Coastal defense batteries equipped with Silkworm and Sunburn anti-ship missilesare located at several sites along the length of the Strait of Hormuz.

 

Badr Brigade Camps (Iran)

Hamzah Camp (northern Iran)

Ramadan Camp (northern Iran)

Nasr Camp (Naqadeh, Iran)

Zafar Camp (Kermanshah)

 

LATEST UPDATE: 1 September 2004

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World Factbook

Summary

 

Summary

[Country map of Iran]

 

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Iran

 

Introduction

 

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Background:Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling shah was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces subsequently crushed westernizing liberal elements. Militant Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and held it until 20 January 1981. During 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq over disputed territory. Key current issues affecting the country include the pace of accepting outside modernizing influences and reconciliation between clerical control of the regime and popular government participation and wid espread demands for reform.

Geography Iran

Location:

Middle East, bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Pakistan

Geographic coordinates:

32 00 N, 53 00 E

Map references:

Middle East

Area:

total:1.648 million sq km

land:1.636 million sq km

water:12,000 sq km

Area - comparative:

slightly larger than Alaska

Land boundaries:

total: 5,440 km

border countries:Afghanistan 936 km, Armenia 35 km, Azerbaijan-proper 432 km, Azerbaijan-Naxcivan exclave 179 km, Iraq 1,458 km, Pakistan 909 km, Turkey 499 km, Turkmenistan 992 km

Coastline:

2,440 km; note - Iran also borders the Caspian Sea (740 km)

Maritime claims:

contiguous zone:24 NM

territorial sea:12 NM

continental shelf:natural prolongation

exclusive economic zone:bilateral agreements or median lines in the Persian Gulf

Climate:

mostly arid or semiarid, subtropical along Caspian coast

Terrain:

rugged, mountainous rim; high, central basin with deserts, mountains; small, discontinuous plains along both coasts

Elevation extremes:

lowest point:Caspian Sea -28 m

highest point: Kuh-e Damavand 5,671 m

Natural resources:

petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur

Land use:

arable land:10.17%

permanent crops:1.16%

other:88.67% (1998 est.)

Irrigated land:

75,620 sq km (1998 est.)

Natural hazards:

periodic droughts, floods; dust storms, sandstorms; earthquakes along western border and in the northeast

Environment - current issues:

air pollution, especially in urban areas, from vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents; deforestation; overgrazing; desertification; oil pollution in the Persian Gulf; wetland losses from drought; soil degradation (salination); inadequate supplies of potable water; wate r pollution from raw sewage and industrial waste; urbanization

Environment - international agreements:

party to:Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified:Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation

Geography - note:

strategic location on the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, which are vital maritime pathways for crude oil transport

People Iran

Population:

66,622,704 (July 2002 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years:31.6% (male 10,753,218; female 10,273,015)

15-64 years:63.7% (male 21,383,542; female 21,096,307)

65 years and over:4.7% (male 1,633,016; female 1,483,606) (2002 est.)

Population growth rate:

0.77% (2002 est.)

Birth rate:

17.54 births/1,000 population (2002 est.)

Death rate:

5.39 deaths/1,000 population (2002 est.)

Net migration rate:

-4.46 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2002 est.)

Sex ratio:

at birth:1.05 male(s)/female

under 15 years:1.05 male(s)/female

15-64 years:1.01 male(s)/female

65 years and over:1.1 male(s)/female

total population:1.03 male(s)/female (2002 est.)

Infant mortality rate:

28.07 deaths/1,000 live births (2002 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population:70.25 years

female: 71.69 years (2002 est.)

male:68.87 years

Total fertility rate:

2.01 children born/woman (2002 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

less than 0.01% (1999 est.)

HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:

NA

HIV/AIDS - deaths:

NA

Nationality:

noun:Iranian(s)

adjective:Iranian

Ethnic groups:

Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%

Religions:

Shi'a Muslim 89%, Sunni Muslim 10%, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i 1%

Languages:

Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2%

Literacy:

definition:age 15 and over can read and write

total population:72.1%

male:78.4%

female:65.8% (1994 est.)

Government Iran

Country name:

conventional long form:Islamic Republic of Iran

conventional short form:Iran

local short form:Iran

local long form:Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran

former:Persia

Government type:

theocratic republic

Capital:

Tehran

Administrative divisions:

28 provinces (ostanha, singular - ostan); Ardabil, Azarbayjan-e Gharbi, Azarbayjan-e Sharqi, Bushehr, Chahar Mahall va Bakhtiari, Esfahan, Fars, Gilan, Golestan, Hamadan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorasan, Khuzestan, Kohkiluyeh va Buyer Ahmad, Kordestan, Lorestan, Markazi, Mazandara n, Qazvin, Qom, Semnan, Sistan va Baluchestan, Tehran, Yazd, Zanjan

Independence:

1 April 1979 (Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed)

National holiday:

Republic Day, 1 April (1979)

Constitution:

2-3 December 1979; revised 1989 to expand powers of the presidency and eliminate the prime ministership

Legal system:

the Constitution codifies Islamic principles of government

Suffrage:

15 years of age; universal

Executive branch:

chief of state:Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-KHAMENEI (since 4 June 1989)

elections:leader of the Islamic Revolution appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts; president elected by popular vote for a four-year term; election last held 8 June 2001 (next to be held NA 2005)

election results:(Ali) Mohammad KHATAMI-Ardakani reelected president; percent of vote - (Ali) Mohammad KHATAMI-Ardakani 77%

cabinet:Council of Ministers selected by the president with legislative approval

head of government: President (Ali) Mohammad KHATAMI-Ardakani (since 3 August 1997); First Vice President Dr. Mohammad Reza AREF-YAZDI (since 26 August 2001)

Legislative branch:

unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami (290 seats, note - changed from 270 seats with the 18 February 2000 election; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)

elections:last held 18 February-NA April 2000 (next to be held NA 2004)

election results:percent of vote - NA%; seats by party - reformers 170, conservatives 45, and independents 10, 65 seats up for runoff; note - election on 5 May 2000 (reformers 52, conservatives 10, independents 3)

Judicial branch:

Supreme Court

Political parties and leaders:

the following organizations appeared to have achieved considerable success at elections to the sixth Majlis in early 2000: Assembly of the Followers of the Imam's Line, Freethinkers' Front, Islamic Iran Participation Front, Moderation and Development Party, Servants of Construction Party, Socie ty of Self-sacrificing Devotees

Political pressure groups and leaders:

active student groups include the pro-reform "Organization for Strengthening Unity" and "the Union of Islamic Student Societies'; groups that generally support the Islamic Republic include Ansar-e Hizballah, Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, an d the Islamic Coalition Association; opposition groups include the Liberation Movement of Iran and the Nation of Iran party; armed political groups that have been almost completely repressed by the government include Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), People's Fedayeen, Democratic Party of Irani an Kurdistan; the Society for the Defense of Freedom

International organization participation:

CCC, CP, ECO, ESCAP, FAO, G-19, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WCL, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO

Diplomatic representation in the US:

none; note - Iran has an Interests Section in the Pakistani Embassy; address: Iranian Interests Section, Pakistani Embassy, 2209 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007; telephone: [1] (202) 965-4990

Diplomatic representation from the US:

none; note - protecting power in Iran is Switzerland

Flag description:

three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red; the national emblem (a stylized representation of the word Allah in the shape of a tulip, a symbol of martyrdom) in red is centered in the white band; ALLAH AKBAR (God is Great) in white Arabic script is repeated 11 times along the bo ttom edge of the green band and 11 times along the top edge of the red band

Economy Iran

Economy - overview:

Iran's economy is a mixture of central planning, state ownership of oil and other large enterprises, village agriculture, and small-scale private trading and service ventures. President KHATAMI has continued to follow the market reform plans of former President RAFSANJANI and has indicated that he will pursue diversification of Iran's oil-reliant economy although he has made little progress toward that goal. The strong oil market in 1996 helped ease financial pressures on Iran and allowed for Tehran's timely debt service payments. Iran's financial situation tightened in 1997 and deteriora ted further in 1998 because of lower oil prices. Subsequent rises in oil prices have afforded Iran fiscal breathing room but do not solve Iran's structural economic problems, including the encouragement of foreign investment and the containment of inflation.

GDP:

purchasing power parity - $456 billion (2002 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

5% (2002 est.)

GDP - per capita:

purchasing power parity - $7,000 (2001 est.)

GDP - composition by sector:

agriculture:19%

industry:26%

services:55% (2002 est.)

Population below poverty line:

53% (1996 est.)

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%:NA%

highest 10%:NA%

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

17.3% (2002 est.)

Labor force:

18 million

note:shortage of skilled labor (1998)

Labor force - by occupation:

agriculture 30%, industry 25%, services 45% (2001 est.)

Unemployment rate:

14% (1999 est.)

Budget:

revenues:$24 billion

expenditures:$22 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (2001 est.)

Industries:

petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating, armaments

Industrial production growth rate:

5.5% excluding oil (2001 est.)

Electricity - production:

120.33 billion kWh (2000)

Electricity - production by source:

fossil fuel:94%

hydro: 6%

other:0% (2000)

nuclear:0%

Electricity - consumption:

111.907 billion kWh (2000)

Electricity - exports:

0 kWh (2000)

Electricity - imports:

0 kWh (2000)

Agriculture - products:

wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton; dairy products, wool; caviar

Exports:

$24 billion f.o.b. (2002 est.)

Exports - commodities:

petroleum 85%, carpets, fruits and nuts, iron and steel, chemicals

Exports - partners:

Japan 20.5%, Italy 7%, UAE 5.9%, France 4.7%, China 4.1% (1999)

Imports:

$19.6 billion f.o.b. (2002 est.)

Imports - commodities:

industrial raw materials and intermediate goods, capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, technical services, military supplies

Imports - partners:

Germany 11%, Italy 8.3%, China 6.1%, Japan 5.3%, UAE 5% (1999)

Debt - external:

$8.2 billion (2002 est.)

Economic aid - recipient:

$129 million (1995) (2000 est.)

Currency:

Iranian rial (IRR)

Currency code:

IRR

Exchange rates:

from 1997 to 2001, Iran had a multi-exchange-rate system; one of these rates, the official floating exchange rate, by which most essential goods were imported, averaged 1,750 rials per US dollar; in March 2002, the multi-exchange-rate system was converged into one rate at about 7,900 rials per US dollar

Fiscal year:

21 March - 20 March

Communications Iran

Telephones - main lines in use:

6.313 million (1997)

Telephones - mobile cellular:

265,000 (August 1998)

Telephone system:

general assessment:inadequate but currently being modernized and expanded with the goal of not only improving the efficiency and increasing the volume of the urban service but also bringing telephone service to several thousand villages, not presently connected

domestic:as a result of heavy investing in the telephone system since 1994, the number of long-distance channels in the microwave radio relay trunk has grown substantially; many villages have been brought into the net; the number of main lines in the urban systems has approximately d oubled; and thousands of mobile cellular subscribers are being served; moreover, the technical level of the system has been raised by the installation of thousands of digital switches

international:HF radio and microwave radio relay to Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Syria, Kuwait, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; submarine fiber-optic cable to UAE with access to Fiber-Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG); Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber-optic line runs from Azerbaijan through the northern portion of Iran to Turkmenistan with expansion to Georgia and Azerbaijan; satellite earth stations - 9 Intelsat and 4 Inmarsat; Internet service available but limited to electronic mail to promote Iranian culture

Radio broadcast stations:

AM 72, FM 5, shortwave 5 (1998)

Radios:

17 million (1997)

Television broadcast stations:

28 (plus 450 low-power repeaters) (1997)

Televisions:

4.61 million (1997)

Internet country code:

.ir

Internet Service Providers (ISPs):

8 (2000)

Internet users:

420,000 (2002)

Transportation Iran

Railways:

total:6,130 km

broad gauge:94 km 1.676-m gauge

standard gauge:6,036 km 1.435-m gauge (187 km electrified)

note:broad-gauge track is employed at the borders with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan which have broad-gauge rail systems; 41 km of the standard-gauge, electrified track is in suburban service at Tehran (2001)

Highways:

total: 140,200 km

paved:49,440 km (including 470 km of expressways)

unpaved:90,760 km (1998 est.)

Waterways:

904 km

note:the Shatt al Arab is usually navigable by maritime traffic for about 130 km; channel has been dredged to 3 m and is in use

Pipelines:

crude oil 5,900 km; petroleum products 3,900 km; natural gas 4,550 km

Ports and harbors:

Abadan (largely destroyed in fighting during 1980-88 war), Ahvaz, Bandar 'Abbas, Bandar-e Anzali, Bushehr, Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni, Bandar-e Lengeh, Bandar-e Mahshahr, Bandar-e Torkaman, Chabahar (Bandar Beheshti), Jazireh-ye Khark, Jazireh-ye Lavan, Jazireh-ye Sirri, Khorramshahr (limited opera tion since November 1992), Now Shahr

Merchant marine:

total:147 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 4,136,971 GRT/7,166,703 DWT

ships by type:bulk 48, cargo 36, chemical tanker 4, container 10, liquefied gas 1, multi-functional large-load carrier 6, petroleum tanker 30, refrigerated cargo 2, roll on/roll off 9, short-sea passenger 1 (2002 est.)

Airports:

322 (2001)

Airports - with paved runways:

total:122

over 3,047 m:39

2,438 to 3,047 m:25

914 to 1,523 m:27

under 914 m:4 (2002)

1,524 to 2,437 m:27

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total:187

under 914 m:39 (2002)

over 3,047 m:1

2,438 to 3,047 m:3

914 to 1,523 m:138

1,524 to 2,437 m:9

Heliports:

13 (2002)

Military Iran

Military branches:

Islamic Republic of Iran regular forces (includes Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force and Air Defense Command), Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) (includes Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Qods [special operations], and Basij [Popular Mobilization Army] forces), Law Enforcement Forces

Military manpower - military age:

21 years of age (2002 est.)

Military manpower - availability:

males age 15-49:18,868,571 (2002 est.)

Military manpower - fit for military service:

males age 15-49:11,192,731 (2002 est.)

Military manpower - reaching military age annually:

males: 823,041 (2002 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure:

$9.7 billion (FY00)

Military expenditures - percent of GDP:

3.1% (FY00)

Transnational Issues Iran

Disputes - international:

despite restored diplomatic relations in 1990, Iran lacks maritime boundary with Iraq and disputes land boundary, navigation channels, and other issues from eight-year war; UAE seeks United Arab League and other international support against Iran's occupation of Greater Tunb Island (called Tunb al Kubra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian by Iran) and Lesser Tunb Island (called Tunb as Sughra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian by Iran) and attempts to occupy completely a jointly administered island in the Persian Gulf (called Abu Musa in Arabic b y UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran); Iran insists on division of Caspian Sea into five equal sectors while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan have generally agreed upon equidistant seabed boundaries; Iran threatens to conduct oil exploration in Azerbaijani-claimed waters , while interdicting Azerbaijani activities

Illicit drugs:

despite substantial interdiction efforts, Iran remains a key transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin to Europe; domestic narcotics consumption remains a persistent problem and Iranian press reports estimate at least 1.8 million drug users in the country

 

This page was last updated on 19 March 2003

 

 

 

LATEST UPDATE: 1 May 2003

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State Dept. Travel Reports

Travel Advisories

Consular Information

 

Travel Advisories

 

 

May 14, 2004

 

The Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of travel to Iran and updates information about the security situation. Due to ongoing tensions in the regions, particularly along the border with Iraq, U .S. citizens may be at higher risk of harassment or kidnapping. This Warning supersedes the Travel Warning for Iran of May 12, 2003.

 

Tensions generated by the current situation in Iraq have increased the potential threat to U.S. citizens and interests abroad posed by those who oppose U.S. policy. Some elements of the Iranian government and population remain hostile to the U.S. American citizens may be subject to the possibility of harassment or kidnapping. Some areas of the country, including the Baluchistan border area near Pakistan and Afghanistan generally, are not safe for tourism. The Kurdish northwest of the country and areas near the Iraqi border are not cons idered safe either.

 

Large-scale demonstrations have taken place in various regions throughout Iran over the past several years as a result of a sometimes volatile political climate. U.S. citizens who go to Iran should exercise caution.

 

The U.S. government does not currently have diplomatic or consular relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore cannot provide protection or routine consular services to American citizens in Iran. The Swiss government, acting thr ough its Embassy in Tehran, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran. Neither U.S. passports nor visas to the United States are issued in Tehran. The Iranian Government does not recognize dual citizenship and generally does not permit the Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. c itizens who are also Iranian nationals. In addition, U.S. citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been detained and harassed by Iranian authorities. Former Muslims who have converted to other religions, as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert, a re subject to arrest and prosecution.

 

For additional information, consult the Department of State's Consular Information Sheet for Iran, the current Worldwide Caution and the Middle East and North Africa Public Announcements located at http://tra vel.state.gov. American citizens may also obtain updated information on security conditions by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the United States or Canada, or, from overseas, 317-472-2328.

 

 

Consular Information

June 28, 2004

 

 

 

COUNTRY DESCRIPTION: Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic, governed by executive and legislative branches that derive national leadership primarily through the Muslim clergy. Shia Islam is the official religion of Iran, and Islamic law is the basis of the authority of the state. The workweek in Iran is Saturday through Thursday; however, many government offices and private companies are closed on Thursdays. Friday is a public holiday for all establishments. Offices in Iran are ge nerally open to the public during the morning hours only.

 

 

 

ENTRY/EXIT REQUIREMENTS : Should you decide to travel to Iran despite the current Travel Warning, a passport and visa are required . The Iranian Interests Section of the Embassy of Pakistanis located at 2209 Wisconsin Ave. N.W, Washington, DC. 20007; tel 202-965-4990, 91, 92, 93, 94, 99, fax 202-965-1073, 202-965-4990 (Automated Fax-On-Demand after office hours). Their Internet Website is h ttp://www.daftar.org (click on "English"). U.S. passports are valid for travel to Iran. However, the authorities sometimes confiscate the U.S. passports of U.S.-Iranian dual nationals upon arrival.

 

U.S.-Iranian dual nationals have been denied permission to depa rt Iran documented as U.S. citizens. To prevent the confiscation of U.S. passports, the Department of State suggests that dual nationals leave their U.S. passports at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate overseas for safekeeping before entering Iran, and use their Iranian passports to enter the co untry. To facilitate their travel if their U.S. passports are confiscated, dual nationals may, prior to entering Iran, obtain in their Iranian passports the necessary visas for the country which they will transit on their return to the U.S., where they may apply for a new U.S. passport.

 

 

 

Alternately, dual nationals whose U.S. passports are confiscated may obtain a ôConfirmation of Nationalityö from the U.S. Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland, which is the U.S. protecting power in Iran. This statement, addressed to the relevant foreign embassies in Tehran, enables the travelers to apply for third-country visas in Tehran. Dual nationals finding themselves in this situation should note in advance that the Swiss Embassy would issue this statement only after the traveler's U.S. nationality is confirmed and after some processing delay. Dual nationals must enter and leave the United States on U.S. passports.

 

 

 

All Iranian nationals, including American-Iranian nationals, should have an exit permit stamped in their passports. The stamp is affixed to page 11 or 13 of the Iranian passport when it is issued and remains valid until the expiration date of the passport. Iranian nationals residing abroad are exempted from paying exit taxes if their stay in Iran does not exceed four months. All Iranian nationals living permanently in Iran are required to p ay the exit tax upon departing Iran.

 

 

 

Moreover, minor children (under the age of 18) of Iranian citizens must have the father's permission to depart Iran, even if the mother has been granted full custody by an Iranian court. Even the non- Iranian wife of an Iranian citizen (who obtains Iranian nationality through marriage and must convert to Islam) requires the consent of her husband to leave Iran. In case of marital problems, women in Iran are often subject to strict family controls. Because of Islamic law, compounded by the lack o f diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran can provide only very limited assistance if an American woman encounters difficulty in leaving Iran.

 

 

 

In an effort to preven t international child abduction, many governments have initiated procedures at entry/exit points. These often include requiring documentary evidence of relationship and permission for the child's travel from the parent(s) or legal guardian not present. Having such documentation on hand, even if not required, may facilitate entry/departure.

 

 

 

DUAL NATIONALITY: U.S. citizens who were born in Iran, who have become naturalized citizens of Iran, or who were at one time citizens of Iran, and the children of such persons, are considered Iranian nationals by Iranian authorities. Therefore, despite the fact that these individuals possess U.S. citizenship, they must enter and exit Iran bearing an Iranian passport. Yet some former Iranian nationals have been issued visas in their U.S. passports. Exit visas are required for non-Iranians who live permanently in Iran on an Iranian residency permit.

 

 

 

While dual nationals in Iran are subject to all Iranian laws, such individuals who possess the nationality of Iran may also be subject to othe r laws that impose special obligations on citizens of that country, such as military service or taxes. More specific information on Iranian passport and exit visa requirements may be obtained from the Iranian Interests Section of the Embassy of Pakistan.

 

 

 

Dual nationals sometimes have their U.S. passports confiscated and may be denied permission to leave Iran, or encounter other problems with Iranian authorities. Refer to the above section titled "Entry/Exit Requirements" for additional information concerning Dual Nationa lity. Likewise, Iranian authorities may deny dual nationals access to the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran, because they are considered Iranian citizens. Refer to the below section titled ôConsular Access,ö as well as the Consular Affairs home page on the Internet at http://travel.state.gov for our Dual Nationality flyer.

 

 

 

SAFETY AND SECURITY: Large-scale demonstrations have taken place in various regions throughout Iran over the past several years as a result of a somet imes volatile political climate. U.S. citizens who travel to Iran despite the Travel Warning should exercise caution throughout the country, especially in the southeastern area of the country. American citizens should avoid travel to areas bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

 

 

 

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet web site at http://travel.state.gov where the current Worldwide Caution Public Announcement, Travel Warnings and Public Announcementscan be found.

 

 

 

Up to date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S., or, for callers outside the U.S. and Canada, a regular toll line at 1-317-472-2328. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

 

 

 

Iranian security personnel may at times place foreign visitors under surveillance. Hotel rooms, telephones and fax machines may be monitored, and personal possessions in hotel rooms may be searched. Taking photographs of anything that could be perceived as being of military or security interest may lead to difficulties with authorities.

 

 

 

CRIME INFORMATION: Major crime is not a problem for travelers in Iran, although foreigners occasionally have been victims of petty street crime. To minimize the possibility of theft, passports, disembarkation cards and other i mportant valuables should be kept in hotel safes or other secure locations.

 

The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and the U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. If you are the victim of a crime whil e in Iran, in addition to reporting to local police, please contact the U.S. Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy. The staff can, for example, assist you to find appropriate medical care, to contact family members or friends and explain how funds could be transferred. Although the investigation a nd prosecution of the crime is solely the responsibility of local authorities, Swiss Embassy officers can help you to understand the local criminal justice process and to find an attorney if needed.

 

 

 

U.S. citizens may refer to the Department of State's pamphlets, A Safe Trip Abroadand Tips for Travel to the Middle East and North Africa, for ways to promote a trouble-free journey. These pamphlets are available by mail from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, via the Internet at http:// http://www.gpoaccess.gov,or via the Bureau of Consular Affairs home page at http://travel.state.gov.

 

 

 

MEDICAL FACILITIES: Basic medical care and medicines are available in the principal cities of Iran, but may not be available in outlying areas. Medical facilities do not meet U.S. standards and frequently lack medicines and suppli es.

 

 

 

MEDICAL INSURANCE: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and whether it will cover emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation. U.S. medical insurance plans seldom cover health costs incurred outside the United States unless supplemental coverage is purchased. Further, U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programs do not provide payment for medical services outside the United States. However, many travel agents and private companies offer insurance plans that will cover health care expenses incurred overseas, including emergency services such as medical evacuations.

 

 

 

When making a decision regarding health insurance, Americans should consider that many foreign doctors and hospitals require payment in cash prior to providing service and that a medical evacuation to the U.S. may cost more than $50,000. Uninsured travelers who require medical care overseas often face extreme difficulties. When consulting with your insurer prior to your trip, ascertain whether payment will be made to the overseas healthcare provider or whether you will be reimbursed later for expenses you incur. Some insurance policies also include coverage for psychiatric treatment and for disposition of remains in the event of death.

 

 

 

Useful information on medical emergencies abroad, including overseas insurance programs, is provided in the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs brochure, Medical Information for American s Traveling Abroad, available via the Bureau of Consular Affairs home page.

 

 

 

OTHER HEALTH INFORMATION: Information on vaccinations and other health precautionsmay be obtai ned from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's hotline for international travelers within the United States at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747), fax 1-888-CDC-FAXX (1-888-232-3299), or via CDC's Internet site at http://www.cdc.gov/travel.For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroadconsult the World Health Organization's website at http://www.who.int/en.Further health information for travelersis available at http://www.who. int/ith.

 

 

 

TRAFFIC SAFETY AND ROAD CONDITIONS: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below concerning Iran is pro vided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or circumstance:

 

 

 

Safety of Public Transportation: Poor

 

Urban Road Conditions/Maint enance: Poor

 

Rural Road Conditions/Maintenance: Good

 

Availability of Roadside Assistance: Poor

 

 

 

Drivers throughout Iran tend to ignore traffic lights, traffic signs and lane markers. Urban streets are not well lit. It is therefore particularly dangerous to drive at night. Sidewalks in urban areas only exist on main roads and are usually obstructed by parked cars. In the residential areas, few sidewalks exist. Drivers almost never yield to pedestrians at crosswalks. For additional general information about road safety, see the Department of State, Bureau of Consular affairs home page at http://travel.state.gov/road_safety.html.

 

 

 

AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT: As there is no direct commercial air service between Iran and the United States by local carriers at present, nor economic authority to operate such service, between the U.S. and Iran, the U.S. Fe deral Aviation Administration (FAA) has not assessed Iran's Civil Aviation Authority for compliance with international aviation safety standards. For further information, travelers may contact the U.S. Department of Transportation within the U.S. at 1-800-322-7873, or visit the FAA Internet websiteat http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/index.cfm.

 

 

 

PASSPORT SEIZURES/EXIT BANS: The Iranian Government has seized the passports and blocked the departure of foreigners involved in commercial disputes.

 

 

 

CUSTOMS REGULATIONS : Iranian customs authorities may enforce strict regulations concerning temporary importation into or export from Iran of items such as firearms, religious materials, antiquit ies, medications, business equipment, etc. However, the import or export of medications for personal consumption is allowed. It is advisable to contact the Iranian Interests Section in Washington, DC for specific information regarding customs requirements. In many countries around the world, counte rfeit and pirated goods are widely available. Transactions involving such products are illegal and bringing them back to the United States may result in forfeitures and/or fines. A current list of those countries with serious problems in th is regardcan be found at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003/special1301.htm.

 

 

 

CRIMINAL PENALTIES: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations, which sometimes differ sig nificantly from those in the United States and may not afford the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. Persons violating Iranian laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned. Fines, public floggings, and long prison terms are common. Former Muslims who have converted to other religions, as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert, are subject to arrest and possible execution. Drinking, possession of alcoholic beverages and drugs as well as flirting o r having sexual contact outside of marriage are considered to be crimes. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Iran are strict and convicted offenders can expect jail sentences and heavy fines. Iran executes many people each year on drug-related charges.

 

 

 

U.S. citizens in Iran who violate Iranian laws, including laws, which are unfamiliar to westerners (such as those regarding the proper wearing of apparel), may face penalties.

 

 

 

The Iranian Gov ernment reportedly has the names of all individuals who filed claims against Iran at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague pursuant to the 1981 Algerian Accords. In addition, the Iranian Government reportedly has compiled a list of the claimants who were awarded compensation in the Iran Claims Program administered by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. The Iranian government is allegedly targeting award-holders who travel to Iran. It is reported that upon some claimants' entry into Iran, Iranian authorities question them as to the status of payment of their respective awards with a view to recouping the award money. It is also reported that the Iranian Government has threatened to prevent U.S. claimants who visit Iran from departing the country until they make arrangements to pay part or all of their award.

 

 

 

CONSULAR ACCESS: U.S. citizens who are not dual nationals of Iran are encouraged to carry a copy of their U.S. passports with them at all times, so that if questioned by local officials, proof of identity and U.S. citizenship are readily available. Under Iranian law, dual U.S./Iranian n ationals are considered Iranian citizens, and Iranian authorities may deny them access to the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran. See also previous section on Dual Nationality.

 

 

 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: Except fo r carpets and foodstuffs, the importation of Iranian-origin goods or services into the United States is prohibited. The exportation or re-exportation of goods, technology or services directly or indirectly from the United States or by a U.S. person to Iran also are prohibited. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury, provides guidance to the public on the interpretation of the current economic sanctions. For further information, consult OFAC's Compliance Programs Division, at 202-622-2490, visit the OFAC's website at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac, or obtain information via fax at 202-622-0077. For information concerning licensing of exports, contact OFAC's Licensing Division at 202-622-2480.

 

 

 

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS: Iran is an earthquake-prone country. General information about natural disaster preparedness is available via the Internet from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)at http://www.fema.gov/.

 

 

 

CHILDREN'S ISSUES: For information on international adoption of children and international parental child abduction,please refer to our Internet site at http://travel.state.g ov/children's_issues.html or telephone Overseas Citizens Services at 1-888-407-4747. This number is available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays). Callers who are unable to use toll-free numbers, such as those calling from overseas , may obtain information and assistance during these hours by calling 1-317-472-2328.

 

 

 

REGISTRATION/U.S. INTERESTS SECTION LOCATION: There is no U.S. Embassy or Consulate in Iran. The Embassy of Switzerland serves as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran. The U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy is located at Africa Avenue, West Farzan Street, no. 59, Tehran. The local telephone numbers are 021-878-2964 and 021-879-2364, fax 021-877-3265, E-mail: vertretung@tie.rep.admin.ch. The workweek is Sunday through Thursday. Public service hours are 8:00 am û 12:00 noon. The Interests Section does not issue U.S. visas or accept visa applications. The limited consular services provided to U.S. citizens in Iran include:

 

 

 

(a) registering U.S. c itizens;

 

(b) answering inquiries concerning the welfare and whereabouts of U.S. citizens in Iran:

 

© rendering assistance in times of distress or physical danger;

 

(d) providing U.S. citizens with passport and Socia l Security card applications and other citizenship forms for approval at the U.S. Embassy in Bern, Switzerland;

 

(e) performing notarial services on the basis of accommodation; and,

 

(f) taking provisional custody of the personal effects of dece ased U.S. citizens.

 

 

 

Updated information on travel and security in Iran may be obtained from the department of state by calling 1-888-407-4747 within the United States and from overseas, 1-317-472-2328. Please also consult the department of state's latest travel warning for Iran, which may be found on the Internet at http://travel.state.gov.

 

* * *

 

 

 

This replaces the Consular Informat ion Sheet dated September 8, 2003, to update information on Dual Nationality, Safety and Security, Crime Information, Traffic Safety and Road Conditions, Aviation Safety Oversight, Customs Regulations and U.S. Government Economic Sanctions and to add a paragraph on Disaster Preparedness.

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Here's another illustration of what an idiot Bush is....

 

2001

 

Many of these agents were withdrawn late last year when Iran's Supreme National Security Council tried to show solidarity with the U.S.-led campaign against Osama bin Laden, according to Western intelligence sources cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a German daily.

 

2002

 

But relations between Washington and Tehran have gone south over the past six months, and it appears as though Iran's intelligence services are trying to re-establish their presence in the Balkans.

 

Full article***

 

special reports

 

Iran Looking To Re-establish Bosnian Presence (06/14/2002)

The driving force seems to be intelligence, not energy

 

The Iranian energy firm Petropars plans to invest in oil fields in Bosnia in the near future, the company's managing director told the Persian daily Asia June 11. The paper reported that economic delegations from Bosnia and Herzegovina had met with Petropars officials already.

 

But such an arrangement appears odd, considering the dearth of hydrocarbon deposits in Bosnia and the fact that partially state-owned Petropars participates in few, if any, overseas activities.

 

Instead, the deal appears to be a cover to allow large numbers of Iranians -- possibly intelligence agents -- to re-establish operations in the Balkans.

 

Petropars was set up in 1998 to serve as an intermediary between foreign companies and Iran's Oil Ministry in handling development work at the country's giant offshore South Pars gas field. Since 1997 it has mediated $7.5 billion in contracts between the National Iranian Oil Company and companies like Shell.

 

But Petropars has virtually no overseas projects and doesn't have a reason to be in Bosnia anyway. The country produces no oil or gas, and its underlying geology suggests few if any untapped reserves.

 

But Iran does have a history in Bosnia. Iranian intelligence agents -- known as the Pasdaran -- were stationed in Bosnia during the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Hundreds of Iranians fought with Bosnian Muslims in that time period, and Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia were credited with saving the government from collapse in April 1994 when Western weapons deliveries were blocked.

 

By November 1995, Washington made the removal of Iranian-backed foreign forces from Bosnia a central provision of the Dayton peace accords that ended the civil war. But elements remained, and the Pasdaran used Bosnia as base to support the Kosovo Liberation Army.

 

Many of these agents were withdrawn late last year when Iran's Supreme National Security Council tried to show solidarity with the U.S.-led campaign against Osama bin Laden, according to Western intelligence sources cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a German daily.

 

But relations between Washington and Tehran have gone south over the past six months, and it appears as though Iran's intelligence services are trying to re-establish their presence in the Balkans.

 

The move comes at an opportune time for them, as the United States continues to look for an opportunity to redeploy its military force from the Balkans into other more pressing areas.

 

NATO announced plans in early April to significantly reduce the number of peacekeeping troops in the Balkans beginning this summer. Various NATO sources estimate the 18,000-troop deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be shaved by one-third, Agence France-Presse reported.

 

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